Lawrence E. Lupien v. Harold W. Clarke

1Ms. Denton also named John Davis, the president of her union local, but he
does not appear to have been personally served, and he did not answer the complaint.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________
No. 04-1982
___________
Sandra Fay Denton, *
*
Appellant, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the Eastern
* District of Arkansas.
Central Arkansas Transit Authority, *
originally sued as Central Arkansas * [UNPUBLISHED]
Transit; Mr. Keith Jones; John Davis, *
Local 704 Union President, *
*
Appellees. *
___________
Submitted: February 16, 2005
Filed: March 4, 2005
___________
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
___________
PER CURIAM.
Sandra Denton appeals the district court's dismissal of her employment-
discrimination suit against the Central Arkansas Transit Authority (CATA) and
CATA employee Keith Jones. 1

-- 1 of 2 --

-2-
Ms. Denton was disciplined and later terminated for sick-leave absences from
her job as a bus driver for CATA. CATA agreed to reinstate Ms. Denton if she took
and passed a Department of Transportation (DOT) physical. Although she had
previously passed a DOT physical, and this had been used as evidence that she was
abusing her sick leave, she failed the physical and was not reinstated. She then filed
the instant suit asserting that by failing to accommodate her with suitable work, and
by terminating her employment, defendants violated her rights under Title VI and VII,
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed Ms. Denton's complaint for failure to
exhaust DOT administrative remedies, citing Harris v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc.,
339 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003).
In Harris, the defendant refused to hire the plaintiff because a DOT physician
found him unfit for duty under DOT regulations. The physician's report conflicted
with a prior physician's report that had reached the opposite conclusion. Because
DOT regulations provide appeal procedures where there is disagreement between the
driver's physician and the physician for the motor carrier concerning the driver's
qualifications, we held that the plaintiff first had to exhaust his administrative
remedies. See Harris, 339 F.3d at 638. By contrast, Ms. Denton does not seek to
challenge defendants' refusal to reinstate her based on the findings of the DOT
physician; rather she challenges her earlier termination, which was a disciplinary
matter, and defendants' failure to accommodate her. Thus Harris is inapposite, and
we do not believe that Ms. Denton was required to exhaust her administrative
remedies with DOT prior to bringing this suit.
We therefore reverse and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
______________________________

-- 2 of 2 --