(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-40496
(Summary Calendar)
LANEY J. HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GORDON R. SULLIVAN,
General Acting Secretary
Department of the Army,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(5:93-MC-14)
(March 8, 1995)
Before DUHÉ, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Laney J. Harris appeals the district
court's denial of motions to proceed in forma pauperis and for

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appointment of counsel in connection with his suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5. Finding no abuse of discretion in the rulings of the
district court, we affirm.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Harris filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that he had been subjected
to racial threats at work, that he was denied a "highly successful
performance rating," that he had been harassed and denied the same
rights and privileges that were enjoyed "by whites," and that he
was denied promotion on the basis of his race. He also filed a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and for the appointment
of counsel.
The magistrate judge found that Harris possessed sufficient
resources to pay the required fees and therefore failed to meet the
requirements to proceed IFP. The magistrate judge also found that,
given Harris's ability to afford an attorney and his failure to
establish that he had a meritorious claim, the appointment of
counsel would be unduly burdensome in his case and recommended that
Harris's motions be denied. After conducting a de novo review of
the record, the district court adopted the findings and conclusions
of the magistrate judge and denied Harris's motion to proceed IFP
and for the appointment of counsel. Harris timely filed a notice
of appeal.

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II
ANALYSIS
Harris contends on appeal that the district court erred by
denying his motion for the appointment of counsel. The
unconditional denial of counsel is an appealable interlocutory
order. See Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 1905).
The denial of Harris's motion is thus properly before this court.
Appointment of counsel in a Title VII case is not a matter of
right. Gonzalez v. Carlin, 907 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 1990).
Title VII merely authorizes district courts to appoint counsel to
represent Title VII plaintiffs upon application and "in such
circumstances as the court may deem just." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1). A federal district court has "considerable discretion" in
determining whether to appoint counsel, so we review such
determinations by the district court under an abuse of discretion
standard. Salmon v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 911 F.2d
1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1990). Factors that the trial court should
consider in determining whether to appoint counsel include the
probable success of the Title VII claim, the efforts taken by the
plaintiff to retain counsel, and the plaintiff's financial ability
to retain counsel. Id.
Harris has not shown that he is financially unable to retain
counsel. In his affidavit in support of his motion to proceed IFP,
Harris stated that he was unemployed, was receiving food stamps,
and had only $5 in his savings account and less than $5 in his
checking account. He also stated however, that in the previous

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twelve months he had received $4,620 from the Texas Employment
Commission, $16,076.83 from the Office of Personnel Management, and
$3,590.75 from the Red River Army Depot, his former employer. He
further stated that he owns three automobiles with a total
estimated value of $3,000, and a house and property valued at
$34,000. And, although Harris does not indicate in his brief that
he made an effort to retain counsel, the district court found that
Harris had been "reasonably diligent" in seeking counsel.
Harris has demonstrated no basis for us to find that the
district court erred reversibly in determining that Harris's
ability to establish a Title VII claim on failure to hire,
harassment, or reprisal is doubtful. See Salmon, 911 F.2d at 1166.
The district court relied in part on the determination of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Harris's claim had no
merit. A determination of the EEOC is "highly probative" in
determining whether to appoint counsel. Gonzalez, 907 F.2d at 580
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
Although Harris has alleged that he was subjected to a hostile
work environment, he has not shown likelihood of success for his
Title VII claim.
"A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one
that does not seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being, can and often will detract from employees'
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on
the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.
Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects,
the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so
severe or pervasive that it created a work environment
abusive to employees because of their race, gender,
religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad
rule of workplace equality."

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Portis v. First Nat'l Bank of New Albany, 34 F.3d 325, 331
(5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993)). "Evidence of a hostile work
environment claim may include `the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'"
Id. at 333 (quoting Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371).
Harris alleges that a Caucasian co-worker made a racist remark
to him in 1985 and again on another unspecified date, and that two
co-workers made racist remarks to him in 1991. Without more, these
allegations are not nearly sufficient to support a successful
"hostile work environment" claim under Title VII, as they fail to
meet Harris's "severe or pervasive" test. See Harris, 114 S. Ct.
370-71. Although Harris alleged that there were numerous other
incidents of harassment, he did not make specific arguments
regarding these other incidents. Thus he has not demonstrated the
probable success of his Title VII claim. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Harris's
motion for the appointment of counsel.
Harris also argues that the district court erred by denying
his motion to proceed IFP. Like an order denying appointment of
counsel, an order denying an application to proceed IFP is
immediately appealable, Flowers v. Turbine Support Division,
507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975), and thus is properly before
this court. The denial of IFP status is reviewed for an abuse of

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discretion. Id. at 1243-44.
Whether a party may proceed IFP in the district court is based
solely on economic criteria. Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891
(5th Cir. 1976). Poverty sufficient to qualify does not require
absolute destitution. Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). The central question is whether the
movant can afford the costs without undue hardship or deprivation
of the necessities of life. Id. at 339-40. As discussed above,
Harris has not demonstrated that he is a pauper. Further, Harris
paid the $100 appellate filing fee, suggesting that he has the
ability to afford the district court fees. The district court thus
did not abuse its discretion by denying Harris's motion to proceed
IFP. The remainder of Harris's appellate brief addresses the
merits of his civil rights claims, which have not yet been ruled on
by the district court and thus are not before us.
AFFIRMED.

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