Donald Harris v. Clarice Stovall

*The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0169P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0169p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
DONALD HARRIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
C LARICE S TOVALL,
Respondent-Appellee.
;>

1
No. 98-2308
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 97-76301—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.
Argued: May 3, 2000
Decided and Filed: May 18, 2000
Before: SUHRHEINRICH and COLE, Circuit Judges;
QUIST, District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: James Sterling Lawrence, Detroit, Michigan, for
Appellant. Vincent J. Leone, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, HABEAS CORPUS DIVISION, Lansing,

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2 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308
Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Sterling
Lawrence, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Vincent J.
Leone, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
HABEAS CORPUS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for
Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
GORDON J. QUIST, District Judge. This appeal of the
denial of a habeas corpus application requires us to apply the
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(“AEDPA”). Donald Harris, a Michigan state prisoner
serving a mandatory life term for first-degree felony-murder,
appeals from an order of the district court denying his
application for habeas relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The victim was John Anthony, who was killed at
gunpoint while working in his store in Detroit. Harris did not
commit the crime alone. Two others, Stanley West and
Frederick Wilkes, were tried together and convicted of the
murder. Harris was tried later. In this appeal, Harris contends
that he was denied due process of law when, as an indigent
defendant, he was denied free transcripts of the earlier trial of
West and Wilkes. Harris claims that the transcripts were
necessary for effective impeachment of the state’s witnesses,
which would support his theory of innocence. The district
court held that petitioner had adequate alternatives to the
transcripts because copies of the preliminary examination
transcripts from the prior trial had been filed. The district
court also found that any error was harmless. The underlying
habeas action was filed in early 1997, and the standards under
the AEDPA apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336,
117 S. Ct. 2059, 2067 (1997); Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d
322, 326 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the district court
incorrectly applied the standards under the AEDPA, we
affirm the result it reached.

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No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 3
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court applies de novo review to the decision of the
district court in a habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g.,
Harpster, 128 F.3d at 326; West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 84
(6th Cir. 1996). Federal habeas review of the state court’s
decision is governed by the standards established by the
AEDPA. See Harpster, 128 F.3d at 326. Under the AEDPA,
an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in
a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
On April 18, 2000, the Supreme Court issued a decision in
Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), setting forth the
standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply
under § 2254(d). The Court held that a decision of the state
court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by
this Court on a questio n of law or if the state court decides a
case differently than this Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 1523. The Court further held
that an “unreasonable application” occurs when “the state
court identifies the correct legal principle from this Court’s
decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner’s case.” Id. A federal habeas court may not find
a state adjudication to be “unreasonable” “simply because that
court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 1522.
In this case, the district court referred to our holding in
Harpster, which simply noted the differing interpretations of
§ 2254(d) developing in our sister circuits, but found that the

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4 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308
standard under § 2254(d) had not been met. See Harpster,
128 F.3d at 326-27. Subsequently, in Nevers v. Killinger, 169
F.3d 352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2340 (1999), we
found it appropriate to rely on the Fifth Circuit’s “debatable
among reasonable jurists” standard in Drinkard v. Johnson,
97 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1996), combined with the First Circuit’s
standard of “so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of
record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside
the universe of plausible, credible outcomes,” set forth in
O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1998). See Nevers,
169 F.3d at 361-62. Later, we reaffirmed this approach in
Maurino v. Johnson, No. 98-1332, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL
432804, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2000). However, the
Supreme Court in Williams found that the Fourth Circuit’s
test—that a state court’s application of federal law was
“unreasonable” only if the court had applied federal law in a
manner that reasonable jurists would all agree was
unreasonable—was erroneously subjective, as the inquiry
should be objective. The Court expressly disavowed the Fifth
Circuit’s “reasonable jurist” standard set forth in Drinkard.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, we find
that Nevers and Maurino no longer correctly state the law on
the issue of the appropriate standard under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). We must therefore rely solely on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Williams for the appropriate standard
under § 2254(d).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Lack of a state court decision articulating its
reasoning
In this case, there appears to be no state court decision to
evaluate under § 2254(d). The issue concerning provision of
a free transcript was raised on appeal to the Michigan Court
of Appeals, which summarily issued an Order Granting [the
Prosecutor’s] Motion to Affirm on February 2, 1978. The
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on February
7, 1979. Thus, the issue is how to apply § 2254(d) when there
is no state court decision articulating its reasons.
No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 9
2We note that even if the Supreme Court had stated the rule sought
by petitioner in a decision issued after petitioner’s trial, petitioner could
not rely upon it. The rule must have been “as of the time of the relevant
state court decision.” Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523.
codefendants for purposes of impeaching witnesses.2 Such
a rule would impose a new obligation on the state government
under factual circumstances beyond that recognized by the
Supreme Court. Consequently, we conclude that Supreme
Court precedent existing at the time of petitioner’s trial did
not dictate or compel a rule that a defendant is entitled to a
free copy of a transcript of his codefendants’ previous trial for
impeachment of witnesses. Although a petitioner’s case need
not be factually identical to the facts in the case before the
Supreme Court, a better analog than as presented in this case
is necessary. Thus, the result of the decision of the Michigan
Court of Appeals to affirm petitioner’s conviction was not an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court
precedent on the rule sought by petitioner was not clearly
established.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.

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8 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308
needed); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 87 S.
Ct. 362 (1966)(per curiam)(transcript of habeas proceedings
needed for appeal); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83
S. Ct. 774 (1963) (transcript needed for appeal); Eskridge v.
Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S.
214, 78 S. Ct. 1061 (1958)(per curiam)(trial transcript needed
for an appeal); Griffin, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585 (trial
transcript needed for an appeal).
Moreover, the statement in Britt that the state must provide
an indigent defendant with the basic tools for an effective
defense was unquestionably broad. The Britt Court itself
recognized that "the outer limits of that principle are not
clear." Britt, 404 U.S. at 227, 92 S. Ct. at 433. Obviously,
the basic tools needed for an effective defense are not
contained in any list, and the Supreme Court has only begun
to delineate what the basic tools might be. For example, in
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), the
Court considered “whether, and under what conditions, the
participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to
preparation of a defense to require the State to provide an
indigent defendant with access to competent psychiatric
assistance in preparing the defense.” Id. at 77, 105 S. Ct. at
1093. The Court specifically mentioned that the language in
Britt regarding providing an indigent defendant the “basic
tools of an adequate defense or appeal,” was only the
beginning of the inquiry. Id. Then, in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), the Court
considered whether and when an indigent defendant is
entitled to nonpsychiatric expert assistance. See id. at 323
n.1, 105 S. Ct. at 2637 n.1. Thus, the Supreme Court has not
completely answered the question of what basic tools are
necessary for an adequate defense.
Petitioner has not cited any Supreme Court authority
extending the principles of Britt to an indigent defendant’s
request for free copies of transcripts from a prior trial of his
No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 5
1It would be error for a federal court to “remand” an action to the
state appellate courts for the issuance of fuller findings to facilitate review
under AEDPA or for a federal court to order any state court to issue fuller
findings. Where a state court decides a constitutional issue by form order
or without extended discussion, a habeas court should then focus on the
result of the state court’s decision, applying the standard articulated
above.
Other circuit courts have concluded that where the state
court has not articulated its reasoning, federal courts are
obligated to conduct an independent review of the record and
applicable law to determine whether the state court decision
is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly
established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See Aycox v.
Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1999) (“we must
uphold the state court’s summary decision unless our
independent review of the record and pertinent federal law
persuades us that its result contravenes or unreasonably
applies clearly established federal law, or is based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented”); Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 523
(7th Cir. 1999); Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087, 1091 n.3
(9th Cir.1999), vacated on other grounds, 120 S. Ct. 1002
(2000); accord Gordon v. Kelly, No. 98-1905, 2000 WL
145144, at *12 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000). That independent
review, however, is not a full, de novo review of the claims,
but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief
unless the state court’s result is not in keeping with the
strictures of the AEDPA.1 In this appeal, we find that the
result reached by the Michigan Court of Appeals in its
summary denial of petitioner’s claim was not inimical to the
AEDPA.
B. “Clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States”
The district court, applying Britt v. North Carolina, 404
U.S. 226, 92 S. Ct. 431 (1971), found that petitioner would be
entitled to a transcript from another defendant’s trial if the

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6 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308
transcript were “necessary for discovery or impeachment
purposes and there were no available alternatives to fulfill
those functions.” The district court also relied on other lower
court decisions, including our decision in Riggins v. Rees, 74
F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 1996). We find that the district court
erroneously applied the AEDPA to the decision of the
Michigan Court of Appeals through a misinterpretation of the
meaning of “clearly established federal law as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States” under § 2254(d) in
two critical ways.
First, the AEDPA expressly limits the source of law to
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). The Williams Court found that a federal court
must find a violation of law “clearly established” by holdings
of the Supreme Court, as opposed to its dicta, as of the time
of the relevant state court decision. See Williams, 120 S. Ct.
at 1523. We have stated that this provision marks a
“significant change” and prevents the district court from
looking to lower federal court decisions in determining
whether the state court decision is contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998). We
reemphasize that point here. It was error for the district court
to rely on authority other than that of the Supreme Court of
the United States in its analysis under § 2254(d).
Second, the district court failed to appropriately apply
“clearly established law” as determined by the Supreme Court
when it applied the rule in Britt to petitioner’s case. The
Williams Court stated that “[w]hatever would qualify as an
‘old rule’ under Teague will constitute ‘clearly established
Federal law, as determined by [this] Court.’” Williams, 120
S. Ct. at 1499 (citation omitted). Under Teague, “a case
announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes
a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1070
(1989). “To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. In determining
No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 7
whether the relief requested would constitute a new rule, the
question becomes “‘whether a state court considering [the
petitioner’s] claim at the time his conviction became final
would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude
that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.’”
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953
(1994)(quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S. Ct.
1257, 1260 (1990)). Thus, applying Teague principles,
“clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States” means that the rule sought by
petitioner must have been dictated or compelled by Britt. We
find that it was not.
Petitioner seeks a rule compelling the state to provide an
indigent defendant with free copies of trial transcripts of his
codefendants’ previous trial so that he can impeach the
prosecution’s witnesses. In Britt, the Supreme Court
considered whether an indigent petitioner was entitled to a
free transcript of his own previous trial, which had ended in
a mistrial because the jury was deadlocked. The Court relied
on Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956), which
held that as a matter of equal protection, the state must
“provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an
adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for
a price to other prisoners.” Britt, 404 U.S. at 227, 92 S. Ct. at
433.
Britt concerned a petitioner who requested a transcript of
his own prior trial which resulted in a deadlocked jury. In
contrast, petitioner seeks transcripts from a previous trial of
his codefendants. The decisions relied upon by the Britt
Court itself address situations where the petitioner needed a
transcript of proceedings in which he was directly involved.
See Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 89 S. Ct. 1818
(1969)(per curiam)(transcript of trial proceeding needed for
the petitioner’s appeal); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367,
89 S. Ct. 580 (1969) (transcript of state habeas proceedings
needed to bring appeal); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88
S. Ct. 194 (1967)(per curiam)(transcript of petitioner’s
preliminary hearing where state’s witnesses testimony was

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