(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________
No. 92- 7235
(Summary Calendar)
_____________________________
THELMA D. HALL, Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellant
_________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi
(CA DC91-W3-D-O)
_________________________________________________
(December 9, 1992)
BEFORE KING, DAVIS, and WIENER, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
In this Mississippi personal injury diversity case, Defendant-
Appellant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) appeals the jury verdict
in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Thelma Hall, complaining that the
district court erred in denying Wal-Mart's Motion for Judgment as
a Matter of Law. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The facts of this case present a variation on the traditional

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"slip and fall" situation. Hall, an elderly woman, sued Wal-Mart
alleging that she had tripped over a concrete parking "bumper"SQthe
type of concrete divider commonly used in parking lots to delineate
parking rows or spacesSQand suffered serious injuries. At trial,
Hall testified that she was exiting the Wal-Mart store, looking
straight ahead on a clear day, when her foot hit something hard and
she fell to the ground. She also testified that she had not seen
the bumper and that she had rarely, if ever, walked through the
parking lot.
In addition to Hall's testimony, photographs of the bumper
were introduced showing its placement and condition. The
photographs show that the bumper in question was not placed between
two opposing parking spots, but ran parallel to a space designated
for handicapped parking. In other words, the bumper in question
was placed perpendicular to all of the other bumpers in the lot.
Moreover, the photographs showed that most of the customary yellow
paint had chipped off the bumper, diminishing its visibility.
Wal-Mart made a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, at the end of Hall's case-in-chief
and again at the end of all evidence. The district court denied
both these motions and submitted the case to the jury. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Hall in the amount of $50,000. Wal-
Mart renewed its objection, filing a post-trial Motion for Judgment
as a Matter of Law, which was also denied. Wal-Mart timely
appealed.

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1 United States Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
690 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982).
2 Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969)
(en banc).
3 Kroger, Inc. v. Ware, 512 So.2d 1281, 1282 (Miss. 1982)
(citations omitted).
4 Stanley v. Morgan & Lindsey Inc., 203 So.2d 473, 476
(Miss. 1967).
3
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a district court may grant a Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law if there "is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury" to find for a particular party on a particular
issue. "The standard of review for motions . . . under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50 are the same for a trial court and an appellate court."1
Thus, we review the jury verdict to determine whether reasonable
jurors could not have reached the result on the evidence
submitted.2
Under Mississippi law, the owner of a business has a duty to
exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably
safe condition and warning of dangerous conditions that are not
readily apparent.3 The owner, however, "is not an insurer of the
customer using the parking lot and sidewalks, and is not liable for
injuries cause by conditions which are not dangerous or which are
or should be known or obvious to the customer."4 Whether a
condition is "open and obvious" "is a question for the jury in all

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5 Bell v. Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657, 664 (Miss. 1985).
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except the clearest cases."5
We cannot agree with Wal-Mart that this case is so clear that
no question for the jury existed. The facts introduced by Hall
demonstrates that there is indeed a question whether this
particular bumperSQplaced in an unusual position and denuded of
most of its yellow warning paintSQwas open and obvious. We
conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Wal-Mart had
breached a duty owed to Hall and was negligent in its placement and
maintenance of the concrete bumper. We find no need to abandon our
extreme deference to findings of facts by juries, given the
circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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