Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued January 28, 2014 Decided January 30, 2014 Before… v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General of the United States

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued January 28, 2014
Decided January 30, 2014
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
No. 13-­‐‑2296
BOGDAN MAZUR,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Or-­‐‑
der of the Board of Immigra-­‐‑
tion Appeals.
Order
Bogdan Mazur, a citizen of Australia and Poland, did not leave when his visa ex-­‐‑
pired. Fourteen years later, after being arrested and charged with crimes, he came to the
attention of immigration officials. He conceded that he lacks any right to remain in this
nation but sought cancellation of removal on the ground that his children would suffer
hardship if he had to leave the United States.
An immigration judge concluded that, even if Mazur is eligible for that relief, he
does not deserve it because of his criminal conduct: Mazur tried to frame his wife for a

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criminal offense, planting cocaine and a gun to inculpate her, then lying to the police.
Mazur pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and was sentenced to 320 days in prison;
other charges were dismissed. The IJ thought Mazur’s conviction to represent a crime of
moral turpitude, which made him ineligible for discretionary relief, and that at all
events the nature of the acts leading to his conviction show him to be a reprehensible
person who does not deserve administrative benefits. (Cancellation of removal requires
an exercise of administrative discretion, and “good moral character” is necessary, 8
U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1)(B), unless the alien had permanent-­‐‑residence status, as Mazur did
not.) The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed on the latter ground, ruling that it is
unnecessary to decide whether Mazur has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.
By the time the Board acted, Mazur’s first wife had divorced him and he had mar-­‐‑
ried again. His second wife, a citizen of the United States, filed an application for a visa
on his behalf, and Mazur sought reopening so that he could apply for adjustment of sta-­‐‑
tus to permanent residence as a citizen’s spouse. 8 U.S.C. §1151(b)(2)(A)(i), §1255(i). The
Board denied that motion, stating that Mazur’s criminal conduct is such a blot against
him that it outweighs any equities in his favor.
We dismiss Mazur’s petition for judicial review. When a decision on the merits is
fully reviewable, a discretionary decision denying a motion to reopen also is reviewa-­‐‑
ble. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010); Calma v. Holder, 663 F.3d 868 (7th Cir.
2011). But when a statute commits the merits to the Board’s discretion and forbids judi-­‐‑
cial review, as it does for cancellation of removal—see 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which
lists discretionary decisions under §1229b as non-­‐‑reviewable—the court also lacks juris-­‐‑
diction to review the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen. See Cruz-­‐‑Mayaho v. Holder,
698 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012); Zambrano-­‐‑Reyes v. Holder, 725 F.3d 744, 749 & n.2 (7th
Cir. 2013). There is an exception to that rule: strictly legal arguments (whether based on
the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation) always are reviewable. 8 U.S.C.
§1252(a)(2)(D). Mazur contends that he comes within that proviso. He does not.
Mazur’s sole contention, in both the opening brief and the reply brief, is that the
Board abused its discretion when denying his motion to reopen. Abuse of discretion is
almost the opposite of a legal argument; a contention that the evidence does not sup-­‐‑
port the decision also falls outside §1252(a)(2)(D). See Jiménez Viracacha v. Mukasey, 518
F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2008); Paez Restrepo v. Holder, 610 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2010).
Counsel for Mazur hinted in his reply brief, and maintained at oral argument, that
the Board committed a legal error by not considering all of the equities Mazur advanced
in his own favor. Yet the Board wrote that it had considered them and found them in-­‐‑
adequate to overcome the gravity of his crimes. Mazur insisted that we should disre-­‐‑

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gard such declarations and force the Board to prove that it has considered all equities
by listing each of the arguments the alien advances. Neither in brief nor at argument
did counsel identify any statute, regulation, or precedential decision of the Board estab-­‐‑
lishing such a requirement. It is enough for the Board to consider the arguments; it said
that it had done so; unless we were to create a presumption of administrative error, that
declaration is enough to scotch an argument based on §1252(a)(2)(D).
The petition for review is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

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