Kenneth Farhat v. Janet Jopke, in her individual

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0158P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0158p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
KENNETH FARHAT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JANET JOPKE, in her
individual and official
capacity; MAUREEN KELLY,
in her individual capacity;
PAM HOOD, in her individual
capacity; TROY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 02-1896
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 01-72333—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.
Argued: December 11, 2003
Decided and Filed: May 28, 2004
2 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
*The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
Before: ROGERS and COOK, Circuit Judges;
BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Timothy M. Holloway, Taylor, Michigan, for
Appellant. Ernest R. Bazzana, PLUNKETT & COONEY,
Detroit, Michigan, William F. Young, WHITE,
SCHNEIDER, BARID, YOUNG & CHIODINI, Okemos,
Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Timothy M.
Holloway, Taylor, Michigan, for Appellant. Ernest R.
Bazzana, PLUNKETT & COONEY, Detroit, Michigan,
William F. Young, Jeffrey S. Donahue, WHITE,
SCHNEIDER, BARID, YOUNG & CHIODINI, Okemos,
Michigan, for Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BERTELSMAN, District Judge. The Appellant, Kenneth
Farhat, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendants. This action arises from the
termination of Farhat from his position as a custodian for the
Troy School District.
Farhat raises four issues on appeal: (1) he was discharged
in retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment rights;
(2) he was denied due process when the school board refused
to grant a post-termination hearing in which he could deal
directly with the board; (3) an order not to speak to other
employees was an invalid prior restraint on his speech; and
(4) Appellee Hood is liable under a conspiracy theory for

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 3
providing information to Appellee Kelly to aid in unlawfully
depriving Farhat of his rights. The district court found that no
constitutional violations had occurred and granted defendants’
motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth
below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Kenneth Farhat was employed as a custodian by
the Troy School District for approximately 15 years. He was
discharged on September 18, 2000 and initiated this lawsuit
against the school district, its superintendent, an assistant
principal, and a fellow custodian who is also a union
representative. Appellant brought this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Appellant’s employment history is significant and factors
into the asserted justification for the actions of the school
district. Appellant had a checkered employment history with
the Troy School District. The record reflects that, from at
least 1997 forward, Appellant had a history of confrontational
behavior as well as hostile and accusatory communications
directed toward the school district, its officials, co-employees
and toward persons affiliated with the union. Appellant
received numerous warnings and other discipline in response
to specific behaviors that school officials found to be
disruptive to, and inappropriate for, the working environment.
Appellant typically responded to such corrective action
with a letter, usually directed to the author of the warning or
reprimand. All of Appellant’s responses contained primarily
personal opinions and conclusions that were directed against
specific individuals with whom he had had a disagreement.
For example, Appellant routinely referred to others as “sick
and demented,” “ignorant and abusive,” “mentally ill,”
“mindless criminals,” “liars,” “lazy and pampered,”
“alcoholic,” “insane,” “ignorant,” “dysfunctional,” “mentally
ill freak,” “jack ass,” and similar terms. The context of such
4 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
epithets will be addressed later in this opinion in greater
detail.
In January 1997, Appellant, then a union steward, attended
a grievance meeting. The record reflects that his behavior at
the meeting was inappropriate and threatening to others.
Appellant received a warning letter from the Superintendent
that explicitly explained to him that this type of conduct
would not be tolerated and, if it continued in the future, that
he could face more severe sanctions, up to and including
termination.
In April 1998, Appellant received another written
reprimand for his conduct toward the school district’s
executive director and a secretary. His conduct was described
as obnoxious, loud and threatening. In response, Appellant
claimed that the statements of the executive director were lies
and were intended as discrimination against him due to his
affiliation with the union. He claimed that he did not lose
control but that it was the school official who lost control at
the meeting.
In May - June of 1999, officials of the Michigan Education
Association (“MEA” or “the union”) corresponded and
discussed their concerns about an upcoming union meeting
with Appellant and his potential for workplace violence.
They expressed concern about their safety and stated that they
were seeking outside support and information about what
options they had to protect themselves if Appellant became
violent.
In January of 2000, Appellant wrote a letter to the
Superintendent claiming that he was going to sue the district
for libel and slander. He also claimed that he was forced into
a meeting where he was threatened with discipline for having
a weapon at a union meeting and at the workplace. Appellant
further asserted that these “liars” and “cowards” had
continued to attack his reputation and that he intended to sue.
Again in January of 2000, Appellant threatened to file

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 5
grievances and to take additional action because he did not
get what he wanted.
Yet again, on February 24, 2000, Farhat wrote to the
“incompetent administration” claiming that he was
wrongfully denied a position because he threatened lawsuits
and grievances. He also stated that he had been wrongfully
disciplined for uncooperative behavior. He claimed it was
others who were uncooperative, not he, as he was “the best
custodian in Troy Schools . . .” and “the best union
representative in Troy Schools, bar none.”
On February 24, 2000, there was a significant incident
between Appellant and another employee/union
representative, Appellee Pam Hood. Appellant’s actions in
regard to this incident precipitated his termination. On this
occasion, Appellant was clearly unhappy about being denied
a position he wanted. Appellant phoned Hood, while she was
at work, and claimed that this was her fault. Within a short
period of time, Farhat called Hood a second time and
allegedly threatened her. Hood interpreted Farhat’s threats as
threats of violence. Appellant allegedly made statements such
as, “When I get through with you, you won’t be driving a bus
or doing custodial work.” Afraid to leave the room for fear
that Appellant was coming to the building to follow through
on his threats, Hood contacted a school official who
instructed her to contact the police. Hood then locked herself
in a room until the police arrived.
The following day, Appellant was suspended with pay to
allow for an investigation of the February 24, 2000 incident.
On March 21, 2000, a meeting was scheduled for Appellant
to have an opportunity to explain his behavior. Present at this
meeting were Appellant, Assistant Principal Maureen Kelly,
and Assistant Superintendent Mike Williams. Appellant was
represented at the meeting by union representatives Joe
Cusmano, Dominic Asaro and Mel Sledzinski. However, due
to Appellant’s uncontrolled, explosive and rude behavior, the
6 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
1The full text of this letter is attached hereto as Appendix A.
meeting was recessed at the suggestion of his union
representative. Appellant was given several opportunities to
speak privately with his representatives before they decided
to end the meeting.
Another hearing was held on April 14, 2000. In a letter
from the Superintendent, Appellant was advised that after two
written reprimands for inappropriate behavior and two
disciplinary hearings, he would be given yet another chance.
However, because the school district found Appellant’s
behavior to be threatening, intimidating, and disruptive, it
gave him the option of attending an anger management
course, plus a 10-day suspension without pay, or 15 days
without pay if he did not attend the anger management course.
Appellant was instructed not to speak to other employees
during his suspension. In this letter, moreover, Appellant was
specifically advised that further conduct of this nature would
not be tolerated.
On May 11, 2000, Appellant responded by letter, stating
that he considered the letter from the Superintendent to be a
“joke,” and claiming that it was illegal. He claimed that all
the allegations against him were lies. He claimed that Hood,
other employees, and the school officials had been plotting
against him. He stated that he has the flawed character trait
of talking “fast and loud” and that this trait was being used
against him.1
This letter is filled with vituperative remarks about the
school district, specific employees, the union and specific
union representatives, and claims of collusion and corruption.
The same can be said of his previous letters and conduct. The
letter is not specific with regard to the charges of collusion or
corruption.

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 7
2The full text of this letter is attached hereto as Appendix B.
On May 18, 2000, Appellant sent a letter to Lu Battaglieri,
the union president. In this letter, Appellant complained that
his union representatives did not investigate his complaints as
he believed they should. He also claimed they were
purposefully not investigating because they were in collusion
with the school district. He referred to Hood as a “demented
and sick human being” and stated that he, Farhat, was the
“only honest union representative in the city.” He also
referred to the Assistant Principal, Appellee Maureen Kelly,
as “mentally ill.”
Appellant further stated that he believed the union
representatives were creating obstacles for the express
purpose of covering up corrupt contract negotiations;
preferential treatment of the corrupt representatives resulting
in privatization, loss of bidding rights, loss of seniority rights,
unwarranted discipline, loss of medical benefits, and loss of
sick days; and a hostile environment of dissension and chaos.
He claimed that he was disciplined because he chose to
expose the union’s and the representatives’ collusion with the
employer. He did not offer any examples of his allegations of
corruption against the union except for what had happened to
him.2 Appellant copied this letter to three other union
officials, including Hood. Hood, concerned about the
statements in the letter, turned it over to the Superintendent.
On June 1, 2000, Appellee Maureen Kelly wrote to Joseph
Cusmano, a union representative, and stated, “We have
serious concerns about what Mr. Farhat has written and we
need to meet with him so that he has a due process hearing.”
As Appellant was on medical leave, these officials decided to
wait until he was released to return to work to continue the
investigation and hold a due process hearing.
On September 18, 2000, Appellant was terminated from his
employment. The letter of termination from the
8 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
Superintendent, Appellee Janet Jopke, stated that Appellant
“crossed over the line” in his letter of May 18, 2000, and that
he is “simply incapable or refuse[s] to recognize the
inappropriateness of [his] conduct.” The Superintendent
specifically stated that she was not concerned with
Appellant’s statements about the union or union
representatives. However, his statements and comments
about school officials and employees were “abusive,”
“caustic,” and “grossly insubordinate” to her prior warnings
and directives, specifically her April 17, 2000 letter.
On November 1, 2000, following Appellant’s filing of a
grievance regarding his termination, a grievance hearing was
held. Present for the hearing were Appellee Kelly, Steven
Amburg for the union, the attorney for the school district,
Craig Lange, and the attorney for Appellant, Jerry Haymond.
Appellant failed to appear at this hearing. The hearing
proceeded in his absence, however, and the grievance was
denied.
On November 6, 2000, Appellant demanded arbitration.
Pursuant to his request and the collective bargaining
agreement, the case proceeded to arbitration before a neutral
arbitrator. The record before the court does not provide the
exact date of the arbitration. However, the record does show
that Appellant attended the arbitration, as did representatives
of the school district and the union. The parties reached a
tentative settlement on all claims, with Appellant present.
However, the settlement was subsequently rejected by
Appellant. Thereafter, the union withdrew its representation
of him.
Appellant’s next challenge to the school district was to file
this lawsuit. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, heard Appellant’s
motion for partial summary judgment, Hood’s motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, and the remaining
defendants’ motions for summary judgment (the school
district and officials named therein). The district court held

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 9
that Appellant’s speech was not protected, that there was no
constitutional violation upon which to base a § 1983 claim,
and that all defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this case is before us on appeal from the district court’s
grant of summary judgment, our review is de novo. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc’y v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir. 1998).
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact” as to an essential
element of the non-moving party’s case. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). An issue of fact is “genuine” if a reasonable person
could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). After the
moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to set forth “specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Where
there are no disputed, material facts, we determine, de novo,
whether the district court properly applied the substantive
law. See Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339,
1345 (6th Cir. 1991).
FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION
To establish a prima facie case of First Amendment
retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Appellant must
demonstrate that: (1) he was engaged in a constitutionally
protected activity; (2) he was subjected to adverse action or
deprived of some benefit; and (3) the protected speech was a
“substantial” or “motivating factor” in the adverse action.
Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
10 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
The framework for analyzing a First Amendment retaliation
case is well-established. In Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587
(6th Cir. 2003), this court recently summarized this analysis:
While public employees may not be required to sacrifice
their First Amendment free speech rights in order to
obtain or continue their employment, Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97
L.Ed.2d 315 (1987)(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed 2d 570 (1972)), a state
is afforded greater leeway to control speech that threatens
to undermine the state’s ability to perform its legitimate
functions. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 n. 21, 115 S.Ct.
1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995). Therefore, in
determining whether a public employer has violated the
First Amendment by firing a public employee for
engaging in speech, the Supreme Court has instructed
courts to engage in a three-step inquiry. First, a court
must ascertain whether the relevant speech addressed a
matter of public concern. See Connick v. Meyers, 461
U.S. 138, 143, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).
If the answer is yes, then the court must balance the
interests of the public employee, “as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed. 2d 881 (1968). Finally, the
court must determine whether the employee’s speech was
a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s
decision to take the adverse employment action against
the employee. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d
471 (1977); Perry, 209 F.3d at 604.
Id. at 596.

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 11
In the case now before the court, it is not contested that
Appellant’s letter of May 18, 2000, culminating the events
described above, was a substantial and motivating factor in
his termination. The letter of termination from the
Superintendent to Appellant specifically stated that he was
being terminated for the expression in that letter, as well as
for other specific instances of unacceptable conduct. This
meets the third step of the test as outlined above: that
Appellant’s expression in the May 18 letter was a motivating
factor in the adverse employment action.
There remain for our consideration the other two steps of
the inquiry, the public concern step and the Pickering
balancing test.
PUBLIC CONCERN
Whether the speech at issue involves a matter of public
concern is a question of law for the court, Bonnell v. Lorenzo,
241 F.3d 800, 809-10 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951
(2001), although there may be some factual questions for a
jury if it is disputed whether the expression occurred or what
words were specifically stated. See generally Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). Our review of the lower
court’s decision on this issue is de novo. Dambrot v. Central
Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1995).
The district court here did not expressly rule on the public
concern issue, but seemed to base its decision on the
Pickering balancing inquiry noted above. However, this issue
has been raised by all parties to this appeal.
In determining whether expression is a matter of public
concern, we are guided by Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983), which we have noted is “the Supreme Court’s most
instructive case on this issue.” See Cockrel v. Shelby County
Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 813 (2002).
12 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
In Connick, an assistant prosecutor, upset over her pending
transfer within the New Orleans District Attorney’s office,
circulated a questionnaire to her fellow employees soliciting
their views on various issues. These issues included “office
transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and
whether employees felt pressured to work in political
campaigns.” Id. at 141. The Court held that, of the several
topics raised by the questionnaire, only the matter of pressure
to work in political campaigns was a matter of public concern.
The Court observed:
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, government officials should
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment. Perhaps the government employer’s
dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary
dismissals from government service which violate no
fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not
subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the
dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable.
Id. at 146 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court further instructed that “[w]hether an employee’s
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 147-48.
Moreover, the entire speech does not have to address matters
of public concern, as long as some portion of the speech does
so. Id. at 149.
Applying this content-based test, the Court concluded that
the “focus” of the assistant prosecutor’s questionnaire, with
the exception of the question pertaining to pressure on
employees to work on political campaigns, was her personal

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 13
3The Court held that the one issue it found to be a matter of
public concern was not actionable because plaintiff’s case failed to pass
the Pickering balancing test. Id. at 154. See discussion, infra.
dispute with her superiors over the proposed transfer and thus
was not a matter of public concern:
While discipline and morale in the workplace are related
to an agency’s efficient performance of its duties, the
focus of [plaintiff’s] questions [in the questionnaire] is
not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather
to gather ammunition for another round of controversy
with her superiors. These questions reflect one
employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt
to turn that displeasure into a cause celèbre.
Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
Summarizing this ruling, the Court stated:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as
a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as
an employee upon matters only of personal interest,
absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is
not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom
of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.
Id. at 147.3
In the twenty-one years since Connick, this court has had
numerous opportunities to apply that decision to determine
when a public employee’s speech is a matter of “public
concern.” In so doing, we have recognized that the most
difficult cases to adjudicate are “mixed speech” cases, i.e.,
those in which the speech for which the employee claims First
Amendment protection arises in the context of an
employment grievance or other personnel dispute, but where
14 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
4See, e.g., Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888,
894 (6th Cir. 200 3); Vau ghn v. Lawrenceb urg Pow er Sys., 269 F.3d 703,
716 (6th C ir. 200 1); Bon nell v. Loren zo, 241 F.3d 800, 812 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001). See also Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d
888, 899 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, as we noted in Bonne ll, Connick itself
was a “mixed spe ech” case b ecause, although the Court did not use that
label, it looked at every act of expression on the employee’s questionnaire
and, after concluding that one of the questions touched upon a matter of
public concern, proceeded to the Pickering balancing test. See Bonne ll,
241 F.3d at 811 n. 7.
5Rod gers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted); Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 893 (6th Cir.
200 3).
6Rod gers, 344 F.3d at 598-99 (eschewing the “course of
employment gloss” on the Connick analysis); Cockrel v. Shelby Coun ty
Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 103 6, 10 52 (6th Cir. 200 1) (ho lding that although
teacher was speaking in her role as an employee when she presented
information on the environmental benefits of industrial hemp, the speech
nonetheless related to matters of political and social concern to the
com munity), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002).
the employee claims that some part of the speech also touches
upon matters of public concern.4
The difficulty of determining whether speech is of “public
concern” is compounded by the fact that these cases tend, as
one might expect, to be highly fact-specific. However, our
close review of Connick and this circuit’s subsequent
decisions yields the following principles:
1. Speech is of “public concern” if it involves issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to make informed decisions about
the operation of their government.5
2. The fact that the public employee engages in the
speech while in the course of his or her employment does
not preclude a finding that the speech touches upon a
matter of public concern.6

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 15
7Rodg ers, 344 F.3d at 60 0 (“Although Plaintiff’s underlying
motive in writing the memo might have been to complain about
incompetent management, our duty is not to discern her underlying
motive, but rather to evaluate her point as it is presented in the speech.”);
Taylor v. Keith , 338 F.3d 639, 645 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The inquiry is
primarily conc erned with what the speaker intended to comm unicate
through his statement, and not his reasons for speaking.”) (citation
omitted); Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052 (“Thus, even if a public employee
were acting out o f a private motive with no intent to air her speech
publicly, as was the case with M yers, so long as the speech relates to
matters of ‘political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as
opposed to matters ‘only of personal interest,’ it shall be considered as
touching upon matters of pub lic concern.”) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S.
at 146-49); Bonne ll, 241 F.3d at 812; Cha ppel v. M ontgo mery Cty. Fire
Prot. Dist. No . 1, 131 F.3d 564 , 575 -76 (6 th Cir. 1997).
8Rod gers, 344 F.3d at 601 n. 5 (“We note that even if P laintiff’s
opinion ultimately proved to be incorrect, this does not deprive her
statements of First Am endment protection.”); Chappel, 131 F.3d at 576-
77 (rejecting defendants’ argument that employee’s speech alleging
corruption and unethical conduct canno t address matters of public concern
absent proof of the truthfulness of his speech); Williams v. Kentucky., 24
F.3d 152 6, 15 35-3 6 (6th Cir.) (rejecting argum ent that plaintiff’s
admission that she “couldn’t prove” her allegations of unethical conduct
foreclosed conc lusion tha t her speech was of public concern), cert. denied
sub nom Allen v. Williams, 513 U.S. 947 (1994).
W e emphasize here, as we did in Chappel, that this principle is
not in conflict with our opinion in Barnes v. McDo well, 848 F.2d 725,
734-35 (6th Cir. 19 88). In Barnes, the employee alleged in his complaint
3. The employee’s motive for engaging in the speech in
question is a relevant, but not dispositive, factor when
considering whether an employee’s expression is of public
concern.7
4. Although First Amendment protection might not be
available if the employer can show that the public
employee knowingly or recklessly made false statements,
a public employee is not required to prove the truth of his
or her speech in order to secure the protections of the First
Amendment.8
16 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
that he had made accusations of corruption against his public employer,
but discovery revealed that his actual speech included no such allegations,
only complaints o f mismanagement. Id. Thus, because the employee had
failed to substantiate the allegations of his complaint, i.e., to produce
evidence that he actually accused his employer of corruption, we found
proper the district court’s conclusion that the speech in question was not
a matter of p ublic concern. As we explained in Chappel, this does not
mean that an employee who does, in fact, engage in speech alleging
public corruption has to prove the truthfulness of that speech in order to
show it touches upon a public co ncern. Chappel, 131 F.3d at 576-77 .
In “mixed speech” cases, application of the second and
third principles is often difficult. That is, if the employee
speaks only in the course of his employment and does so
solely for personal reasons, when will the speech be of
concern to the community?
Taking the motive issue first, our opinions are clear that,
consistent with the “content” test of Connick, the pertinent
question is not why the employee spoke, but what he said:
The defendants’ most sweeping argument is that none of
Chappel’s speech may be considered speech on a matter
of public concern because all of his speech was
fundamentally and predominately motivated by his self-
interest in obtaining a position as a paramedic with the
ambulance district. . . . They also suggest that Chappel
“lashed out against Chief Welch and the rest of his
family,” alleging misappropriations, nepotism, and a
conflict of interest, only because “he believed that they
were standing in his way.”
The defendants’ argument, that Chappel’s subjective
motivations are dispositive when determining whether
his speech addresses a matter of purely personal concern,
is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Connick. In Connick, a public employee disseminated a
questionnaire “to gather ammunition for another round of
controversy with her superiors” because she was
“dissatisf[ied] with a transfer.” Connick, 461 U.S. at

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 17
148, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. Notwithstanding the fact that this
personal grievance motivated the entire questionnaire,
the Court concluded that “[o]ne question in [the]
questionnaire . . . touch[ed] upon a matter of public
concern.” Id. at 149, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. We agree, as a
majority of the Third Circuit recently concluded, that
“[i]f motive were dispositive, the [Court’s] inquiry [in
Connick] could only have resulted in finding either that
all of [the employee’s] speech was public concern speech
or that none of it was.” Azzaro v. County of Allegheny,
110 F.3d 968, 978 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). . . .
[T]he inquiry into what a speaker intends to
communicate remains fundamentally different from an
inquiry into why the speaker intends that communication.
The former inquiry is of much greater significance in
determining whether speech addresses a matter of public
concern.
Chappel, 131 F.3d at 574-75 (italics in original; underlining
added). See also Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 817 (“However, even
assuming that Plaintiff was motivated by personal animus in
circulating the Apology, the fact remains that in doing so, he
addressed a matter occurring at the college which was of
public concern.”).
As for the “course of employment” issue, this circuit has
flatly rejected the argument that the fact that a public
employee’s speech occurs while he is carrying out his job
duties renders the speech of only private concern, noting that
such a rule would eviscerate First Amendment protection in
public employment. See Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 598-99;
Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002). Cf. Banks v.
Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 898-99 (6th Cir.
2003) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
Against the background of Connick and these principles,
our circuit has distilled the “public concern” test by stating
18 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
that the court must determine: the “focus” of the speech; “the
point of the speech in question”; “to what purpose the
employee spoke”; “the intent of the speech”; or “the
communicative purpose of the speaker.” See Rodgers, 344
F.3d at 600 (holding that pertinent inquiry is “the point or
focus of the speech in question”); Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d
639, 645 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that proper inquiry is the
“point of the speech” and “what the speaker intended to
communicate”); Buckley v. City of Portage, No. 98-1783,
1999 WL 777542, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999) (examining
“primary focus” of speech), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262
(2000); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187-
88 (6th Cir. 1995) (court must look to the “point” of the
speech and the “communicative purpose” of the speaker);
Rahn v. Drake Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 407, 412-13 (6th Cir. 1994)
(court must examine “complete record” and determine
“focus” of statement for which employee claims protection),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1142 (1995).
As a corollary to this “focus” test, we have held that the
proper inquiry is not what might be “incidentally conveyed”
by the speech, and that “passing” or “fleeting” references to
an arguably public matter do not elevate the speech to a
matter of “public concern” where the “focus” or “point” of the
speech advances only a private interest. See Rodgers, 344
F.3d at 597-98; Taylor, 338 F.3d at 645-46; Buckley, 1999
WL 777542, at *4-5; Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1187; Rahn, 31
F.3d at 412-13.
Turning to the employee’s speech in the case at bar, viewed
in context of the complete record, we believe that the primary

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 19
9See Rod gers, 344 F.3d at 599-60 0; Buckley, 1999 WL 777542,
at *4; Rahn, 31 F.3d at 413.
10See Rodge rs, 344 F.3d at 598-600 ; Taylor, 338 F.3d at 645;
Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1187.
11See Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1188.
12See Barnes v. McDo well, 848 F.2d 725 , 735 (6th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted ), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 100 7 (1989 ).
13See Rahn, 31 F.3d at 412-13.
14See R odgers, 344 F.3d at 597; Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1187.
“focus,”9 “point,”10 or “communicative purpose”11 of
Appellant’s letters was his own personal “beef”12 with the
union and the school district concerning his deteriorating job
situation, and his references to collusion or corruption were
“passing”13 references that were “incidental to the message
conveyed.”14 Thus his letters were not matters of “public
concern.”
Moreover, even if Appellant had satisfied this prong of the
First Amendment retaliation analysis, we conclude that
application of the Pickering balancing test still requires that
the summary judgments entered by the court below be
affirmed.
PICKERING BALANCING TEST
Application of the Pickering balancing test is a matter of
law for the court to decide. Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888,
898 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
In Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the
Court held that the firing of a teacher for writing a letter to a
newspaper, opposing a tax increase advocated by the
defendant Board of Education, was a violation of the First
20 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
15W e read the district court’s succinct remarks at the summary
judgment hearing as a statement that the summary judgments were
granted on this ground.
Amendment because the issue was a matter of public concern.
Id. at 570-71. The letter was personally critical of the
members of the Board. The Supreme Court noted, however,
that there were no close working relationships between the
teacher and the members of the Board and, therefore, the
protected expression did not violate the Board’s “interests as
an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Id. at
568-70.
The Court further enunciated what has come to be known
as the “Pickering balancing test”: “The problem in any case
is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.” Id. at 568.
Applying this test, we conclude that, even if portions of
Appellant’s expression did address matters of public concern,
the disruptiveness of his speech in the workplace outweighed
any value his expression might have had. Thus, summary
judgment was properly granted.15
Authority for this conclusion is found in Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). There, a nurse was reported
to her employer as having made critical remarks concerning
the operation of one of the departments of the hospital in
which she was employed. She also made highly derogatory
remarks concerning her supervisor, a physician. Id. at 665-
66.

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 21
Some of the remarks the nurse was alleged to have made
were disputed by her. The Court held that her firing was
justified, even though the employer had based its decision on
the reported remarks without having determined what remarks
were actually made. Id. at 677 (plurality opinion by
O’Connor, J.), 686 (concurring opinion by Scalia, J.).
The Court recognized the right of even a governmental
employer to deal with disruption in the workplace. It
emphasized that the government as employer has efficiency
concerns that give it greater discretion in dealing with a
disruptive employee, more discretion than it would have to
deter speech by a private citizen. Id. at 674-75. “[S]urely,”
the plurality observed, “a public employer may, consistently
with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from being
rude to customers,” as well as to other employees, including
the supervising physician. Id. at 673 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
In language particularly applicable to the instant case, the
plurality stated:
[T]he extra power the government has in this area comes
from the nature of the government’s mission as an
employer. Government agencies are charged by law with
doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help
do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible.
When someone who is paid a salary so that she will
contribute to an agency’s effective operation begins to do
or say things that detract from the agency’s effective
operation, the government employer must have some
power to restrain her. The reason the governor may . . .
fire [a robustly critical high-ranking] deputy is not that
this dismissal would somehow be narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest. It is that the governor
and the governor’s staff have a job to do, and the
governor justifiably feels that a quieter subordinate
would allow them to do this job more effectively.
22 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
The key to First Amendment analysis of government
employment decisions, then, is this: The government’s
interest in achieving its goals as effectively and
efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a
significant one when it acts as employer. The
government cannot restrict the speech of the public at
large just in the name of efficiency. But where the
government is employing someone for the very purpose
of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may
well be appropriate.
Id. at 674-675 (emphasis added).
The same principles have been recognized in our own
opinions. See, e.g., Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F. 3d 888, 897
(6th Cir. 2000); Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 596; Hoover v.
Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 466 (6th Cir. 2002); Strouss v.
Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, 250 F.3d 336, 346 (6th Cir.
2001); Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 810-811; Charvat v. Eastern
Ohio Reg’l Wastewater Auth., 246 F.3d 607, 617 (6th Cir.
2000); Chappel, 131 F.2d at 573-574.
Thus, we find that Appellant’s speech, even if of public
concern, is not protected. Appellant’s “speech” was highly
disruptive to the point that it interfered with the effective
operation of the school district’s custodial staff. Indeed, at
times they feared for their physical safety in the workplace
due to Appellant’s behavior. As the plurality stated in
Waters: “As a matter of law, this potential disruptiveness was
enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the
speech might have had.” Waters, 511 U.S. at 681. Therefore,
on this ground also we find that the district court properly
held that there was no First Amendment violation. Thus, the

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 23
16Appellant’s claims that his termination violated his First
Amendm ent rights to association and to petition the government are
without merit. Appellant’s association claim must fail because he did not
adduce any evidence that he was terminated because of his union
activities. His petition claim fails because the “p etition” he relied on in
his complaint - - his contac ts with the T roy City government - - was made
after he was terminated, and thus could not have been a factor in the
decision to terminate him.
lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the retaliation
claims must be affirmed.16
DUE PROCESS
The next issue presented is Appellant’s claim that he was
denied procedural due process because the school district did
not meet the Constitutional due process requirements for
pretermination and post-termination hearings. In support of
these claims, Appellant states that he never received a hearing
before a neutral decisionmaker. He further states that he was
not permitted to present his grievance directly to the school
board which, he asserts, is required by Michigan statute.
Due process requires some sort of pretermination hearing,
the formality of which depends upon the importance of the
interest and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. See
Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1006-07 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989). For public
employees who can only be fired for cause, the Supreme
Court has held, specifically, that a pretermination proceeding
is required. Id. (discussing Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).
In Loudermill, the Supreme Court held that a full
evidentiary hearing is not required prior to termination.
Rather, the pretermination hearing is to provide an initial
check against mistaken conclusions, “essentially, a
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the charges against the employee are true and
24 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
support the proposed action.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-
46. The essential elements required for due process are notice
and an opportunity to respond, either in writing or in person.
Id. at 546.
In the Sixth Circuit, we have held that prior to termination
of a public employee who has a property interest in his
employment, the due process clause requires that the
employee be given “oral or written notice of the charges
against him or her, an explanation of the employer’s evidence,
and an opportunity to present his or her side of the story to the
employer.” Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491,
494 (6th Cir.) (citing Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,
844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848
(1990). “To require more than this prior to termination would
intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s interest
in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.”
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
We also have held that in the pretermination stage, the
employee does not have a right to, and the Constitution does
not require, a neutral and impartial decisionmaker. The “right
of reply” before the official responsible for the discharge is
sufficient. Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1006. It is at the post-
deprivation stage where a neutral decisionmaker is needed to
adjudicate the evidence. Where there is a system of post-
termination procedures available to the employee that
includes a neutral decisionmaker and/or arbitration, coupled
with a pretermination “right of reply” hearing, then the
employee has received all the process due under the
Constitution. See Duchesne, 819 F.2d at 1006; Buckner, 901
F.2d at 494; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.
The law is well-established that it is the opportunity for a
post-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that
is required for due process. As long as the procedural
requirements are reasonable and give the employee notice and
an opportunity to participate meaningfully, they are
constitutionally adequate. See Hennigh v. City of Shawnee,

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 25
155 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998). As succinctly stated
by the Seventh Circuit, the “availability of recourse to a
constitutionally sufficient administrative procedure satisfies
due process requirements if the complainant merely declines
or fails to take advantage of the administrative procedure.”
Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F. 2d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir.)
(citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom Dusanek v.
O’Donnell, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982). Consequently, where the
employee refuses to participate or chooses not to participate
in the post-termination proceedings, then the employee has
waived his procedural due process claim. See Krentz v.
Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 228 F.3d 897, 904 (8th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
“The law is also clear that grievance procedures provided
by a collective bargaining agreement can satisfy a plaintiff’s
entitlement to post-deprivation due process.” Hennigh, 155
F.3d at 1256; American Postal Workers Union Columbus
Area Local AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Service, 736 F. 2d 317,
319 (6th Cir. 1984). As we stated in Buckner, the opportunity
to challenge the termination in a more detailed post-
termination proceeding, under the collective bargaining
agreement, satisfies the employee’s constitutional due process
rights. Buckner, 901 F.2d at 497.
In Duchesne, the employee claimed that he was denied
procedural due process because his pretermination proceeding
was biased. Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1005. The proceeding
was presided over by the person who ultimately fired the
employee, who was also the person about whom the
employee had complained to the city council. Id. We held
that even if the decisionmaker at the pretermination hearing
was biased, due process is fulfilled by a post-termination,
trial-type proceeding where an opportunity to “ferret out bias,
pretext, deception and corruption by the employer in
discharging the employee” is provided. Id. at 1008.
Duchesne held that the employee was not entitled to a
pretermination hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and
26 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
the injunction granted by the district court was vacated. Id. at
1007-1008.
In Buckner, a terminated police officer alleged that he had
been denied due process because no hearing was held prior to
his discharge. The officer further alleged that the termination
violated a state statute because he was an alcoholic in
treatment at the time of his discharge and believed he was
fired because of that condition. Buckner, 901 F.2d at 493.
We held that the facts of the case established that the officer
was given notice and an opportunity to respond, even though
he was in the hospital and there was not a formal
pretermination hearing in the standard format. Id. at 495-496.
Similarly, in Loudermill, the Court held that “all the
process that was due is provided by a pretermination
opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination
administrative procedures . . . .” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-
548.
In the case before us, we find that Appellant was given all
the process due and that his constitutional rights were
protected. Appellant was provided with two pretermination
proceedings that were attended by himself as well as his
chosen union representatives. Post-termination, he was given
the opportunity for a full hearing before a neutral arbitrator,
as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. At the
arbitration, the parties reached a tentative settlement.
However, after a few days, Appellant rejected the settlement.
Following this rejection, the union withdrew its representation
of him. The record reflects that Appellant made no further
attempts to pursue this issue directly with the school board.
Instead, Appellant filed this lawsuit.
Under the authority cited above, due process has not been
denied in this case. Appellant was given pretermination
notice and an opportunity to be heard. That is all that is
required prior to termination, even if the person against whom
he made the allegations was the same person who presided

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 27
over the hearing. It is the post-termination proceeding where
bias and corruption are ferreted out. See Buckner, 901 F.2d
at 494; Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1006.
We also find that post-deprivation due process was
adequate. Appellant was provided a post-termination
arbitration that he requested, attended, and at which he
reached a settlement, albeit one he later rejected. The fact
that Appellant was given the opportunity for a post-
termination proceeding, before a neutral arbitrator, belies his
claim that due process was denied. See Buckner, 901 F.2d at
494-5; Hennigh, 155 F.3d at 1256; American Postal Workers,
736 F.2d at 319. Being dissatisfied with the result of the
arbitration does not give rise to a constitutional violation.
Moreover, we find that Appellant waived his post-deprivation
due process when, after rejecting the settlement, he failed to
pursue further arbitral proceedings. See Krentz, 228 F.3d at
904.
Appellant’s claim that Michigan law requires that he be
given a hearing directly before the board, lest he be denied
due process, also fails. The applicable Michigan statute,
M.C.L.A. 423.211, states that an employee may negotiate
directly with the employer and present grievances directly to
the employer. By its plain language, this action is
discretionary. Especially where other procedural measures
are available for the employee to present his case, due process
is not denied if the employer relies on the collective
bargaining agreement to provide that process. See Hennigh,
155 F.3d at 1256; American Postal Workers, 736 F.2d at 319.
Therefore, as a matter of law, we find that the district court
correctly held that Appellant was provided procedural due
process. The employer provided not one, but two,
pretermination hearings where Appellant was given notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, he was provided
the opportunity for a post-termination arbitration presided
over by a neutral arbitrator. The Constitution requires
nothing further.
28 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
Further, Appellant has failed to allege and prove the
inadequacy of state remedies, which failure is fatal to his
procedural due process claim. See Jefferson v. Jefferson
County Pub. Sch., 360 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing
various cases). Indeed, he concedes that state law permitted
him to arbitrate with the defendants even after the union
declined to represent him. Nonetheless, Appellant failed to
continue the arbitration after the union’s withdrawal and
elected to file this lawsuit instead.
PRIOR RESTRAINT
The third issue Appellant presents for review is his
allegation that the school district placed an unconstitutional
prior or overbroad restraint on his speech when, as part of
the15-day suspension and investigation, he was instructed to
refrain from speaking to other employees about the
investigation. Appellant dedicates approximately one page of
his argument to this issue, which is thin on analysis.
Appellant simply alleges that there was no legitimate reason
for this restriction, with no supporting evidence or argument.
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of a prior restraint on
speech of a government employee in Jackson v. City of
Columbus, 194 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 1999) (abrogated on other
grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002)). Jackson involved the termination of a police chief
who alleged that his dismissal was racially motivated. He
further alleged that a “gag order” not to speak to the media
pending investigation of his alleged misconduct
unconstitutionally restrained his speech. Id. at 746. We
recognized that the Pickering balancing test applied to the
analysis of such allegedly improper prior restraints on the
speech of a public employee. Id.
Thus, the same process applies here as it did with the first
issue we addressed in this appeal. That is, we first determine
if the issue is one of private or public concern. Second, we
balance the interests of the government employer in

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 29
maintaining a functioning and cohesive working environment
against the employee’s interest in speaking. Id.
We find that the balance of interests on this issue weighs in
favor of the employer. As we stated previously, even if
Appellant’s speech had been of public concern, it is clear that
the interests of the employer outweigh the interests of the
employee, for this limited purpose. The school district only
restricted Appellant’s speech for 15 days, pending its
investigation of allegations about him and by him. Further,
he was restricted in his speech only as to co-employees. He
was not restricted from speaking to the public or his union.
As stated by Appellee Kelly in her deposition, the reason for
this restriction was to prevent further disruption of the
workplace and potential interruption of the investigation by
Appellant’s abusive and threatening behavior. The record is
replete with Appellant’s history of this very type of behavior.
Appellant has not presented any evidence of how he was
limited by this alleged restraint. Thus, we have nothing to
place on the Pickering scale to measure against the
employer’s interests. As such, we find that the alleged prior
restraint on Appellant’s speech was reasonable in light of the
employer’s interest in completing its investigation and in
protecting the workplace. The district court properly granted
summary judgment on this issue.
CONSPIRACY
Appellant’s final allegation is that Appellees are liable for
civil conspiracy for unlawfully causing his termination. He
bases this allegation on the theory that the “general objective
which Hood and Kelly shared was to cause some type of
adverse action concerning Farhat’s career.” Appellant claims
that because Hood went to her supervisor to advise the
supervisor of Appellant’s conduct, there was a conspiracy.
A civil conspiracy is “an agreement between two or more
persons to injure another by unlawful action.” Weberg v.
30 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 526 (6th Cir. 2000). Claims of
conspiracy must be pled with some specificity: vague and
conclusory allegations that are unsupported by material facts
are not sufficient to state a §1983 claim. Gutierrez v. Lynch,
826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
Quite simply, Appellant has failed to establish that he was
injured by any unlawful action. As we have held here, there
were no constitutional deprivations by Appellees, thus there
is no unlawful action. Without an unlawful action causing
injury, Appellant cannot prove the elements required to
support a claim for conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court
correctly granted summary judgment to Appellees on this
issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, as to all claims.

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 31
Appendix A
Date: 5-11-00
To: J. Jopke, Superintendent Troy Schools
From: Ken Farhat, Custodial Steward, Troy Schools
Re: Rebuttal to Letter dated 4-17-00
I have been off work since 2-25-00, because of the ever
increasing violations of my civil rights, that has led to a
suspension based on a false police report by an incompetent
and corrupt union representative, Pam Hood. I was placed off
work because I was exposing Pam Hood for her collusion and
coercion, and failure to represent members of this bargaining
unit, in cooperation with your administration. This situation
is nothing more than a fabrication by administrators who are
unwilling to be accountable for their abuse, discrimination,
and incompetence.
Since you illegally removed me, I have been forced to attend
illegal meetings with the purpose to create fabricated charges
of inappropriate behavior, typical of the administrators in
Troy Schools. I am supposed to be docile while I am
harassed, lied about, in the most boring and redundant
manner. If I show opposition to these lies, more lies are
produced. The most telling ability of Kelly and her
persecution of me, is the statement she made to the fact that
I was filing charges against Pam Hood through proper
channels of MEA. Kelly referred to me as a threat. Since she
made mention to this in an angry and hostile manner, I
assume I was disciplined for my legal actions within the
union infrastructure. Kelly must believe I am a prisoner with
no civil rights.
During a hearing on 4-14-00, I was asked how I felt about
your letter dated 1-28-97, applied to me. It was a joke since
it was illegal to begin with. You stated that day, when you
gave me the letter, that it would not go in my file, it is not
designated “personnel file,” I was not offered a union
representative and it is not noted that I was. I did not file a
32 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
grievance because you said at the time it was not a discipline
action, but a concern. Furthermore, Maureen Kelly now says,
in regard to that meeting that your letter pertains to, that I was
pounding my fist on the table and leapt out of my chair, your
letter does not describe this at all. Your letter is a joke, in the
fact it isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. Also, Kelly is
lying in claiming Harry Sahourieh and Lloyd Stage support
her statements in regards to that day, and that they will
provide testimony, testimony that you at the time did not
pursue. Stage’s exact quote was “I was not paying attention,”
seems odd if I had pounded my fist and leapt out of a chair
that he didn’t notice that, being one seat over. Harry flat out
denies that he agrees with Kelly, or has provided any
testimony in agreement. Now that I am aware of this letter
being illegally put in my file, I will file the proper grievances.
The second so called discipline from Mike Williams, was
grieved, but the grievances were not processed because Mary
Watson refused to file them in the transition to the MEA,
since I now know she is in collusion with the employer I will
re-file these. Mike Williams’s letter is an outrageous and
cowardly tactic to camouflage his harassment, and abuse in
claiming that I was committing medical fraud and illegal
union organizing. When he could not prove this by
entrapment, he lied and said he was threatened, typical of
Williams. Also I wrote a rebuttal to all school board
members and never really got a reply, so his letter is not
worth the paper is [sic] written on. And again, Harry was
present and ready to testify that there was no threat. So much
for those.
In regards to Pam Hood, the Troy Police don’t believe her,
and closed the case. She concealed the fact that she was
coerced by Mike Williams prior to calling the police, that she
has been plotting this for some time, and has been slandering
me in the work place for years. As a matter of fact, I made a
complaint to Carol Miller, Asst. Principle [sic] at Troy High,
some weeks earlier in regards to Hood’s attacks on me. It
was the same day I asked that something be done with Becky

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 33
Makowski, another employee that you have allowed to attack
me in the work place, along with Butler-Bull and Loretta
Witkowski. Hood’s actions were of retaliation and defense
because she realized I was going to expose her, and file
charges for collusion, and I would not submit to collusion
myself in regards to a member I was representing. A situation
that Pam Hood states, “I’m doing what Maureen Kelly wants
me to do, I’m doing what I’m told to do.”
My pattern of behavior is of honesty and integrity, traits that
are solely missing in Troy Schools. It is your administration
that is feared not me. My characterization of those such as
Jack Britton is completely warranted, he is an incompetent
supervisor that retaliated against me by abuse of his authority,
sanctioned by you. When I exposed his abuse and threatening
behavior towards members of this bargaining unit, I was
illegally demoted and further slandered and libeled. You also
claim my co-workers fear me, if they fear me it is because of
the conspiracy of this administration and corrupt union reps
that have been allowed to spread this slander and libel of
threats against people. Furthermore, as always in Kelly’s
warped investigations, she never names who these frightened
co-workers are, or of their testimony, and has refused to
provide this testimony.
I will only admit I talk fast and loud, everybody knows this as
a natural trait. Even if it is a flawed character trait, it is not a
threat. This is being exploited by this administration to avoid
the grievances I have filed, and will file upon returning to
work.
I expect this administration to produce more than rhetoric as
evidence.
I also request that a copy of the medical report be sent to my
residence, this is in regards to the appointment with
Dr. Sheiner. Contact Maureen Kelly.
34 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
Lastly, I have made an appointment to attend counseling at
the Evergreen Counseling Center, although this may change,
because of PPOM requirements. Not because of my behavior,
but because of this administration’s behavior.
Sincerely,
Kenneth Farhat
Cc. J. Cusmano
M. Kelly
M. Williams
L. Boehmns
J. Britton

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 35
Appendix B
Date: 5-18-00
To: Lu Battaglieri, President MEA
From: Ken Farhat, Custodial Rep Troy Schools, TESPA
Re: Failure to represent
On 5-16-00, I met with Tom Fette, Joe Cusmano, and Jeff
Nyquist, you know who they are. Also present was Tim
Hagan, my attorney. During this meeting and by Mr.
Nyquist’s direction it was agreed that an investigation, into
the allegations and incidents leading up to my suspension,
would be conducted. Apparently Mr. Nyquist has no
influence over Cusmano, or Fette, to motivate them to follow
up on this. I believe Mr. Nyquist to be in good faith at this
time, Fette and Cusmano are not. Instead they continue to
avoid their responsibility, to cover up for Pam Hood, and
protect the employer, this corrupt local, and the incompetence
of the MEA reps up to date.
Today at approximately 9:30 a.m., I called Cusmano about a
concern more recent that the May 16 meeting. He refuses to
investigate. It only involves the President of my local, Pam
Hood, claiming that I stopped her bus with students aboard.
I believe that offence would get me life in prison, if true. It
is a demented accusation from a demented and sick human
being. Cusmano refused to contact Hood, and stated it was
not his concern.
Furthermore, in regards to the other matters of a needed
investigation, he now flatly refuses to do anything to uncover
evidence. Evidence and testimony that will prove beyond a
shadow of a doubt of the conspiracy behind Hood’s behavior,
and my being victimized for being the only honest union rep
in Troy with the ability and courage to stand up to this
ignorant and abusive administration in Troy Schools.
I can only conclude Cusmano, Fette, Mott, and Gay Shaw are
intentionally creating obstacles, innuendo and lies, to cover
36 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. No. 02-1896
up for the corrupt contract negotiation, the ongoing collusion
of the local representatives, and the preferential treatment
they receive. Of course at the expense of the bargaining unit.
An expense that has led to privatization, loss of seniority
rights, loss of bidding rights, unwarranted discipline, loss of
medical benefits, loss of sick days, the implementation of a
medical exam article that violates our civil rights, and a
hostile environment of dissension and chaos. Least I am
remiss, I should include the main component here, Maureen
Kelly’s good friend Mary Watson. A MEA staff rep who has
no problem lying in front of nearly 200 people about all the
above. This to enhance her mentally ill friend Kelly, and to
use this bargaining unit as a concession for the teachers
negotiation.
On 5-17-00, my attorney was contacted by Mr. Nyquist. He
stated a representative would be assigned to conduct an
investigation into my situation. On 5-18-00, I contacted
Fette, he claimed no knowledge of a rep other then an
advocate in a distant arbitration. I need action now. I don’t
know what Cusmano intends to present at this arbitration
other than begging like a dog. I will not do this.
The MEA has committed total failure in this matter and others
of this bargaining unit, yet Mark Middlewood is being
allowed to parade around the state claiming this contract is a
good contract. It is, if you’re a mindless animal, which
Maureen Kelly has done a good job in hiring mindless,
criminals as employees.
Well now you’ve been told, somewhat that is. I invite you to
a union meeting to hear our discussion. Oh excuse me that’s
right we don’t have meetings anymore. They are canceled
when our local reps are exposed for their incompetence and
collusion, and refuse to answer questions of their conduct.
Like our last meeting last February.
I have been disciplined because I choose to expose MEA and
local reps in complete collusion with the employer. To the

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No. 02-1896 Farhat v. Jopke, et al. 37
point these liars are giving testimony, illegal testimony, to the
employer. Despicable.
It is your responsibility to assign staff that is honest and
unbiased. Where is the aggressive representation that was
promised during the organizing effort? Where is the legal
team that was supposed to protect our civil rights? You have
no answer because it was all a lie, and you were not President.
This was orchestrated by Mary Watson and carried on by
every MEA rep since. Fix it please. Believe me, I will
contact newspapers and politicians till something is done. I
will not be deterred, by any threat or conspiracy. I intend to
sue.
Sincerely,
Ken Farhat
CC. Fette
Shaw
Hood

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