Clyde James Rainey v. Mike Knowles

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, United States District Judge for**
the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLYDE JAMES RAINEY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
MIKE KNOWLES,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 08-17222
D.C. No. 4:07-cv-00678-CW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 15, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: RYMER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and PALLMEYER, District
Judge.**
Clyde James Rainey appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
FILED
JUL 06 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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2
I
The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court was not
required sua sponte to hold a competency hearing is neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. The standard applied by
the court of appeal comports with federal law. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 402 (1993); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1966). No
controlling federal law indicates that a mental deficiency, alone, suffices, nor did
Rainey’s behavior raise a bona fide doubt such that the trial court was obliged to
conduct a hearing on its own initiative. Expert testimony showed that Rainey
could think, get through life, and live and work on his own. And Rainey’s
discussion with his mother not only reveals consciousness of guilty, but confirms
Rainey’s understanding of the nature of the proceedings he faced and his ability to
help in his defense. Finally, defense counsel expressed no concern about Rainey’s
competence. This is not a controlling factor as a matter of federal law (as it is
under California state law), but it bolsters the conclusion that the trial judge was
not required to conduct a competency hearing.
II

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3
The state trial judge’s finding on habeas review that Phillip Kendrick’s
statement was not material, and thus that failure to disclose it did not violate Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is not based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts. Kendrick testified at an evidentiary hearing, gave several different
versions of the incident, and admitted he was not telling the truth. Nor was the
court’s determination an unreasonable application of Brady. See United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1985); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280
(1999). The absence of testimony as unreliable and untrustworthy as Kendrick’s
does not undermine confidence in the outcome.
The trial court’s conclusion that any attempt to prove Rainey’s confession
was false would be unavailing likewise is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, Supreme Court precedent. Rainey’s statements to his mother were
clear, spontaneous, and unqualified. His statement to the police also implicated a
gang member, which would undermine a theory that he was afraid of gang
retaliation.
AFFIRMED.

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