David Maples v. Jimmy Stegall

*The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0296P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0296p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
DAVID MAPLES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JIMMY STEGALL,
Respondent-Appellee.
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No. 01-2727
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 00-71718—Victoria A. Roberts, District Judge.
Submitted: June 18, 2003
Decided and Filed: August 19, 2003
Before: BOGGS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;
MARBLEY, District Judge.*
2 Maples v. Stegall No. 01-2727
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. David A. Maples, New
Haven, Michigan, pro se.
GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
MARBLEY, D. J., joined. BOGGS, J. (p. 15), delivered a
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. David Maples
pled guilty in Michigan state court to one count of
distributing cocaine. He did so only after receiving
assurances from his attorney that he would subsequently be
able to appeal an alleged violation of his speedy-trial rights.
That advice turned out to be erroneous. The Michigan Court
of Appeals held on direct appeal that Maples’s plea agreement
clearly precluded him from subsequently raising this issue.
After the Michigan court system denied him any relief,
either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings,
Maples filed a petition for habeas corpus in the district court
below. He raised, among other alleged errors, an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. The district court denied the
petition, but granted Maples a certificate of appealability
solely with respect to the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the
judgment of the district court and REMAND the case with
directions that the court assess the merits of Maples’s speedy-
trial argument as part of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.

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No. 01-2727 Maples v. Stegall 3
I. BACKGROUND
Maples was charged in Michigan state court with delivery
of more than 50 grams of cocaine and with being part of a
conspiracy to so deliver, in violation of Michigan state law.
He filed motions to dismiss the charges on the grounds that he
was entrapped and that the state’s 180-day speedy-trial rule
was violated. The court denied both motions.
On the day scheduled for trial, Maples entered into a plea
agreement, pursuant to which he pled guilty to the delivery
charge and the state moved to dismiss the conspiracy charge.
At the plea colloquy, the following exchange transpired
between Daniel Feinberg, Maples’s trial counsel, James
Sullivan, the Assistant District Attorney, and the court:
Feinberg: Also, your honor, I believe since it is a
jurisdictional matter, this wouldn’t affect [Maples’s]
rights preserved on appeal, 180 days and all that . . . .
The Court: I am not going to make any comments on the
180-day rule. I can’t remember whether it does or not.
Do you recall?
Sullivan: I am sure . . . I think he waived it.
The Court: I can’t comment on that. . . . I cannot tell you.
You are going to have to advise your client in that regard
on that; whether it is waived or not. I cannot make any
comments on that. Frankly, I don’t recall.
Maples subsequently accepted the plea agreement. He did so
because his counsel advised him that the plea agreement
would not preclude him from arguing on appeal that his
speedy-trial rights were violated.
Maples appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of
Appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss, which was based in part upon the alleged
violation of his right to a speedy trial. In an unpublished per
4 Maples v. Stegall No. 01-2727
curiam opinion, the state appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. It held that “Defendant’s unconditional guilty
plea waives review of the claimed violation of the 180-day
rule . . . and his claimed violation of his constitutional and
statutory right to a speedy trial . . . .”
Proceeding pro se, Maples then filed an application for
leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. He raised the
same claims that he had raised before the Court of Appeals,
as well as a claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to apprise Maples that he could not
appeal the speedy-trial issue after accepting the guilty plea.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in a
summary order.
Maples subsequently filed a motion for relief from
judgment with the state trial court. He again raised the
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and again the trial
court denied relief. Maples then sought leave to appeal the
trial court’s ruling to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
denied the application on October 21, 1999.
Fifty-one days later, on December 11, 1999, Maples
completed his application for leave to appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court. The application included a claim that his
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. That day,
Maples called the prison mailroom, per prison policy, to
ascertain the cost of mailing his application. He was told to
call back two days later.
On December 13, 1999, Maples was quoted the price to
send his application. Although the record is unclear on this
issue, it appears that Maples delivered his application to the
prison mailroom either that day or the very next day, 53 or 54
days after the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to
appeal.
The Michigan Supreme Court received Maples’s
application on December 17, 1999, 57 days after the Court of

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No. 01-2727 Maples v. Stegall 5
Appeals issued its ruling. This was untimely under Michigan
law, which requires that such an application “be filed [no]
more than 56 days after the Court of Appeals decision.”
MCR 7.302(C)(3). The Michigan Supreme Court therefore
returned the application without filing it due to the procedural
default.
Maples then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the district
court below. Among other claims raised in support of
collateral relief, Maples contended that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for misadvising him about his
ability to raise the speedy-trial issue after pleading guilty.
The district court denied the petition, holding in pertinent part
as follows:
Petitioner was represented by counsel at his plea, and he
indicated that his plea was voluntary and intelligent.
Although his attorney asserted that the plea did not waive
Petitioner’s right to raise his speedy trial claim on appeal,
the trial court stated that it could not comment on that
issue. The plea was not conditioned on Petitioner’s right
to appeal the speedy trial issue. Therefore, Petitioner’s
guilty plea forecloses habeas review of his speedy trial
claim.
The district court did not explicitly rule on the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. Maples filed a motion for a
certificate of appealability on this issue. The district court
granted a certificate as to “whether Maples received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney advised
Maples that he could plead guilty and still raise a speedy trial
claim on appeal.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
“This court applies de novo review to the decision of the
district court in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Harris v.
6 Maples v. Stegall No. 01-2727
Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 2000). Maples filed his
federal habeas corpus petition after the passage of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
codified principally at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It provides in
part that a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
with respect to a state-court judgment only where
the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This statute by its own terms is applicable only to habeas
claims that were “adjudicated on the merits in State court
. . . .” Id. Where, as here, the state court did not assess the
merits of a claim properly raised in a habeas petition, the
deference due under AEDPA does not apply. Williams v.
Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 706 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying pre-
AEDPA standards to a habeas petition filed pursuant to
§ 2254 because “no state court reviewed the merits of [the]
claim”). Instead, this court reviews questions of law and
mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Id.
The case law in this circuit, however, has been less than
consistent on this point, as indicated by the following
statement:
Several other circuits . . . found when a state court fails
to address a petitioner’s federal claim at all, the appellate
court should apply the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of
review. . . . Whether these courts’ holdings are correct,
however, is not for this panel to decide. In Doan [v.
Brigano, 237 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2001)], the state court
failed to mention, let alone adjudicate, the petitioner’s

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No. 01-2727 Maples v. Stegall 7
federal claim. However, the Doan court still applied the
AEDPA standard in reviewing the petitioner’s claim.
Even if the Doan court did not explain its reasoning for
adopting its position, this panel is still bound by its
decision.
Clifford v. Chandler, 333 F.3d 724, 730 (6th Cir. 2003)
(internal citations omitted). Normally, this would end our
inquiry, and we would proceed to apply AEDPA, because “[a]
panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of another
panel.” Hinchman v. Moore, 312 F.3d 198, 203 (6th Cir.
2002). Both Clifford and Doan, however, were abrogated by
Wiggins v. Smith, –U.S. –, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003), a Supreme
Court opinion that was issued the day after Clifford.
The Wiggins Court held that the petitioner was entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. Id. at 2544. It applied AEDPA’s
“unreasonable-application” test to the state court’s ruling on
the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2538 (“The Court of Appeals’
assumption that the investigation was adequate thus reflected
an unreasonable application of Strickland.”) (internal citation
omitted). The Wiggins Court, however, noted that because no
state court analyzed the petitioner’s claim for prejudice—the
second prong of Strickland—its “review [wa]s not
circumscribed by a state court conclusion.” Id. at 2542 (“In
this case, our review is not circumscribed by a state court
conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the state
courts below reached this prong of the Strickland analysis.”).
The Court therefore did not assess whether the state court’s
ruling “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” but rather conducted its review de novo. Id. at 2542-
44. In light of this new Supreme Court precedent, we too
must review Maples’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
de novo. See Hinchman, 312 F.3d at 203 (“[A] prior decision
remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision
8 Maples v. Stegall No. 01-2727
of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of
the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior
decision.”).
B. Maples’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476
(2000). A petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test to prevail
on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. First, the
petitioner must show that the performance of counsel fell
“below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688. In so doing, the petitioner must rebut the
presumption that counsel’s “challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The second prong requires that the defendant
“show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 694.
1. Procedural default
“Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only
after they have exhausted their claims in state court.”
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)). A habeas petitioner has not exhausted
his claims in state court unless he has “properly presented”
his claims to a state court of last resort. Id. at 848 (emphasis
omitted). The state’s sole argument in the present appeal is
that because Maples failed to timely raise his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim before the Michigan Supreme
Court, the federal courts are precluded from ruling on the
merits of the claim.
This court will consider the merits of a procedurally
defaulted claim in a habeas petition, however, where the

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No. 01-2727 Maples v. Stegall 9
petitioner “show[s] that there was cause for the default and
prejudice resulting from the default, or that a miscarriage of
justice will result from enforcing the procedural default in the
petitioner’s case.” Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 436
(6th Cir. 2003). A fuller explanation of this principle was set
forth in Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50 (6th Cir.
2000) (internal citations omitted), where the court stated:
When a habeas petitioner fails to obtain consideration of
a claim by a state court, either due to the petitioner’s
failure to raise that claim before the state courts while
state-court remedies are still available or due to a state
procedural rule that prevents the state courts from
reaching the merits of the petitioner’s claim, that claim is
procedurally defaulted and may not be considered by the
federal court on habeas review. A petitioner may avoid
this procedural default only by showing that there was
cause for the default and prejudice resulting from the
default, or that a miscarriage of justice will result from
enforcing the procedural default in the petitioner’s case.
The state contends that Maples has not shown cause for his
procedural default. “‘[C]ause’ under the cause and prejudice
test must be something external to the petitioner, something
that cannot fairly be attributed to him[;] . . . some objective
factor external to the defense [that] impeded . . . efforts to
comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (emphasis in original).
One of this court’s opinions that on the surface appears
similar to the case at bar is Shorter v. Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation & Corrections, 180 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 1999).
There, Shorter raised a claim in his habeas petition that was
not reviewed by the Ohio Supreme Court because his opening
brief was filed two days late. Id. at 724. Shorter argued that
there was “cause” for the procedural default because he had
been assured by the United States Postal Service that his brief
would be delivered to the Ohio Supreme Court no later than
the last day that it would have been accepted for filing. Id. at
725-26.
10 Maples v. Stegall No. 01-2727
In rejecting Shorter’s argument, this court held that cause
had not been demonstrated by entrusting the brief to the
Postal Service, since counsel could have hand-delivered the
brief to the clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court himself. Id. at
726. The key difference between the present case and Shorter
is that the petitioner in Shorter was represented by counsel,
whereas Maples was not. Shorter summarized its reasoning
as follows: “[P]etitioner’s . . . counsel elected not to drive the
brief to the Ohio Supreme Court . . . , but rather relied upon
the U.S. Postal Service. If such reliance constitutes ‘cause,’
then arguably, there is no hope for the concept of finality.”
Id. Maples, on the other hand, was proceeding pro se and,
because he was incarcerated, he did not have the opportunity
to hand-deliver his brief to the Michigan Supreme Court.
A case that we find much more on point is Mohn v. Bock,
208 F. Supp. 2d 796 (E.D. Mich. 2002). In Mohn, as here, the
habeas petitioner raised a claim that was not reviewed by the
Michigan Supreme Court because it arrived one day after the
56-day filing deadline. Id. at 801. Pursuant to prison policy,
Mohn had presented his brief to his prison unit manager five
days prior to the deadline. Id. at 802. But the brief was
apparently not sent out promptly, which resulted in it being
received one day late by the Michigan Supreme Court. The
application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme
Court was therefore rejected as untimely. Id. at 801-02.
In the subsequent habeas action, the district court held that
Mohn had demonstrated cause to excuse the procedural
default because “the papers were no longer in his control”
once he gave them to the prison officials five days prior to the
deadline. Id. at 802. Mohn is obviously not binding
precedent, but we fully agree with its result. Maples had
completed his application for leave to appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court five days prior to the filing deadline, and he
attempted to submit it to the prison officials at that time.
Unlike in Shorter, he did not have the ability, through
counsel, to deliver the papers personally to the state court, and
was instead forced to rely on prison officials to do this for

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No. 01-2727 Maples v. Stegall 11
him. The prison officials’ inaction, which resulted in the
application for leave to appeal being denied because it was
filed in an untimely fashion, presents an “objective factor
external to the defense [that] impeded . . . efforts to comply
with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753
(internal quotation marks omitted).
This is not to say that the “prison mailbox rule” established
by Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), is binding on the
state of Michigan, which it is not. See, e.g., Adams v.
LeMaster, 223 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that
“the Houston decision is not binding on state courts”). Where
a pro se prisoner attempts to deliver his petition for mailing
in sufficient time for it to arrive timely in the normal course
of events, however, the rule is sufficient to excuse a
procedural default based upon a late filing. If the prison had
accepted and mailed Maples’s petition when he first
attempted to deliver it—five days before the state’s
deadline—we have no doubt that it would have been timely
delivered in the normal course of events. Maples has
therefore shown cause to excuse his procedural default.
The prejudice resulting from the procedural default is that
the Michigan Supreme Court refused to consider Maples’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, as the
state admits, Maples “no longer has any procedure available
to present his claim to the Michigan Supreme Court.” The
state does not contest that the procedural default prejudiced
Maples. We thus will turn to the merits of Maples’s claim.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000)
(recognizing that a federal court should assess the merits of a
state habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claim when
the petitioner has demonstrated cause and prejudice that
excuses the default).
12 Maples v. Stegall No. 01-2727
2. The merits of Maples’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim
Maples’s trial counsel provided legal advice that, as the
Michigan Court of Appeals held, was patently erroneous.
Contrary to his counsel’s representation, Maples’s guilty plea
precluded him from appealing his speedy-trial claim. Such
advice certainly falls below an “objective standard of
reasonableness” and cannot possibly be considered “sound
trial strategy.”
Furthermore, Maples has stated that he would have insisted
on proceeding to trial, rather than plead guilty, but for his
counsel’s erroneous advice. The state has not challenged
Maples’s assertion, thus removing this factor as a contested
issue in this case. On the surface, at least, this satisfies the
prejudice standard as articulated in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 59 (1985), which applied Strickland to instances where
the defendant pleads guilty. The Court in Hill stated that in
order to establish prejudice “the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.”
Hill goes on to state, however, that “[i]n many guilty plea
cases . . . the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend
largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have
succeeded at trial.” Id. There are two plausible
interpretations of the preceding quotation. One reading of
Hill is that a court should sometimes, but not always, analyze
the merits of the underlying claim (e.g., whether there was in
fact a speedy-trial violation) in order to assess whether the
petitioner suffered prejudice. See id. (stating that a
substantive inquiry should occur “[i]n many guilty plea
cases,” implying that such an inquiry is not necessary in all
such cases). A second interpretation of Hill is that the court
must always analyze the substance of the petitioner’s
underlying claim, and that this inquiry will be dispositive to

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No. 01-2727 Maples v. Stegall 13
the resolution of the habeas action “in many guilty plea
cases.”
We believe that the second interpretation of Hill is
preferable for two reasons. First, it is more in line with this
court’s analysis of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
under Strickland, which inevitably engages in a substantive
inquiry into the petitioner’s claims. E.g., Carter v. Bell, 218
F.3d 581, 597-600 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the habeas
petitioner had demonstrated prejudice stemming from his
counsel’s ineffective assistance after analyzing the merits of
petitioner’s underlying claim). Second, Hill, like the case
before us, involved a situation where the petitioner’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim stemmed from trial
counsel’s affirmative misrepresentation to the defendant who
subsequently pled guilty. Id. at 54 (describing how
petitioner’s counsel misrepresented the amount of time that
the petitioner would be required to serve in prison before he
was eligible for parole).
We acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Hill did not
itself inquire into the substance of the petitioner’s claim, but
this was only because Hill did not clear the first hurdle of
stating that he would have proceeded to trial but for his
counsel’s errors. Id. at 60 (“Petitioner did not allege in his
habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed him
about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not
guilty and insisted on going to trial.”). Presumably, the Court
in Hill discussed the importance of inquiring into the merits
of a petitioner’s underlying claim because it intended for
lower courts to conduct such an analysis where, as here, the
petitioner’s counsel made an affirmative misrepresentation
upon which the petitioner reasonably relied in deciding to
plead guilty.
Because we adopt this interpretation of Hill, we must
remand this action to the district court to assess whether
Maples’s speedy-trial rights were in fact violated. The
14 Maples v. Stegall No. 01-2727
substance of the speedy-trial issue has neither been addressed
by any court nor briefed for this appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we VACATE the
judgment of the district court and REMAND the case with
directions that the court assess the merits of Maples’s speedy-
trial argument as part of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.

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No. 01-2727 Maples v. Stegall 15
______________________________________________
CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART
______________________________________________
BOGGS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part. Michigan has adopted a 56-day rule for application
to its Supreme Court for leave to appeal from a decision of
the court of appeals. As far as any precedent in any federal
court holds, Michigan would be free to set this limit as 46
days or 66 days or 36 days.
Given this leeway, and given the court’s holding that
Michigan is not obliged to adopt the federal “prison mail box
rule”, I do not see how the failure by Maples to file on time is
from a cause “external to the petitioner.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991).
There is no indication that Maples was prevented from
submitting his petition to prison authorities in sufficient time
that the normal course of the mails (with some leeway for
safety) would have delivered it to the Michigan Supreme
Court on time. The fact that Maples says he delayed because
he did not know the postage amount is unpersuasive. He
could have ascertained that amount at a much earlier time.
Indeed, there is no indication that knowledge of the exact
amount was a prerequisite for submitting his document to the
prison authorities for mailing; for all that appears, the proper
amount, whatever it was, would have been deducted from his
prison account.
Under these circumstances, to hold that petitioner’s failure
is from a reason “external” to him is no more persuasive then
saying that the 56-day limit was too stringent.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the court’s holding that
petitioner’s claim was not procedurally defaulted. To the
extent that the court surmounts this hurdle, I agree with the
remainder of its decision.

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