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*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-8491
Summary Calendar
WESLEY MARION HINDS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
JAMES A. COLLINS, Director
Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice
Institutional Division, ET AL.,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
CA W91 368
June 11, 1993
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
BACKGROUND
Wesley Marion Hinds, currently a prisoner in the Michael Unit
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, pleaded guilty to

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murder and was sentenced to serve 45 years in prison. He did not
appeal his conviction, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
later denied his application for a state writ of habeas corpus
without written order.
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis Hinds then filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The
magistrate judge recommended denying the petition and, over Hinds's
objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's
report and recommendation and denied the petition. The district
court granted Hinds a certificate of probable cause.
OPINION
Hinds challenges the validity of his guilty plea, arguing that
it was not intelligent or voluntary, and that it should not have
been accepted by the trial court. In particular, he contends that
the state's plea offer was invalid because it contained the
stipulation that the trial court would make an affirmative finding
that Hinds used a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime.
Because he pleaded guilty only as a party to murder, and not as the
primary actor, Hinds argues that under Texas law the state could
not offer, he could not agree to, and the trial court could not
accept, a guilty plea containing the affirmative finding that he
caused the death of another by use of a deadly weapon.
Hinds's argument fails because the Texas caselaw which he
cites as the basis of his argument is inapposite to the instant
case. He relies on Travelstead v. State, 693 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985), and Ex Parte Adkins, 767 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim.

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App. 1989) (en banc), for the proposition that an affirmative
finding that a deadly weapon was used invalidates a guilty plea
where the defendant pleaded guilty as a party to the offense, and
not as a primary actor. In so holding, however, the court in
Travelstead noted only that a trial court must make it clear that
"the defendant, and not another party, [must] use or exhibit the
deadly weapon." Travelstead, 693 S.W.2d at 402. The record
establishes that Hinds used the deadly weapon: Hinds specifically
testified during his guilty plea hearing that he used a knife
during the commission of the crime, and he entered a full judicial
confession to the indictment, which specifically alleged that he
used a deadly weapon to intentionally cause the death of another.
In Adkins the court noted, first, that it was clear from the
record and the face of the judgment that the defendant had pleaded
guilty to the offense only as a party, and not as a primary actor.
The court also found that the trial judge "went to great pains" to
ensure that the defendant knew he was pleading guilty to the murder
only as a party to the murder, and not as the actual "triggerman."
Finally, the court set the plea agreement aside because the record
was "replete with evidence that applicant, as a mere party to the
offense, never `used or exhibited a deadly weapon.'" Adkins, 767
S.W.2d at 811. The affirmative finding that the defendant used a
deadly weapon, therefore, was erroneous, despite its inclusion in
the original plea agreement. Id.
In the instant case, on the other hand, the record, face of
the judgment, and guilty plea colloquy, all indicate that Hinds

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pleaded guilty to the crime as a primary actor. The affirmative
finding that he used a deadly weapon was therefore not erroneous.
Hinds's guilty plea was also valid under federal standards.
Under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L.
Ed. 2d 274 (1969), before a trial court may accept a guilty plea it
must ascertain that the defendant "has a full understanding of what
the plea connotes and of its consequences." A plea will be deemed
voluntary and valid unless the defendant "has such an incomplete
understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an
intelligent admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S.
637, 645 n.13, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976); see also
Davis v. Butler, 825 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1985). In Gilliard v.
Scroggy, 847 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019
(1989), this Court stated that "[t]o satisfy due process, the state
trial judge must, at a minimum, inform the defendant of the
critical elements of the crime to ensure that he receives `real
notice of the true nature of the charge against him.'" Id. at 1143
(quoting Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645).
A review of the guilty plea colloquy in the instant case
reveals that Hinds was fully and adequately informed of the charge
against him, including the key elements which he now challenges.
In particular, the trial court informed Hinds that an affirmative
finding could be made that Hinds used or exhibited a deadly weapon
during the commission of the crime, and that such a finding could
adversely affect his eligibility for parole. Moreover, as noted

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above, Hinds specifically testified during his guilty plea hearing
that he used a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime.
In addition, the indictment, to which Hinds fully confessed,
charged that Hinds "intentionally and knowingly cause[d] the death
of an individual . . . by cutting and stabbing him with a knife."
This judicial confession, as well as Hinds's testimony, belies
Hinds's contention that he thought he was pleading guilty only as
a party to the offense, and not as a primary actor.
In a related argument, Hinds contends that the district court
improperly refused to accept the affidavits of his parents into
evidence. He argues that these affidavits establish that he
believed that he was pleading guilty only as a party to the
offense, and not as a primary actor. A careful reading of these
affidavits, however, establishes only that Hinds's parents believed
that Hinds acted as a "follower" in the crime, and was not the
principle cause of the decedent's death. The affidavits do not
speak to the plea agreement reached between Hinds and the State.
Hinds also argues that the district court erroneously failed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the merits of his
claim that he was convicted only as a party to the offense, and not
as a primary actor. A federal habeas petitioner is not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing where the record is complete or the
petitioner raises only legal claims which may be resolved by
reference to the existing record. Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d
493, 501 (5th Cir. 1988). The issue upon which Hinds sought an
evidentiary hearing is the same issue he has raised on appeal. It

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is apparent from the preceding discussion that the existing record
is adequate to address that claim. Thus, an evidentiary hearing is
unnecessary. See Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir.
1988).
Finally, Hinds alleges that the district court erred when it
declined to address his claim that he has been denied equal
protection of the law. He contends that he is entitled to the same
relief as the defendant in Adkins, and the failure of the district
court to grant him such relief constitutes a violation of his equal
protection rights. As was demonstrated previously, however,
Hinds's case is factually distinguishable from Adkins. He is
therefore not "similarly situated" to the defendant in Adkins. See
Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989).
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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