Darren Hastings v. Remarketing Solutions, Inc.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0207n.06
Filed: March 18, 2009
No. 08-5535
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DARREN HASTINGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
REMARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
BEFORE: NORRIS, COOK, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Darren Hastings appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) against defendant Remarketing Solutions, Inc. (“Remarketing”) alleging
“outrageous conduct” and retaliatory discharge under Tennessee’s common law and a violation of
§ 50-1-304(d)(1) of the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”). TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304.
Hastings’s complaint asserts that defendant unlawfully terminated his employment because he
refused to commit fraud, to wit, that he was fired because he would not unilaterally insert the
effective date in a service contract he reviewed while employed as Remarketing’s in-house attorney.
The district court’s April 7, 2008, memorandum opinion carefully analyzed Hastings’s
allegations against defendant and dismissed his TPPA and retaliatory discharge claims because he

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failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that Remarketing’s actions constituted fraud. The
district court also ruled that Hastings’s complaint failed to assert that Remarketing had engaged in
an illegal activity that implicated important public policy concerns, a necessary element to sustain
recovery under both the TPPA and Tennessee’s common law. Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79
S.W.3d 528, 538 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that discharged employee must demonstrate that employer’s
illegal activities implicated important public policy concerns to maintain viable TPPA claim);
Franklin v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 521, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that “under
both the [TPPA] and the common law, the ‘illegal activity’ or violation by the employer must
implicate important public policy concerns . . . .”). Finally, the district court dismissed Hastings’s
tort claim for outrageous conduct because his factual allegations, taken as true, were not so
“outrageous” as “to be beyond the pale of decency” as required by Tennessee law. See Jones v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 266 (6th Cir. 1991); Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 398 S.W.2d 270,
274 (Tenn. 1966), abrogated on other grounds, Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 444-46 (Tenn.
1996).
We have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs, the applicable law, and the record before our
court, and we agree that Hastings’s claims were properly dismissed. Because the district court’s
decision is well-reasoned, we see no reason to embellish upon the district court’s rulings. Therefore,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for the reasons stated in the district
court’s memorandum opinion issued on April 7, 2008.

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