United States of America v. Javier Madrigal

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 11, 2014
Decided December 19, 2014
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐1900
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
JAVIER MADRIGAL,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:13‐CR‐22‐TLS
Theresa L. Springmann,
Judge.
O R D E R
Javier Madrigal and his partner sold methamphetamine out of a restaurant
Madrigal owned and operated in Indiana. Madrigal pleaded guilty to possession of at
least 50 grams of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), but was
sentenced (based partly on relevant conduct) to 262 months’ imprisonment, the bottom
of the guidelines range. Although his plea agreement included an appeal waiver,
Madrigal field a notice of appeal, and his appointed counsel now seeks to withdraw on
the ground that all potential appellate claims are frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐1900 Page 2
U.S. 738, 746 (1967). Madrigal opposes counsel’s motion. See C IR . R. 51(b). Because the
analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects
discussed in counselʹs brief plus Madrigalʹs response. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d
774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel first considers whether Madrigal could challenge the voluntariness of his
guilty plea but neglects to say whether he discussed this possibility with his client.
See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287
F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Yet counsel’s omission does not require that we deny the
Anders motion because his discussion and our review of the record persuade us that any
challenge to his guilty plea would be frivolous. Because Madrigal did not move to
withdraw his plea in the district court, our review would be for plain error. See United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002); United States v. Villarreal‐Tamayo, 467 F.3d 630, 632
(7th Cir. 2006). The transcript of the plea colloquy shows that the district court
substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See United States v.
Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334
(7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1988). The court advised
Madrigal of his constitutional rights, the charges against him, and the minimum and
maximum penalties, and the court found that the plea was voluntary and had a factual
basis. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b).
Counsel does consider whether Madrigal could contest the validity of the plea
agreement by asserting that the government breached its agreement to recommend a
sentence “equal to the minimum of the applicable guidelines range” when it sought at
sentencing to hold him responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine based
on relevant conduct. But counsel correctly determines that this argument would be
frivolous because the plea agreement did not prohibit the government from asking the
district court to consider as relevant conduct any drug quantity it deemed appropriate in
calculating the guidelines range. See United States v. Linder, 530 F.3d 556, 564–65 (7th Cir.
2008). The government complied with its agreement to recommend the minimum of a
within‐range sentence when it asked the court to sentence Madrigal to 262 months based
on the 262 to 327‐month range calculated by the court.
In his Rule 51(b) response, Madrigal proposes various arguments related to the
district court’s relevant‐conduct findings and guidelines‐range calculation, but his broad
appeal waiver forecloses any such claim of error. In his plea agreement, he “expressly
waive[d] my right to appeal or to contest my conviction and my sentence . . . or the
manner in which my conviction or my sentence . . . was determined or imposed, to any

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No. 14‐1900 Page 3
court on any ground . . . .” Because an appeal waiver stands or falls with the guilty plea,
see United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sakellarion,
649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011), we must enforce Madrigal’s waiver. Moreover, the
district court did not rely on any impermissible factor when it imposed his sentence,
see Dowell v. United States, 694 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bownes,
405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005), and the term of 262 months’ imprisonment is below the
statutory maximum of life, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); Bownes, 405 F.3d at 63.
Thus, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and D ISMISS the appeal.

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