Barbara L. Chavez v. Gloria Henry

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BARBARA L. CHAVEZ,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
GLORIA HENRY,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 07-15290
D.C. No. 05-cv-00490-OWW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Oliver W. Wanger, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 25, 2010**
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Barbara L. Chavez appeals from the district court’s
judgment dismissing her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
FILED
JUN 18 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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07-15290 2
Chavez contends that she is entitled to statutory tolling for the time that
elapsed between the denial of her first habeas petition in the Kern County Superior
Court and the filing of her second habeas petition in the California Court of
Appeal, as well as for the time between the denial of her second habeas petition
and the filing of her third habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. This
contention lacks merit. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (petitioner not entitled to statutory tolling for gaps of 101 and
115 days between state court habeas filings).
Chavez further contends that her delay was explained and justified. This
contention fails. See Evan v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 200 (2006) (federal petition
timely only if properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral
review remained pending during relevant period); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993,
998 (9th Cir. 2009) (petitioner not entitled to equitable tolling simply because he
remained in administrative segregation and had limited access to law library and
copy machine); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (pro se
petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication by itself insufficient to warrant tolling);
Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (petitioner not entitled to
tolling for state petitions filed after federal time limitation has run).

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07-15290 3
We decline to consider Chavez’s unexhausted contentions that her delay was
reasonable because she needed additional time to develop her claims and that in
2004 she was operating under the guidance of Saffold v. Carey, 312 F.3d 1031,
1035-36 (9th Cir. 2002). See Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 694 n.9
(9th Cir. 2002).
We construe Chavez’s additional argument as a motion to expand the
certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R.
22-1(e); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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