Carol A. Graham v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Senior United States Circuit Judge for**
the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROL A. GRAHAM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-16139
D.C. No. 4:07-cv-00541-JMR-
GEE
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John M. Roll, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 16, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: RIPPLE , RYMER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.**
Carol A. Graham appeals an adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), upholding the denial of
her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
FILED
JUN 28 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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payments. Because the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm.
Although a close case, we are persuaded that the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) gave “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the opinion of Graham’s
treating psychiatrist, Dr. S. Arnold Nelson. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830
(9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Nelson’s April 2003 opinion referred to Graham’s “ongoing
insecurity, fears, depression, [and] nightmares,” but his progress notes, which
cover ten visits over two years, made only limited references to these symptoms.
In the portions of the progress notes calling for the physician to record his
observations of the patient, Dr. Nelson reported “OK” or “unremarkable” for eight
of Graham’s ten visits.
Graham also received Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores
indicating only moderate or slight difficulty in occupational functioning. Graham
correctly points out that the GAF scores are not dispositive because they were
assessed at a time when she was not working. See Social Security Ruling 85-15
(1985) (“Individuals with mental disorders” may adopt “a highly restricted . . .
lifestyle within which they appear to function well,” but “may cease to function
effectively when facing such demands as getting to work regularly, having their
performance supervised, and remaining in the workplace for a full day.”). But the

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GAF scores are nonetheless relevant. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857
(9th Cir. 2001).
The ALJ erroneously questioned whether Dr. Nelson was a treating source,
but the error was harmless because the ALJ nonetheless applied the correct legal
standard. See Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir.2006) (“We have . . .
affirmed under the rubric of harmless error where the mistake was nonprejudicial
to the claimant or irrelevant to the ALJ’s ultimate disability conclusion.”).
AFFIRMED.

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