Ronald J. Mulder v. James Schomig

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD J. MULDER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
JAMES SCHOMIG,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 08-15477
D.C. No. 2:04-CV-00324-KJD-
GWF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 26, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Ronald J. Mulder appeals from the district court’s
judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. §2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §2253, and we affirm.
FILED
JUN 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Mulder was charged with first degree murder with use of a deadly weapon in
connection with the burning death of a friend in May 2001. Mulder entered an
Alford plea to first degree murder without use of a deadly weapon and was
sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty years. See
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). He contends that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to investigate adequately the defense of intoxication and
for failing to engage the assistance of an expert witness on intoxication. Mulder
maintains that had counsel prepared a stronger intoxication defense, Mulder would
likely have elected to stand trial rather than enter an Alford plea.
The record reveals that counsel’s efforts with respect to the intoxication
defense were reasonable and that the Nevada Supreme Court’s denial of Mulder’s
Strickland claim was, therefore, neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Furthermore, Mulder has not shown prejudice
from the alleged errors on the part of counsel because there is no reasonable
probability that he would have elected to stand trial and risk consecutive life
sentences without the possibility of parole where there was very little chance that a
trial would have resulted in a better sentence than the one he received by pleading.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The
prejudice assessment is an objective one made “without regard for the

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‘idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.’” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
AFFIRMED.

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