(caption unavailable)

*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-11052
WILLIAM BRYAN FROUST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SCURRY COUNTY, TX, SHERIFF OF, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
June 11, 1996
Before GARWOOD, DAVIS and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.*
PER CURIAM:
After consideration of the arguments, briefs, and record, this
Court determines that no reversible error has been demonstrated in
the dismissal of appellant’s suit.
Among other things, it is evident that appellant suffered no
prejudice from the claimed denial of access to the courts. See
Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 2974 (1992). Appellant’s claim in this respect was based

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on his alleged inability to adequately respond to a motion to
dismiss filed in his pending civil rights case on July 15; he had
a twenty-day period in which to respond to the motion. He filed
his response on July 19, and was transferred out of defendants’
facility (where he was only sixty days in all) on July 20; on July
26 appellant filed a motion for summary judgment in his civil
rights case. That suit was pending before the same district court
(and district judge) as that in which the instant suit is pending.
Appellant claimed that because he lacked legal assistance, his
response was not what it could have been, with the result that the
motion to dismiss was granted in part on August 10. Appellant
identifies no deficiency in his response, nor how the partial
dismissal would have been avoided had the response been other than
what it was or had appellant been afforded legal assistance. The
magistrate judge took judicial notice that in the other suit the
motion to dismiss was granted in part as to claims against Sheriff
Dieken. Following our earlier remand, the defendants filed an
amended answer asserting, among other things, that after August 10
appellant had been allowed to file an amended complaint against
Dieken in the other case, and that it was still pending, and hence
appellant had suffered no prejudice. Responding to this answer,
appellant did not dispute those allegations, and indeed admitted
that Dieken had been reinstated as a defendant in the other case.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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