United States of America v. Troy Heintzelman

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Decided March 8, 2006
Before
Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
No. 04-1344
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TROY HEINTZELMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 02 CR 1149
David H. Coar,
Judge.
O R D E R
Troy Heintzelman appealed his sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment for
attempt and conspiracy to smuggle cocaine, contending that the district court
plainly erred under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). We ordered a
limited remand to ask whether the judge would have imposed the same sentence
under an advisory regime, see United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483–84 (7th
Cir. 2005). The judge said yes.
Heintzelman now argues that his sentence is unreasonably long. To this end,
he cites mitigating factors that he thinks compel a sentence with less prison time
and more opportunity for psychological care and rehabilitation. His father abused
UNPUBLISHED ORDER
Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53

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No. 04-1344 Page 2
him, he explains. The resulting trauma led him to self-medicate and, consequently,
he developed a substance-abuse problem. He also insists that his criminal history
is “relatively minor.” Regardless, Heintzelman’s sentence was at the bottom of the
applicable guidelines range and presumptively reasonable. See United States v.
Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). He has not provided any persuasive
reason to rebut that presumption, and what we might have done in the sentencing
court’s place is irrelevant. See United States v. Laufle, No. 04-3978, 2006 WL
47642, at *7 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2006); United States v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685,
686–87 (7th Cir. 2005).
Additionally, Heintzelman maintains that the district court’s statement on
limited remand was too perfunctory to ensure that the court considered his
psychological problems and criminal history. Admittedly, the court’s statement is
short. The court said simply that, in light of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and the parties’ statements of position, it would not change the sentence
under an advisory regime. Regardless, brevity does not matter so long as the record
makes clear that the judge gave the relevant factors “meaningful consideration,” see
United States v. Brock, No. 03-2279, 2006 WL 39050, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 2006).
It does. At sentencing, the judge considered Heintzelman’s history of abuse and
psychological problems but declined to dip below the applicable range because
Heintzelman’s mental disorders were not “linked” sufficiently to smuggling to
excuse his crimes. Although the judge had more flexibility on remand, nothing
prevented him from sticking to his guns. As for criminal history, Heintzelman’s
own arguments are too cursory to understand. We will not increase sentencing
courts’ work by requiring discussion of frivolous arguments, see United States v.
Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.

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