* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
1 The facts presented in this opinion are based on the facts
given in this Court's opinion in Jones's direct appeal. See United
States v. Jones, No. 91-8399 (5th Cir. March 10, 1992)
(unpublished).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-8411
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ROY MARION JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
(A 83 CR 36)
October 25, 1993
Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
BACKGROUND 1
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2
This case involves a 1982 conspiracy to import 1000 pounds of
marijuana into the United States from Mexico. Roy Marion Jones was
to fly an Aero-Commander airplane containing the marijuana from a
ranch in Mexico to a ranch in Texas. Jones test flew the Aero-
Commander, but it was apparently unsuitable and arrangements were
made for a Beechcraft Bonanza aircraft to be used.
Subsequently, the Bonanza was located on radar, heading north
over international waters on a course for the United States. Three
planes from the Customs Service were dispatched to intercept the
Bonanza. Drug Enforcement Agent Richard Braziel made radio contact
with the pilot of the Bonanza and recognized the voice as that of
Jones. The Bonanza then landed at the Killeen, Texas, airport
followed shortly by the Customs planes. When the government agents
arrived at the Bonanza, the pilot was gone, but the load of
marijuana was not. One of Jones's fingerprints was found on the
entry door of the aircraft. Jones was not located, but was
reported to be hiding in Mexico.
Jones was indicted for his part in the above conspiracy on
April 6, 1983, but was not brought to trial until April 1991.
Jones had been arrested and convicted on a cocaine charge in
Barraquilla, Colombia, in 1983 and was incarcerated in a Colombian
jail until 1988. Jones was using a alias at the time. Following
release from the Colombian jail, Jones lived in Central and South
America under a false name. He was not arrested until he returned
to Miami, Florida, in late 1990. A jury found Jones guilty of
conspiring to import marijuana and conspiring to possess with
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3
intent to distribute marijuana. Jones was found not guilty on the
counts of the indictment charging him with the actual importation
and possession of the marijuana. The district court sentenced
Jones to five years on each conspiracy count, with the terms of
imprisonment to run consecutively. Jones was also ordered to pay
a $15,000 fine.
On direct appeal, Jones argued that the delay in bringing him
to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial, that
the evidence to support his conspiracy convictions were
insufficient, and that the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing him. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
Jones filed a motion to correct or reduce his sentence
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 arguing the second and third issues
listed above. The district court denied the motion because it
lacked merit. Jones timely filed a notice of appeal.
Subsequently, Jones filed an unopposed motion with this Court to
remand the case so that the district court could consider the
Supreme Court case of Doggett v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 112
S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992) (speedy trial issue). This
Court granted the motion. After allowing briefing on the subject
of Jones's right to a speedy trial, the district court again found
no merit in Jones's Rule 35 motion. The district court returned
the case to this Court and this Court reinstated Jones's appeal.
OPINION
The version of Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) applicable to defendants
such as Jones, who committed offenses prior to November 1, 1987,
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2 The district court denied the motion because it lacked
merit; however, the Government had asserted to the district court
that a Rule 35 motion was not the proper mechanism to bring these
claims. As a result, this Court may affirm the district court's
denial of the Rule 35 motion on this basis. See Bickford v.
International Speedway Corp., 654 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. Unit A
August 31, 1981).
4
provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within
the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence." Motions
under Rule 35(a) are restricted to correcting illegal sentences2;
and are not for raising issues challenging the validity of the
underlying conviction. United States v. Hanyard, 762 F.2d 1226,
1229 (5th Cir. 1985).
The questions of whether Jones was denied his constitutional
right to a speedy trial and whether he should have been acquitted
on the conspiracy counts because he was acquitted on the
substantive counts of the indictment both present issues attacking
the validity of his underlying conviction. Therefore, denial of
the Rule 35 motion with respect to these issues was correct.
Jones argues that the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to two consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment.
Jones's offense was committed before the effective date of the
sentencing guidelines. A sentence imposed within the statutory
limits in such a case is generally not subject to appellate review.
United States v. Castillo-Roman, 774 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir.
1985). A pre-guidelines sentence will only be overturned if it was
arbitrarily and capriciously imposed, a gross abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Johnson, 823 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 1987).
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3 United States v. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d 738, 756-57
(5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984)
overruled Rodriguez on other grounds. See United States v.
Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1513 n.29 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1422 (1993).
5
On direct appeal, Jones unsuccessfully argued that the
sentence was excessive because it was more than his codefendants
received. In his Rule 35 motion, Jones argues that the district
court incorrectly imposed a consecutive rather than concurrent
sentences because the conspiracy to import marijuana and the
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana arose
from the same transaction. Imposition of consecutive sentences for
these two separate counts of conviction was approved by the court
in United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906, 920-25 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc), aff'd sub nom. Alberanz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333
(1981).3 Jones has not shown any abuse of discretion on the part
of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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