affirmed the dismissal of the action on the procedural ground that § 1983 is not an… v. / Filed: January 12, 2004 BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0058P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0058p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
IN THE MATTERS OF: LEWIS WILLIAMS,
JR. AND JOHN GLENN ROE
_______________________________________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
IN RE LEWIS WILLIAMS, JR.
Petitioner-Appellant
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No. 04-3014
Filed: January 12, 2004
BEFORE: KENNEDY, SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE,
Circuit Judges
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Lewis Williams filed
this §1983 action in the district court challenging the method
of administering the lethal injection of drugs at his execution
as a constitutional violation of his right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment and seeking an injunction to
postpone his execution scheduled for January 14, 2004. The 1The complaint also sought similar relief for John Glenn Roe
scheduled for execution February 3, 2004.
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district court treated petitioner*s complaint as a second, or
successive, petition1 and transmitted it to the court.
The § 1983 action challenging the method of administering
drugs at his execution is, as he concedes, to be treated as a
second habeas action under current Sixth Circuit decisions.
The majority of the panel would deny permission to file a
second habeas on the grounds presented. They have never
been presented to the state court, so there has been no
exhaustion. The affidavits in support of a preliminary
injunction, in essence, state that if lethal injection is not
administered properly, petitioner could experience severe pain
without displaying any sign of it. Responsive affidavits
detailing the procedure indicate that the concern expressed by
petitioner is so unlikely as to be immeasurable.
Petitioner essentially bases his request for a stay of
execution on the Supreme Court having granted certiorari in
Nelson v. Campbell, No. 03-6821, 2003 WL 22327593, 72
USWL 3363 (Dec. 1, 2003). Nelson involves a case
involving a prisoner facing the death penalty whose
peripheral veins were unavailable and who had to be sedated
through the central venous system. The state in Nelson chose
the “cut down” technique which allegedly requires more
experience and medical training than the usually-performed
per cutaneous technique. The Court granted certiorari to
answer the following question:
Whether a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
a death-sentenced state prisoner, who seeks to stay his
execution in order to pursue a challenge to the
procedures for carrying out his execution, is properly
recharacterized as a habeas corpus petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254?

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The Court has also acted on at least two cases involving
similar last-minute challenges to the method of execution of
by injection, both from the Fourth Circuit. In Rowsey v. Beck,
No. 04-6073 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2004), motion to vacate granted,
Beck v. Rowsey, 504 U.S. __, 2004 WL 40382 (Jan. 8, 2004),
the court vacated the stay granted by the Fourth Circuit. In
Reid v. Johnson, No. 03-7916 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2003),
motion to vacate stay denied, Johnson v. Reid, 504 U.S. __,
2003 WL 22970950 (Dec. 18, 2003), the district court had
granted an injunction staying an execution. The court of
appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied the state*s
motion to vacate. Of most relevance to the present petition,
however, is the Court*s denial of application for stay of
execution in Zimmerman v. Johnson, 2003 U.S. Lexis 9199,
72 USLW 3406 (Dec. 15, 2003). In Zimmerman, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action on the procedural
ground that § 1983 is not an appropriate vehicle for
challenges to the method of execution and held that applicant
should have proceeded by applying for a writ of habeas
corpus. The four Justices that dissented from the denial of
stay stressed that the Court should stay execution until Nelson
was decided. The majority, however, clearly disagreed. We
understand this decision to mean that this Circuit is free to
follow its prior precedent with regard to this question until the
Supreme Court issues its decision in Nelson.
Accordingly, the majority of the panel is of the opinion that
we should continue to follow Sixth Circuit precedent in In re
Sapp, 118 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1997) and treat this case as
a second, or successive, petition. The district court properly
transferred the case as filed to this court so it could pass on it
as a request for a second petition. We decline to permit the
claim to be filed as a second petition. It has never been
presented to a state court. Indeed, petitioner does not
seriously claim it meets the requirements for a second
petition.
Petitioner asks that we stay our decision to await the
decision of the Supreme Court in Nelson. He proffers
affidavits from a physician who states that if thiopental
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sodium is not administered for a sufficient length of time to
complete the other steps of the procedure, petitioner will
suffer severe pain. A lay person who experienced this
difficulty describes the pain in her affidavit. In response, the
state submits an affidavit from an extremely well-qualified
physician explaining why, in the dose to be used by the state,
two (2) grams, the condition described by plaintiff*s expert
will almost certainly not occur. He notes that when thiopental
sodium is commonly used for general anesthesia in surgery,
it is normally administered in a dose of 300 to 400
milligrams.
Petitioner’s motions for remand to the district court, for
preliminary injunctive relief and for stay of execution are
DENIED.
In order that petitioner have counsel to pursue any possible
habeas relief from the order, Stephen A. Ferrell is appointed
to represent petitioner on such proceedings.

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In re: Lewis Williams, Jr.; No. 04-3014
SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur
in Judge Kennedy’s opinion. However, I would simply direct
the Warden to carry out the execution in the manner
advocated by the petitioners’ expert. The petitioners do not
challenge the fact of their execution; they challenge only the
method currently employed by the State of Ohio. By affidavit
they have proposed an alternative method which they
advocate does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The affidavit of the petitioners’ expert, Dr. Mark J.S. Heath,
which is incorporated into the petitioners’ “Motion to Stay
and Abey Proceedings,” states in relevant part:
J) The benefits of thiopental in the operating room
engender serious risks in the execution chamber. Based
on the information I have available to me concerning
Ohio’s execution protocol, a two (2) gram dose of
sodium thiopental is apparently administered in a single
injection from a single syringe. By contrast, based on
my research and the research of others into the
procedures for executing human beings by means of
lethal injection, the original design of the lethal injection
protocol called for the continuous intravenous
administration of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate. Based
on my research and the research of others, the central
elements of the lethal-injection procedure used in Ohio
is similar to the one adopted many years ago in
Oklahoma (which, it appears, many states used as a
model without substantive independent research).
Oklahoma requires the “continuous intravenous
administration of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate”
(Oklahoma Statutes, Title 22 Criminal Procedure,
Chapter 17 part 1014A). It does not appear that Ohio’s
protocol includes this “continuous” requirement. The
use of a continuous administration of the ultrashort-
acting barbiturate is essential to ensure continued and
sustained unconsciousness during the administration of
pancuronium and potassium chloride. It is my opinion
based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
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the failure to require a continuous infusion of thiopental
places the condemned inmate at a needless and
significant risk for the conscious experience of paralysis
during the excruciating pain of both suffocation and the
intravenous injection of potassium chloride.
Motion to Stay and Abey Proceedings, at 13 (quoting Heath
Affidavit ¶ 17).
If the Warden is ordered to follow the method advanced by
the petitioners’ chosen expert, then the procedural question
of whether the claim is properly considered a § 1983 action or
a successive habeas petition will be moot, as the petitioners
would have received the relief that they request.

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No. 04-3014, In re Lewis Williams, Jr.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I believe that the proper course of action is to grant the
preliminary injunction staying the execution of Williams.
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Nelson v.
Campbell, No. 03-6821, 2003 WL 22327593, 72 U.S.L.W.
3363 (Cert. Granted Dec. 1, 2003), calls into question our
decision in In re Sapp, 188 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997), upon
which the district court relied in transferring the action to us
as a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1631. In Sapp, a panel of this court held that a
challenge to a method of execution brought as an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes a habeas corpus petition. Sapp,
188 F.3d at 464. Sapp relied upon an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of
Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 653-54 (1992), in reaching its decision.
Now, the Supreme Court has undertaken to resolve the
following question: “Whether a complaint brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 by a death-sentenced state prisoner, who seeks
to stay his execution in order to pursue a challenge to the
procedures for carrying out the execution, is properly
recharacterized as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254?” Nelson, 2003 WL 22327593, at *1 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court’s ruling could directly overrule
Sapp, confirm the earlier high court holding upon which Sapp
relied, or reach some middle ground, but naturally we will not
know the answer to this question for several months.
It would be inappropriate and unjust to permit Williams’s
execution to occur when the Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether Williams has a right to present his claim as a § 1983
action. The Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, and other
circuits have all granted stays of execution when the Supreme
Court has taken a case to resolve an important issue germane
to the action. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 853 (1994);
Selvage v. Collins, 494 U.S. 108, 109 (1990); Steffen v. Tate,
39 F.3d 622, 623 (6th Cir. 1994); Mobley v. Head, 306 F.3d
1096, 1097 (11th Cir. 2003). Recently, the Fourth Circuit
stayed the execution of two prisoners, one from Virginia and
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one from North Carolina, pending the Supreme Court’s
decision in Nelson after those prisoners brought § 1983
claims apparently identical to Williams’s. See Reid v.
Johnson, No. 03-7916 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2003) (order
granting preliminary injunction); Rowsey v. Beck, No. 04-
6073 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2004) (order denying motion to vacate
stay of execution granted by the district court). The Supreme
Court denied a motion to vacate the stay in Reid, Johnson v.
Reid, 504 U.S. ____, 2003 WL 22970950 (Dec. 18, 2003), yet
it vacated the stay of execution in Rowsey, over the dissent of
four Justices. Beck v. Rowsey, 504 U.S. ____, 2004 WL
40382 (Jan. 8, 2004). The disparate treatment of these two
cases by the Supreme Court is difficult to reconcile given
their similarity; the district court in Rowsey stated that the
issue there was “factually and procedurally similar, if not
identical” to the issue in Reid. Rowsey v. Beck, No. 5:04-CT-
04-BO, at 4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2004). The Supreme Court’s
denial of an application for a stay of execution in Zimmerman
v. Johnson, 2003 U.S. Lexis 9199, 72 U.S.L.W. 3406
(Dec. 15, 2003), does not provide any further guidance.
Without further development of the reasons for the Supreme
Court’s actions, we should exercise prudence and caution in
the face of ambiguity when the consequences of our decision
have such gravity.
At this stage, the question of whether Williams has properly
filed a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B) is irrelevant
because the predicate issue of whether his § 1983 claim is
properly construed as a second or successive petition is
pending before the Supreme Court. Equally unimportant is a
consideration of the merits of Williams’s § 1983 action —
whether the State of Ohio’s procedures for lethal injection,
which include the allegedly improper use of the barbituate,
thiopental sodium, and the administration of a neuromuscular
blocking agent, pancuronium bromide, that is banned for
veterinary use by several states, constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
resolution to this question is not appropriately considered
now; if the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Nelson

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v. Campbell demonstrates that Williams’s action is a § 1983
action and not a second or successive habeas petition, the
district court must first consider his claim. In any event, the
contrasting views of the physicians’ affidavits presented by
Williams and the State of Ohio serve to demonstrate a serious
question regarding the merits. Nonetheless, here we simply
must decide whether Williams’s execution can go forward
given that the Supreme Court may determine that Williams
has the opportunity to present his grievance before the district
court as a § 1983 action. It should not.
In the interest of procedural fairness, I would grant the
motion for a preliminary injunction to stay the execution and
hold the case in abeyance. It would be cause for great regret
if Williams were executed on Wednesday morning only to
have the Supreme Court determine several months later that
Williams in fact deserved a chance to pursue his action in
federal district court.
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NO. 04-3014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: JOHN GLENN ROE
Petitioner-Appellant
v.
______________________________________/
Filed: January 12, 2004
BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, and CLAY,
Circuit Judges.
Petitioner John Glenn Roe filed joint motions with Lewis
Williams, Jr. to stay and abey proceedings and for
preliminary injunctive relief for stay of execution. Because
these are habeas proceedings, we address each of the
petitioners’ motions separately. We hereby adopt in this case
the reasoning and the result of the majority opinion authored
by Judge Kennedy and concurred in by Judge Suhrheinrich in
the matter of In re: Lewis Williams, Jr., issued on January 12,
2004. We further adopt the concurring opinion of Judge
Suhrheinrich in the Williams matter.
Thus, for the reasons stated in the those opinions, Petitioner
John Glenn Roe’s requests for a stay and abeyance and for
preliminary injunctive relief are DENIED.

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CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I hereby dissent from the order and opinion of the majority
in the instant case for the reasons expressed by Judge Moore’s
dissent in In re Lewis Williams, Jr., No. 04-3014.
2This order was initially entered on January 13, 2004. It was
amended on January 15 , 200 4 to reflect the jo inder in Judge Clay’s
dissenting opinion of the several judges noted as having done so. In all
other respects, the amended o rder is identical to the initial order.
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No. 04-3044
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
LEWIS WILLIAMS, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs -Appellants A M E N D E D
v.
O R D E R2
ROBERT TAFT, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees
Filed: January 15, 2004
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; KENNEDY, MARTIN,
S U H R H E I N R I C H , B A T C H E L D E R ,
DAUGHTREY, MOORE, COLE, CLAY,
GILMAN, GIBBONS, and ROGERS, Circuit
Judges
This matter comes before the court upon the petition of the
plaintiffs-appellants for initial hearing en banc of case No. 04-
3044 and a motion for stay of execution, and the motion of
the defendants-appellees for dismissal of the appeal.
A majority of the non-recused judges in regular active
service having voted to grant the petition for hearing en banc,
the petition is GRANTED and the appeal is referred to the en
banc court for further consideration.

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Less than a majority of the court having voted in favor of
either the motion to dismiss the appeal or the motion to stay
execution, those motions are hereby DENIED.
CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by MARTIN,
DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges. I
dissent from the order denying the motion to stay execution
in Williams v. Taft, No. 04-3044, because the vote was illegal
under 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). Section 46(c) provides, in relevant
part, that an en banc court “shall consist of all circuit judges
in regular active service …, except that any senior circuit
judge of the circuit shall be eligible … to participate … as a
member of an in banc court reviewing a decision of a panel
of which such judge was a member.” 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(emphasis added). In other words, the statute expressly
circumscribes a senior circuit judge’s ability to participate in
an en banc proceeding by limiting that participation to the
review of the panel’s decision from which the en banc review
arose. Here, all that is presently before the en banc court is a
motion to stay Williams’ execution, not the merits of the
preceding panel decision. Accordingly, the statute does not
permit Judges Kennedy and Suhrheinrich to participate in the
vote on the motion to stay. To the extent the Sixth Circuit
Rules, the Sixth Circuit Internal Operating Procedures or
internal Court Rules might be interpreted to grant my two
colleagues the right to vote, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) is paramount.
This misapplication of the statute has resulted in an outcome
contrary to law inasmuch as the requested stay would have
been granted in the absence of the votes cast by Judges
Kennedy and Suhrheinrich. Moreover, this unlawful denial
of the motion to stay has eviscerated the results of the poll of
the active judges granting en banc review. Without a stay, the
en banc review authorized by § 46(c) will never take place.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
________________________________
Leonard Green, Clerk
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Nos. 04-3044/3066
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOHN GLENN ROE,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v. O R D E R
ROBERT TAFT, Governor, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees
Filed: January 30, 2004
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MARTIN, BATCHELDER,
DAUGHTREY, MOORE, COLE, CLAY,
GILMAN, GIBBONS, ROGERS, and COOK,
Circuit Judges
A majority of the non-recused judges in active service
having voted sua sponte to reconsider and rescind the order
of January 13, 2004, granting hearing en banc in Case No. 04-
3044, all pending motions and filings are referred in the first
instance to the assigned panel, for such action as it finds
appropriate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Danny J. Boggs, Chief Judge, concurring in the issuance
of the court’s Order. There could be some controversy over
the extent to which the appeal initially filed “jointly” by Mr.
Williams and Mr. Roe on January 13 should have been treated
as a single matter, even though it clearly dealt with matters
considerably, if not totally, identical to those that had been
dealt with by separate death-penalty panels on January 12.
However, this court chose, without ultimate objection, to
treat Roe’s status as being an appellant within the “initial
hearing en banc” granted by the non-recused active members
of the court. Thus, at a minimum, the appeal lay within the
competence of the en banc court, and the en banc court was
free, on motion by a judge of that court, to reconsider and
rescind its previous action.
To the extent that Judge Clay challenges the decision of a
judge to vote rather than to recuse on a specific matter, that is
a matter within the discretion of the individual judge. The
court has no power to make a “decision to permit Judge Cook
to participate in the instant vote,” nor to prevent her from
participating. To the extent that I understand the matter,
Judge Cook never had any connection whatsoever with any
matters concerning John Glenn Roe in her previous service
on the Ohio Supreme Court. Lewis Williams is no longer
alive, and thus no matter concerning him can impact the
consideration of Roe’s case. There is thus no reasonable
ground to question her decision to vote on the matter that was
properly before the judges of the en banc court.
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CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by MARTIN,
DAUGHTREY, and COLE, Circuit Judges. Let us be
clear on what has just transpired. This Court extricated the
appeal relating to Petitioner John Roe’s claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 from Case No. 04-3044 in which en banc
review had already been granted on January 13, 2004;
assigned it a new case number; and conducted a vote on
whether to rescind the January 13 decision to hear the appeal
en banc. The adoption of this procedure, and the ensuing vote
to grant the rescission by a six to five vote, has nullified the
votes of the non-recused active judges cast on January 13 and
has created the appearance of manipulation and impropriety.
Accordingly, I dissent.
In Williams v. Taft, Case No. 04-3044 (6th Cir. Jan. 13,
2004), Lewis Williams and John Roe filed a complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging execution procedures. The
district court refused to entertain the lawsuit, construing it as
second or successive habeas corpus petitions that could not be
heard in the district court without the prior approval of this
Court. After the district court transferred the matter to this
Court, and Williams’ and Roe’s purported habeas claims were
assigned to separate three-judge panels, Williams and Roe
petitioned for initial en banc adjudication of the district
court’s decision that effectively dismissed their §1983 claims.
At that point, this Court arguably had the option of deeming
Roe’s en banc petition as duplicative of, or superseded by, the
three-judge panels’ review, but did not do so. This Court also
arguably had the option of uncoupling Williams’ and Roe’s
respective § 1983 claims for purposes of appellate review, but
it chose not to. Instead, this Court established that appellate
review of Williams’ and Roe’s respective § 1983 claims
would be considered jointly under a unitary case number,
separate and apart from the appeal considered by the three-
judge panels. A poll of the non-recused, active judges was
then conducted on whether to hear this case en banc. By a six
to four vote on January 13, the Court granted the petition for
initial hearing en banc. Judge Cook did not participate in that
vote, having recused herself on her own initiative.

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Prior to this Court’s vote to rescind the vote of January 13,
the only issue left open was Roe’s motion to stay the
execution, which had been a joint motion with Williams. For
the reasons stated in my dissent in Case No. 04-3044, the vote
on the motion to stay was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
due to the participation of Senior Judges Kennedy and
Suhrheinrich. But even assuming, arguendo, that their
participation had been proper with respect to Williams, it is
clear that that vote did not, and could not have impacted, Roe.
Judge Kennedy was not a member of the three-judge panel
that had adjudicated the successive petition issue with respect
to Roe. Accordingly, to the extent the Court’s judgment of
January 13 denied Roe’s motion to stay the execution, that
judgment should have vacated, and the non-recused, active
judges should have been polled on whether to grant Roe’s
motion to stay the execution. This was not done.
Even assuming it was technically proper for this Court to
have voted on whether to rescind its action of January 13, I
have grave concerns about this Court’s decision to permit
Judge Cook to participate in the instant vote. As noted, on
her own initiative, Judge Cook recused herself from the
January 13 vote concerning Williams’ and Roe’s joint request
for en banc review. After Williams was executed, however,
Judge Cook indicated that she should participate in an en
banc Court concerning Roe’s appeal because she had not
previously considered any matters concerning Roe. I beg to
differ. Judge Cook’s basis for recusal survived Williams’
execution because Williams’ and Roe’s appeals were
intertwined. Most of the pleadings and briefs pertaining to
Roe were joint efforts with Williams. Judge Cook necessarily
read and considered these papers in considering her vote on
the rescission. In addition, Judge Cook was privy to the intra-
Court communications and deliberations concerning
Williams’ appeal. Had this Court been aware that Judge
Cook was going to “un-recuse” herself after Williams’ death,
precautions would have been (or should have been) taken to
preclude her receipt of any pleadings or communications
concerning Williams. This was not done either. Needless to
say, Judge Cook’s consideration of how she should vote in
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Roe was necessarily influenced and impacted by the Court’s
deliberations in Williams from which Judge Cook recused
herself. The entire situation suggests impropriety.
Without Judge Cook’s vote, the vote to rescind would have
failed on a tie vote and the en banc Court would have
considered Roe’s appeal. Thus, the decision of this Court to
conduct another vote on whether to hear Roe’s appeal en
banc, combined with Judge Cook’s participation in that vote,
has created the perception that certain members of this Court
have manipulated the process to avoid, what was in their
view, the unfavorable result of the January 13th poll. This
outcome unfortunately conveys the impression of a result-
oriented process rather than an orderly process which seeks to
preserve the appearance and reality of due process.

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Nos. 04-3044/3066
UNITED STATES COURT APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOHN GLENN ROE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. O R D E R
ROBERT TAFT, Governor, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees;
________________________________________/
Filed: February 2, 2004
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, and CLAY, Circuit
Judges.
On January 30, 2004, a majority of the non-recused judges
in active service voted sua sponte to reconsider and rescind
the order of January 13, 2004, granting hearing en banc in
Case No. 04-3044, and ordering that “all pending motions and
filings are referred in the first instance to the assigned panel,
for such action as it finds appropriate.”
Thus, presently before this panel are the following motions:
(1) Appellant Roe’s Motion to Conform the En Banc
Court to the requirements of 28 U.S.C.§ 46(c);
(2) Appellant Roe’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment and
Renewed Motion for Stay of Execution;
(3) Appellant Roe’s Motion to Expedite Appeal;
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(4) Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of
Jurisdiction; and
(5) Appellees’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss Appeal for
Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction.
The majority of the panel having previously concluded that
Judge Graham properly transferred the § 1983 case to this
Court as a request to file a second petition, and having
concluded that Roe failed to meet the requirements for filing
a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2),
and having no sound reason to revisit those rulings, we
HEREBY DENY Appellant Roe’s Renewed Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and FURTHER DENY Roe’s Renewed
Motion for Stay of Execution. Appellant Roe’s Motion to
Expedite Appeal is GRANTED. Given the En Banc Court’s
January 30, 2004 order reconsidering and rescinding the order
of January 13, 2004, Appellant Roe’s Motion to Conform the
En Banc Court to the Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) is
MOOT. Appellees’ Motion and Renewed Motion to Dismiss
the Appeal are GRANTED.
CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. I dissent from
the panel’s denial of the motion to stay the execution and the
grant of the motion to dismiss the appeal. My reasons for
dissenting are set forth in my dissent to the panel’s prior order
of January 13, 2004, in Case No. 04-3044, and in my dissent
to the en banc Court’s order of January 30, 2004, in Case
Nos. 04-3044/3066.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
/s/ Leonard Green
___________________________________
Clerk

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