Nonprecedential Disposition

United States Court of Appeals
FortheSeventhCircuit
Chicago,Illinois60604
ArguedSeptember16,2009
DecidedNovember18,2009
Before
RICHARDD.CUDAHY,CircuitJudge
DIANEP.WOOD,CircuitJudge
DIANES.SYKES,CircuitJudge
No.082799
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,
PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
RICHARDA.LEE,
DefendantAppellant.
AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrict
CourtfortheNorthernDistrictof
Illinois,WesternDivision.
No.07CR500441
FrederickJ.Kapala,
Judge.
ORDER
OnJune15,2007,officersfromtheRockford,IllinoisPoliceDepartmentexecuteda
searchwarrantatahousewhereRichardA.Leehadhiddenadigitalscaleandabag
containingpowderandcrackcocaine.Thepolicereturnedtothehousefivedayslaterand
arrestedLeeforaparoleviolation.TheofficerssearchedLeeincidenttothearrestand
foundahandguninhispossession.Leeconfessedtoowningthenarcoticstheofficers
seizedduringtheJune15search.
Leepleadedguiltytopossessionwithintenttodistributecrackcocaineinviolation
of18U.S.C.§841(a)(1)andbeingafeloninpossessionofafirearminviolationof18U.S.C.
§922(g)(1).Aspartofhispleabargain,Leeagreedthathequalifiedasacareeroffender
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No.082799 Page2
1 Leemadethecareeroffenderargumentinasupplementalprosebrief.Inthatbriefhealso
raisedaclaimofineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.Althoughweaddressthecareeroffender
argumenthere,weexpressnojudgmentontheineffectiveassistanceclaim.Suchclaimsarebest
broughtoncollateralreviewinapetitionforhabeascorpusunder28U.S.C.§2255.SeeUnitedStates
v.Allison,59F.3d625,629(7thCir.1995).
underU.S.S.G.§4B1.1basedona1998felonyconvictionforpossessionwithintentto
distributecocaineanda2002Illinoisconvictionforseconddegreemurder.Atsentencing
thedistrictcourtadoptedthepresentenceinvestigationreport(“PSR”)findingthatLeewas
acareeroffenderunder§4B1.1;Leedidnotobject.Hedidargue,however,that§4B1.1
failedtoaccountfortheSentencingCommission’sintenttoreducethepenaltiesforcrack
cocaineoffenses.Thedistrictcourtrejectedthisargumentbutdidnotethatthecareer
offenderguidelinesare“strict,”“harsh,”and“tough.”Thedistrictcourtcorrectly
calculatedtherelevantguidelinesrangeandimposedawithinguidelinessentenceof
198months’imprisonment.
Leechallengeshissentenceontwogrounds.First,hearguesthatwemustremand
hiscaseforresentencinginlightofKimbroughv.UnitedStates,128S.Ct.558(2007),because
thedistrictcourtfailedtogivereasonsforrejectinghisargumentbasedonthecrack/powder
cocainedisparity.Second,Leecontendsthatthedistrictcourterredwhenitsentencedhim
asacareeroffenderbecausehisIllinoisconvictionforseconddegreemurderisnotacrime
ofviolence. 1
OurprecedentforeclosesLee’sfirstargument.InKimbroughtheSupremeCourtheld
thatdistrictcourtshavediscretiontodisregardthe100to1crack/powderratiowhen
fashioningsentencesunderU.S.S.G.§2D1.1.128S.Ct.at575.ButLeewassentencedasa
careeroffenderunder§4B1.1,andwehaveheldthat§4B1.1doesnotimplicateKimbrough
becausethecrack/powderdisparityinthecareeroffenderguideline“arisesfromastatute,
nottheadvisoryguidelines.”UnitedStatesv.Harris,536F.3d798,813(7thCir.2008).We
recentlyreaffirmedHarrisinUnitedStatesv.Welton,583F.3d494,499(7thCir.2009)
(defendantssentencedascareeroffendersunder§4B1.1“havenosentencingchallenge
basedontheseverityofthecrack/powderdisparity”).Therefore,totheextentLeeargues
thatKimbroughnecessitatesaremandforresentencing,hisargumentfails.
Inhisprosebrief,Leearguesthatthecareeroffenderguidelinedoesnotapplyto
himonthegroundthathisIllinoisconvictionforseconddegreemurderdoesnotqualifyas
acrimeofviolencebecauseitisnot“purposeful”asrequiredbyBegayv.UnitedStates,
128S.Ct.1581(2008).Leefailedtoraisethisargumentbelow,soourreviewisforplain
error.SeeUnitedStatesv.Olano,507U.S.725,73235(1993);UnitedStatesv.Myers,569F.3d
794,800(7thCir.2009).Asathresholdmatter,weinterpretthecareeroffenderguidelinein
thesamewayweinterprettheArmedCareerCriminalAct(“ACCA”),UnitedStatesv.

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No.082799 Page3
Woods,576F.3d400,40304(7thCir.2009),anditisnoterrorforasentencingcourttorely
onanunchallengedPSRwhendeterminingwhetherqualifyingconvictionsexistfor
purposesoftheACCA,UnitedStatesv.Thornton,463F.3d693,70001(7thCir.2006).Lee
didnotobjecttohisPSR,whichclassifiedhimasacareeroffender,andthedistrictjudge
reliedonthePSRwhenhesentencedLeeasacareeroffender.
Furthermore,Leewasconvictedofseconddegreemurder,not“seconddegree
manslaughter”asheargues.Indeed,thereisnocrimeinIllinoiscalled“seconddegree
manslaughter.”See720ILL. COMP. STAT . 5/91to93(listingIllinois’homicidecrimes).
Seconddegreemurderobviouslyqualifiesasacrimeofviolenceundereitherdefinitionof
theterm;ithasasanelementthe“useofphysicalforceagainstthepersonofanother,”
§4B1.2(a)(1),andispurposefulconductthat“presentsaseriouspotentialriskofphysical
injurytoanother,Ҥ4B1.2(a)(2).See720ILL. COMP. STAT . 5/92.Accordingly,thedistrict
courtdidnoterrinsentencingLeeasacareeroffender.
AFFIRMED

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