Ross Massbaum v. Wnc Management;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for**
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
LSS/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSS MASSBAUM,
Plaintiff-counter-defendant -
Appellant,
v.
WNC MANAGEMENT; et al.,
Defendants-counter-claimants
- Appellees.
No. 08-55406
D.C. No. 8:07-cv-00096-DOC-
RNB
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 15, 2009**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Ross Massbaum appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
for defendants in his action alleging housing discrimination on the basis of race
FILED
JAN 11 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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and disability. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Fair Housing
Act claim because Massbaum failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the
defendants acted with any discriminatory intent during the events at issue, or
whether their practices disproportionately impacted any particular racial group.
See McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 505 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that a disparate treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act requires
some showing of discriminatory intent, while a disparate impact claim requires,
inter alia, showing “a significantly . . . disproportionate impact on persons of a
particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices”).
For the same reasons, summary judgment was proper on the claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335
F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of
intentional discrimination.”); De Horney v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav.
Ass’n, 879 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]o establish a § 1981 claim, the
plaintiff must prove intentional or purposeful discrimination.”).

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Summary judgment was proper on the 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim because
Massbaum did not show he is a member of a racial minority. See Phiffer v. Proud
Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980).
Summary judgment was proper on the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act claims, because Massbaum failed to raise a triable
issue as to whether defendants discriminated against him on the basis of a
disability. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d
976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
require proof of discrimination by reason of a disability).
Massbaum’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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