Eric V. Harden v. Marion County Sheriff ’ S Department

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14‐1713
ERIC V. HARDEN,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
MARION C OUNTY SHERIFF ’ S
D EPARTMENT,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 12‐cv‐581‐TWP‐TAB — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 20, 2015 — D ECIDED A UGUST 25, 2015
____________________
Before R IPPLE and R OVNER , Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY,
District Judge.
KENNELLY, District Judge. In 2012, Eric Harden sued the
Marion County Sheriff’s Department for retaliation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐
 Of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi‐
nois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 14‐1713
3(a). He alleged that the Sheriff’s Department terminated
him in retaliation for testifying on behalf of African‐
American police officers in a race discrimination investiga‐
tion. The district granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s
Department. Harden now appeals that decision. We affirm.
I.
Because we are reviewing the district court’s grant of
summary judgment against Harden, we recount the facts in
the light most favorable to him, “resolving all evidentiary
conflicts in [his] favor and according [him] the benefit of all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record.”
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 842 (7th Cir. 2012).
Harden was employed by the Marion County Sheriff’s
Department from November 1, 2008 until his termination on
December 23, 2010. He was hired to work as a building dep‐
uty and, in that capacity, provided security to the City‐
County building in Indianapolis. At least two of Harden’s
supervisors felt that he was an excellent employee. One of
his supervisors, Sgt. Ernest Worthington Todd, III, described
Harden’s “skills, training, and judgment” as “superior to
nearly all the other building deputies,” and his “demeanor
and professional bearing” as “top notch.” App. at 54. Anoth‐
er supervisor, Lt. Nathaniel Neal, said that he was “com‐
pletely satisfied with Harden’s job performance” and that
Harden “was one of my top employees.” App. at 49.
In 2010, the Sheriff’s Department’s Equal Employment
Opportunity officer, Sgt. Nancy Blair, initiated an investiga‐
tion into the alleged discriminatory treatment of African‐
American deputies. Her investigation focused on two offic‐
ers in particular: Lt. Tammy Nelson and Cpl. James Russo.

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No. 14‐1713 3
Harden, who is Caucasian and thus was not subjected to the
alleged discrimination, agreed to be interviewed for the in‐
vestigation. During his interview, Harden testified that Lt.
Nelson and Cpl. Russo treated African‐American deputies
differently from Caucasian deputies. He alleged that he had
“heard comments” that “just [don’t] seem right,” and that
“certain officers are not respected at all.” Supp. App. at 1; see
also App. at 21. He also alleged that Lt. Nelson and Cpl. Rus‐
so gave African‐American deputies less‐desirable assign‐
ments than Caucasian deputies. As a result of this investiga‐
tion, both Lt. Nelson and Cpl. Russo were demoted.
Shortly after giving this interview, Harden began to no‐
tice changes in his work schedule. Harden’s patrol time was
reduced—a change that, he alleges, was recognized as unde‐
sirable in the Sheriff’s Department. Harden was also taken
off a prestigious assignment with the mayor. When Harden
approached Cpl. Russo about the changes, Cpl. Russo re‐
plied, “It’s not me and Tammy [Nelson] fucking with you,
it’s [Deputy Chief Shirley] Challis and [Lt. Bryce] Wolfe [sic]
fucking with you.” App. at 18. He also warned Harden, “[I]n
the future you ought to be more careful with who you talk
to.” App. at 18.
In addition to the work‐schedule changes, Harden con‐
tends, Lt. Nelson, Cpl. Russo, Lt. Wolf, and Deputy Chief
Challis pressured Harden’s supervisors to cite Harden for
disciplinary infractions. According to Lt. Neal, Lt. Nelson
instructed him to “write [Harden] up for anything I could
find on him.” App. at 50. Similarly, Lt. Neal also says that
Cpl. Russo asked him “why [he] didn’t write Harden up
more often.” App. at 50. (Lt. Neal told him, “it was because
[Harden] never did anything wrong.” App. at 50.) Accord‐

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4 No. 14‐1713
ing to Lt. Neal, Lt. Wolf insisted that a complaint about
Harden’s conduct on the shooting range “go up the chain of
command” even though the shooting range instructor “did
not wish to complain on Harden.” App. at 50–51. Lt. Neal
also “did not agree with the decision to proceed with [the]
complaint and, as his supervisor, did not believe that Hard‐
en should have been disciplined” for his conduct on the
shooting range. App. at 51. In addition, Deputy Chief Challis
allegedly instructed another of Harden’s supervisors, Sgt.
Minton, to find “any reason” he could to discipline Harden.
App. at 20.
Harden eventually concluded that he was suffering retal‐
iation and contacted the EEOC. After some initial investiga‐
tion into his complaint, the EEOC retained an outside inves‐
tigator, Michelle Cooper, to whom Harden gave a statement
in September 2010. Harden testified that after he gave this
statement, the harassment ceased.
About three months later, Harden arrested a man by the
name of Victor Rybolt for neglect of a child. Upon his release
from custody, Rybolt realized that $100 was missing from
his wallet and reported the missing property to the Sheriff’s
Department. One witness to this exchange says that Rybolt
initially accused Lt. Maurice Frazier of the theft, though Ry‐
bolt himself later denied making this accusation. The follow‐
ing day, the Sheriff’s Department launched a criminal inves‐
tigation regarding the theft. When interviewed by an inves‐
tigator, Rybolt stated that he had seen Harden take an un‐
sealed property bag into a back room, where Harden would
have been alone. Harden was ultimately cleared by the crim‐
inal investigation. The Sheriff’s Department then initiated an
Internal Affairs investigation. Internal affairs investigators

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No. 14‐1713 5
concluded that Harden had, in fact, perpetrated the theft of
Rybolt’s money. Shortly thereafter, the Sheriff’s Department
terminated Harden.
Harden filed this suit in May 2012. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s De‐
partment about two years later. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Harden argues that he has presented suffi‐
cient evidence of unlawful retaliation to survive summary
judgment. He also contends that one of the district court’s
evidentiary rulings was in error. We review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
Harden. See, e.g., Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 876
(7th Cir. 2014). We review the district court’s evidentiary rul‐
ing for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Harney v. City of Chicago,
702 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 2012).
A. Evidentiary issues
We begin with the evidentiary issues raised by the Sher‐
iff’s Department. The Sheriff’s Department argues that
Harden’s response to the summary judgment motion relied
on inadmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979,
985 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A party may not rely upon inadmissible
hearsay to oppose a motion for summary judgment.”). In
particular, the Department cited Rybolt’s alleged accusation
of Lt. Frazier and statements made by various Sheriff’s De‐
partment personnel to Lt. Neal. The district court ruled that
one of these statements—Rybolt’s accusation of Lt. Frazier—
was indeed inadmissible hearsay (it did not address the oth‐
ers).

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6 No. 14‐1713
This ruling was erroneous. As Harden notes, the state‐
ment is offered to prove that the Sheriff’s Department was
aware of (and ignored) another suspect, not to prove that Lt.
Frazier was the thief. Evidence that is “used only to show
notice” is not hearsay. Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Mar‐
seilles Land & Water Co., 518 F.3d 459, 468 (7th Cir. 2008); see
also FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee’s note (“If the
significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that
it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything as‐
serted, and the statement is not hearsay.”). The ruling was
not reversible error, however, because the district court con‐
cluded—as we do—that the Sheriff’s Department is entitled
to summary judgment even if the statement is considered.
We need not address the other statements cited by the
Sheriff’s Department, namely statements that Lt. Neal says
various supervisory personnel made to him. Even if these
statements, which we summarized earlier in this decision,
are considered, they do not warrant reversal of the district
court’s decision.
B. Retaliation claim
Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees for testifying, assisting, or otherwise participating
in a race discrimination investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).
“[R]etaliation may be established by either the direct or indi‐
rect methods of proof.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 859. Harden
proceeds under both methods.
To prove retaliation under the direct method, Harden
must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) he
suffered a materially adverse employment action, and (3)
there was a causal link between his protected activity and

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No. 14‐1713 7
the adverse action. Id. To prove retaliation under the indirect
method, Harden must show that: (1) he engaged in protect‐
ed activity, (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment
action, (3) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expecta‐
tions, and (4) he was treated less favorably than similarly‐
situated employees who did not engage in protected activi‐
ty. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir.
2008). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under
the indirect method, “a presumption of [retaliation] is trig‐
gered” and the burden shifts “to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, [nonretaliatory] reason for its action.” Cole‐
man, 667 F.3d at 845 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff, who must present evidence that the stated reason is
a ‘pretext,’ which in turn permits an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” Id.
We begin with the direct method. The first two elements
are not in dispute.1 Thus, we limit our inquiry to whether
Harden has presented sufficient evidence that his protected
activity was a “substantial or motivating factor” in his ter‐
mination. Id. at 860. To do so, Harden may rely on direct ev‐
idence, “which would entail something akin to an admission
by the employer (‘I’m firing you because you had the nerve
1 Although the Sheriff’s Department concedes that Harden’s termi‐
nation was a materially adverse action, it argues that the discipline im‐
posed on Harden in the months leading up to his termination was not.
That may be true, but it is beside the point. Harden does not say that the
discipline was a materially adverse action; rather, he points to the disci‐
pline as circumstantial evidence of the Sheriff’s Department’s true moti‐
vations. The rush to discipline him for specious infractions, Harden con‐
tends, suggests that the Sheriff’s Department was motivated by retalia‐
tion.

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8 No. 14‐1713
to accuse me of sex discrimination!’).” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). He may also “present[] a ‘convincing mosa‐
ic’ of circumstantial evidence that would permit the same
inference without the employer’s admission.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). That is, even if “[n]o single piece
of evidence [ ] amount[s] to a smoking gun,” Harden may
“establish retaliation by assembling a number of pieces of
evidence none meaningful in itself, consistent with the
proposition of statistical theory that a number of observa‐
tions each of which supports a proposition only weakly can,
when taken as a whole, provide strong support if all point in
the same direction.” Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635,
647 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Harden does not have direct evidence of a causal connec‐
tion and therefore relies on circumstantial evidence to satisfy
the third element. We have recognized three categories of
circumstantial evidence: suspicious timing, ambiguous
statements, and “other bits and pieces from which an infer‐
ence of [retaliatory] intent might be drawn”; evidence that
similarly‐situated employees were treated differently; and
evidence that the employer’s stated reason for the decision
was pretext. Id. at 643–44. “[T]hese categories of evidence are
not exclusive, nor are they a set of prongs of a circumstantial
evidence ‘test.’” Id. at 644.
Harden first argues that there is evidence of suspicious
timing. Temporal proximity between an employee’s protect‐
ed activity and an adverse employment action is rarely
enough to show causation. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860. An in‐
terval of the length at issue in this case may be probative of
causation if “there is corroborating evidence of retaliatory
motive,” id. at 861, but Harden has offered no such evidence.

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No. 14‐1713 9
Harden next points to evidence that, he says, reveals “a
continuing pattern of harassment of which his termination
for theft is the final act.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. This evidence
includes Lt. Nelson and Cpl. Russo’s statements encourag‐
ing Lt. Neal to discipline Harden; Deputy Chief Challis’s
statement encouraging Sgt. Minton to discipline Harden; the
discipline actually imposed on Harden, which Lt. Neal
thought was unwarranted; undesirable changes to Harden’s
schedule; Cpl. Russo’s statement that Deputy Chief Challis
and Lt. Wolf were “fucking” with Harden by changing his
schedule; Cpl. Russo’s warning that Harden “ought to be
more careful with who [he] talk[s] to”; and the fact that
Harden was removed from his post at the mayor’s office,
which Lt. Neal interpreted as “retribution for Harden’s
EEOC complaint.” This evidence certainly suggests that of‐
ficers within the Sheriff’s Department—including officers
who oversaw Harden’s schedule and assignments—had it in
for Harden. What’s missing, however, is a link between this
evidence and Harden’s termination. Harden has offered no
evidence that the animus of these individual officers had any
impact on either the Internal Affairs investigators or the
higher‐ups who made the decision to terminate him. (In‐
deed, the harassment ceased after Harden filed a complaint,
which suggests that some high‐ranking officers opposed this
harassment.) Thus, although the evidence of harassment
says something about the context in which the theft investi‐
gation was initiated, without more, it cannot support an in‐
ference that Harden’s termination was retaliatory.
Harden’s appeal therefore turns on his claim that the In‐
ternal Affairs investigation was mere pretext for unlawful
retaliation. Before addressing the merits of Harden’s pretext
argument, however, we must attend to an issue that was

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10 No. 14‐1713
raised at oral argument. Harden’s attorney now claims that
transcripts of the interviews conducted by Internal Affairs
were never produced to him. These transcripts are potential‐
ly important because an investigative report that misrepre‐
sents witness statements is “enough for a reasonable jury to
conclude that the proffered reason for termination is pre‐
textual.” Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 358 (7th Cir.
2002), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724
F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013). But Harden neither filed a motion to
compel in the district court nor made this argument in any
of his briefs. 2 Arguments that are raised for the first time in
oral argument are forfeited. See Veluchamy v. FDIC, 706 F.3d
810, 817 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, for the purposes of this appeal,
we assume that the Sheriff’s Department produced tran‐
scripts of the Internal Affairs interviews to Harden. Because
the transcripts are not in the record, furthermore, we also
assume that they are consistent with the Internal Affairs re‐
port.
We now turn to whether Harden has offered evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find that the Sheriff’s
Department’s stated reason for the discharge—the conclu‐
sion by the Internal Affairs investigators that Harden was
responsible for the theft—was a pretext for unlawful retalia‐
tion. In making this determination, we do not evaluate
2 Harden did argue at summary judgment that because the Sheriff’s
Department failed to produce the audio recordings of the interviews, he
was entitled to an inference that these recordings would have supported
his case. The district court found, however, that “[s]uch an inference is
not warranted in this case because Harden was provided the transcripts
of the interviews” and “Harden does not assert that the transcripts them‐
selves are not accurate.” Harden v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:12‐
CV‐00581‐TWP, 2014 WL 852946, at *6 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 4, 2014).

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No. 14‐1713 11
whether the stated reason “was inaccurate or unfair, but
whether the employer honestly believed the reason it has
offered to explain the discharge.” Harper v. C.R. England, Inc.,
687 F.3d 297, 311 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting another source). A
pretextual decision, then, “involves more than just faulty
reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the employer;
it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” Ar‐
gyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736 (internal quotation marks omit‐
ted).
Based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury
could find that the Internal Affairs investigation was unwor‐
thy of credence—that is, a “sham” investigation. In a typical
sham investigation, persons conducting the investigation
fabricate, ignore, or misrepresent evidence, or the investiga‐
tion is circumscribed so that it leads to the desired outcome
(for instance, by deliberately failing to interview certain wit‐
nesses). The investigation at issue in this case, by contrast,
was thorough and transparent. The investigators inter‐
viewed each and every person involved in the incident
(fourteen in all), they reviewed surveillance footage and ra‐
dio traffic, and they explained their grounds for eliminating
suspects other than Harden. Moreover, there is no evidence
of any kind that the investigators themselves harbored retal‐
iatory animus.
In addition to conducting a thorough investigation, the
investigators offered a legitimate explanation for their con‐
clusion that Harden was the thief. First, they noted that
Harden was the only person who went into the back room,
where he would have been alone. Thus, they reasoned,
Harden was the only person who had the opportunity to
steal the money (because he was the only person who was

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12 No. 14‐1713
ever alone with the money) and the means to steal it (be‐
cause as the arresting officer, he had “legitimate access” to
the property bag and “no one would question him handling
the property bag or its contents”). App. at 69–70. Second, the
investigators observed that Harden’s arrest report for Rybolt
did not list the amount of money recovered, even though fif‐
ty‐seven of Harden’s fifty‐nine other arrest reports listed this
amount for those arrestees. This omission, the investigators
reasoned, was intended to obscure the fact that a theft had
occurred. Third, the investigators noted that when they
asked Harden why he did not list the amount, he replied,
“You only fill out that part of the incident report if the sub‐
ject being arrested has over $500.00 on him.” App. at 64.
That statement, however, was inconsistent with Harden’s
assertion, made earlier in the interview, that he did not
know how much money was in the wallet. It was also incon‐
sistent with his other arrest reports, some of which list de‐
nominations as small as $0.25 or $0.00. And fourth, the in‐
vestigators provided a plausible explanation for why Hard‐
en had the motive to commit the theft (disrespectful com‐
ments made by Rybolt, which angered Harden, and Hard‐
en’s personal financial troubles).
Harden offers several reasons to support his contention
that the investigation was pretextual. First, throughout his
brief, Harden disputes the investigators’ reasoning. But
“faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the
employer” is not sufficient to show pretext. Argyropoulos, 539
F.3d at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather,
Harden must offer evidence tending to show that the Sher‐
iff’s Department did not actually believe the findings of the
investigation. To do this by challenging the strength of the
Internal Affairs report, Harden “must identify such weak‐

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No. 14‐1713 13
nesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in
the report “that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy
of credence.” Harper, 687 F.3d at 311 (internal quotation
marks omitted). He has not done so. At most, Harden has
raised some doubts about his guilt. That is not enough to
suggest that the Internal Affairs investigation was a sham or
that the relevant decisionmakers at the Sheriff’s Department
did not legitimately rely on the investigatorsʹ conclusions in
terminating him.
Harden also contends that weaknesses of the criminal in‐
vestigation cast doubt on the Internal Affairs investigation.
First, he points to discrepancies between the criminal inves‐
tigation interviews and the probable cause affidavit. The
criminal investigation, however, was conducted by a differ‐
ent investigator. Moreover, in terminating Harden, the Sher‐
iff’s Department relied on the Internal Affairs investigation,
not the criminal investigation. The alleged weaknesses of the
criminal investigation thus have little bearing on whether
the Internal Affairs investigation was a sham or unworthy of
credence.
Second, Harden observes that he was cleared by the
prosecutor’s office and that Detective Sharp—the detective
who conducted the criminal investigation—later testified
that he did not know who committed the theft. This indi‐
cates, Harden contends, that the Sheriff’s Department did
not really believe that he was guilty. But Detective Sharp
was neither involved in the Internal Affairs investigation nor
responsible for deciding whether to terminate Harden. Ac‐
cordingly, his personal beliefs about Harden’s guilt tell us
nothing about the beliefs of the actual decision‐makers. In
any event, the fact that no criminal charge was instituted

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14 No. 14‐1713
against Harden is of little relevance. Criminal investigations
and internal investigations are governed by different stand‐
ards of proof; the Sheriff’s Department could honestly be‐
lieve, based on the Internal Affairs investigation, that Hard‐
en committed the theft even if those responsible for institut‐
ing criminal charges did not think they could prove a crimi‐
nal theft charge.
Next, Harden argues that he “immediately became the
principal suspect” and that the Sheriff’s Department ignored
Rybolt’s accusation of another officer, Lt. Frazier. The facts
in the record, however, do not support this claim. In describ‐
ing the process by which they conducted the investigation,
the investigators state that they “did not focus [their] inves‐
tigation on Dep. Harden but rather everyone in the room
were suspects because they were in the room when the
money went missing.” App. at 69. Indeed, the investigators
interviewed each and every person who was involved in the
incident. Harden notes that the Internal Affairs report does
not mention Rybolt’s accusation of Lt. Frazier. He argues
that this omission was deliberate and belies the investiga‐
tors’ true intentions. But there is no evidence in the record
that Holland, the person who allegedly heard the accusation,
told the investigators about it during her interview.
Lastly, Harden contends that it was highly unusual to in‐
vestigate an arrestee’s theft allegation. Thus, he argues, the
fact that the Sheriff’s Department initiated the theft investi‐
gation in the first place is evidence of pretext. In Baker v. Ma‐
con Resources, Inc., 750 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2014), we said that
“selective enforcement or investigation of a disciplinary pol‐
icy can [ ] show pretext.” Id. at 677. Baker is distinguishable,
however, for two reasons. First, the employer in Baker had

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No. 14‐1713 15
reason to believe that the plaintiff’s supervisors had violated
the same company policy as the plaintiff with regard to the
same incident, but failed to “offer[] a reason why, at the
same time it fired [the plaintiff] … , it chose not to investi‐
gate whether her own supervisors violated the same report‐
ing rule.” Id. Our use of the phrase “selective investigation”
did not refer to the initiation of the investigation in the first
instance, but the manner in which the investigation was
conducted once initiated. Here, by contrast, the Internal Af‐
fairs investigators did not selectively investigate the theft ac‐
cusation; they interviewed each and every person involved
in the arrest of Rybolt. And although the Sheriff’s Depart‐
ment did not typically initiate arrestee theft investigations,
there is no evidence in the record that the Department had
actually concluded that these other arrestee theft accusations
had merit (unlike the Rybolt accusation). Thus, there is no
evidence that the Department “selectively enforced” the dis‐
ciplinary policy either. Second, in addition to selective inves‐
tigation, the court in Baker also found flagrant inaccuracies
and inconsistencies in the employer’s supposed reason for
the terminating the plaintiff. Id. In this case, by contrast,
there is no evidence that the investigation was conducted in
bad faith or that the investigation was not the true basis for
Harden’s termination.
The same goes for the other cases in which we have said
that selective enforcement or investigation can be evidence
of pretext. In Coleman, we observed that “evidence of selec‐
tive enforcement of a rule calls into question the veracity of
the employer’s explanation.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 857 (inter‐
nal quotation marks omitted). But in Coleman, unlike the case
at bar, it was undisputed that the comparators had actually
violated the same rule as the plaintiff (indeed, in a manner

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16 No. 14‐1713
that a reasonable jury could conclude was “much more
egregious”).3 Id. at 857. In Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr.,
612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010), we concluded that there was ev‐
idence that the employer’s “grounds for firing [the plaintiff]
were insincere” because the decision to terminate was
“reached in an unusual way.” Id. at 916. Specifically, the em‐
ployer had decided to terminate “within 24 hours of receiv‐
ing [a] complaint” about the plaintiff, conducted a “cursory
investigation,” failed to consider “evidence that the com‐
plaint was unfounded,” and provided “[a] shifting justifica‐
tion for [the] employment action.” Id. at 915–16. Here, by
contrast, the Internal Affairs investigation was thorough and
transparent.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no reasona‐
ble jury could find that the Internal Affairs investigation was
pretextual. The Sheriff’s Department was therefore entitled
to summary judgment on Harden’s claim under the direct
method of proof.
Our conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that
the Departmentʹs reliance on the Internal Affairs investiga‐
tion was pretextual is also dispositive of Harden’s claim un‐
der the indirect method of proof. Where pretext is absent,
the court need not “march through” the entire process for
showing retaliation under the indirect method. Lesch v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2002) (pro‐
ceeding to the dispositive issue of pretext without deciding
if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case). The Sher‐
3 We also questioned whether the plaintiff could ʺfairly be said to
have violated any workplace rule at all.ʺ Id. at 853.

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No. 14‐1713 17
iff’s Department is therefore entitled to summary judgment
under the indirect method as well.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s
Department.

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