(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-4624
Summary Calendar
BEATRICE J. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
U. S. SECRETARY OF HHS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(91-CV-817)
January 22, 1993
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMoss, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
BACKGROUND
Beatrice J. Brown applied for supplemental social security
benefits because of disability in April 1989. She described her
disability as high blood pressure, a back problem, breathing
difficulties and recent surgery for a vaginal problem. According

-- 1 of 12 --

2
to Brown, she became disabled in 1977 and had not worked since that
time.
Brown's claim was denied initially in June 1989 and on
reconsideration. She requested and received a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).
In March 1990 the ALJ determined that Brown had not engaged in
substantial gainful employment since 1977. Although she was unable
to perform her past relevant work as a cafeteria worker because of
a severe condition, the ALJ found that Brown had the residual
functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work.
He found that Brown was not under a disability as defined in the
Social Security Act at any time through the date of the decision.
The decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Secretary
when the Appeals Council denied Brown's request for review.
Brown filed suit in the district court seeking review of the
Secretary's decision. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court adopted the report and recommendation
of the magistrate judge and affirmed the Secretary's decision.
Brown was born in 1944 and completed the tenth grade. She
described herself as a housewife between 1966 and the time of her
application for benefits. Brown worked several weeks at an
unspecified job at some type of tomato business and several months
as a dishwasher in a school cafeteria. She claims that she stopped
working at the cafeteria because she could not carry heavy objects.
Although carrying heavy objects was also a problem at the tomato

-- 2 of 12 --

3
business, she allegedly left that job because the company was
destroyed in a fire.
In her initial disability reports filed in April 1989, Brown
stated that she could do light house cleaning but that when she
bent over low her back ached. She also reported that she walked
for exercise, sometimes visited with friends and relatives, and
drove her car occasionally. Although Brown did her own shopping,
she brought her daughter along because her vision would become
blurry sometimes and it would be difficult to see small objects.
Additionally, Brown stated that she did most of her own cooking and
put her clothes in the washing machine. Finally, Brown complained
that she sometimes became tired when she walked, had back aches
"off and on," experienced head aches "sort of often," and at times
was short of breath.
Brown has had numerous surgical procedures and medical
problems dating from at least 1986.
In May 1986, Dr. Foster Stickley performed an exploratory
laparotomy, total abdominal hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy. The diagnosis was uterine fibroid, endometriosis of
the fallopian tubes and ovaries, pelvic inflammatory disease, and
anemia, secondary to blood loss. The surgery was described as very
traumatic but Brown tolerated the procedure well and was sent to
recovery in excellent condition.
In April 1987 Dr. Lonnie Gardiner performed a combined
flexible esophagogastroduodenoscopic procedure to evaluate Brown's
chronic epigastric pains. This procedure revealed mild diffuse

-- 3 of 12 --

4
gastritis and mild distal esophagitis. As a result, Brown was
placed on intensive medical therapy for four to eight weeks.
In August 1988 Dr. Gardiner performed a partial colonoscopy to
evaluate rectal bleeding. The examination revealed moderate
internal hemorrhoids, but no polyps, vascular lesions, or mass
lesions.
In January 1989 Dr. Gardiner performed a flexible
sigmoidoscopy on Brown to determine the cause of hemoccult positive
stools and rectal bleeding. The examination revealed moderate
internal hemorrhoids, but no polyps or vascular or mass lesions.
In preparation for vaginal surgery in April 1989, Dr. Stickley
took X-rays of Brown which revealed scoliosis of the lower thoracic
spine with convexity to the right. The X-rays showed no evidence
of active cardiopulmonary disease.
During the April 1989 surgical procedure Stickley took
multiple vaginal biopsies from Brown. A pathologist's evaluation
of the biopsies revealed a small benign epithelial inclusion cyst,
a small focus of calcification, and foci of nonspecific chronic
inflammation. The report indicated no evidence of endometriosis or
neoplasm (tumors). Dr. Stickley observed that "nothing we found in
her vagina . . . would make her have any problems medically for
disability."
Dr. Kenneth Ritter examined Brown in June of 1989 for the
Disability Determinations Services. Ritter found that Brown's
problems were:
(1) Hypertension under good control at the
present time, and it, with increased

-- 4 of 12 --

5
heart size, and the chart from her family
physician, is [sic] apparent that this
has only been under recent control, and
not under very good control in the past.
(2) Some abdominal pain of an unknown type
although certainly with the number of
medication [sic] she takes this is
possibly responsible for this.
(3) Thoracic Scol[i]osis as a possible cause
of her back pain.
Ritter concluded that "[f]unctionally Mrs. Brown could certainly do
most of the things someone her age would be expected to do. I
found her to walk well, to be reasonably strong, and to not have
significant difficulties in bending or moving around."
Dr. Gardiner, corresponding with Brown's attorney in October
1989, described her chronic medical problems as including
"hypertension, marked scoliosis of the lumbar spine, osteoarthritis
of the lumbar spine, and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
spine." According to Gardiner, "[t]hese conditions of the lumbar
spine cause significant back pain and disability for . . . Brown."
Gardiner remarked that "[g]iven Mrs. Brown's conditions, I feel
that the most she could do would be sedentary work; however, she
may be unable to tolerate even sedentary work."
OPINION
This Court reviews the Secretary's decision to deny disability
benefits based on whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support it and whether the proper legal standards were
used in evaluating the evidence. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019,
1021 (5th Cir. 1990). "Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence

-- 5 of 12 --

6
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Id. at 1021-22 (citation omitted).
In applying this standard, the Court does not reweigh the
evidence or try the issues de novo, but must review the entire
record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support
the Secretary's findings. Id. at 1022.
An individual is disabled under the Social Security Act if he
is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A).
The Secretary follows a five-step process in evaluating a
disability claim. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. If the response to any
step in the process is inconclusive, the Secretary proceeds to the
next step. A finding that a claimant is disabled or not disabled
at any point terminates the sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1992).
In order to be evaluated as disabled, the claimant: (1) cannot
be performing work that is substantial gainful employment; (2) must
have a severe impairment that limits his physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities; (3) must have an impairment that meets
the duration requirement and is listed or equal to one listed in
the appendix to the regulations; (4) cannot have the residual
functional capacity, measured by physical and mental demands, to do

-- 6 of 12 --

7
work performed in the past; and (5) cannot be able to perform other
work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(f); Anthony, 954 F.2d at 293.
The claimant has the initial burden of establishing that he
can no longer perform his previous work. The burden then shifts to
the Secretary to show that there is other substantial work which
the claimant can perform. If the Secretary meets this burden, the
claimant must then prove that he is not able to perform the
alternate work. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th
Cir. 1989); see Carter v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir.
1983). While Brown could no longer perform work she did in the
past, for the reasons stated below, the ALJ correctly reached the
fifth step and ruled that Brown could engage in substantial gainful
activity because of her age, education, past relevant work, and
residual functional capacity.
Brown contends that there was no substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ's decision. Specifically she claims that the
ALJ did not give adequate consideration to her subjective
complaints of pain, i.e., the stomach pain and breathing
impairment, and did not consider the combined effects of her
hypertension, back impairment, and other problems in the context of
her ability to engage in the full range of sedentary work on a
sustained basis.
Where a claimant is said to be capable of performing sedentary
work, the ALJ must consider the likelihood that the claimant can
meet the minimum physical requirements on a daily basis in the
"`sometimes competitive and stressful conditions'" of the real

-- 7 of 12 --

8
world. Wingo v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Allred v. Heckler, 729 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984)).
Subjective Pain:
The effect of the claimant's subjective pain forms part of
the determination of whether he can function in the "competitive
and stressful conditions" of the real world. "How much pain is
disabling is a question for the ALJ since the ALJ has primary
responsibility for resolving conflicts in the evidence." Scharlow
v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1981). Subjective
evidence need not be given precedence over objective evidence.
Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d at 1024.
In considering Brown's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ
made the following observations:
[the] claimant's subjective symptoms,
including pain, are of only a mild to moderate
degree and tolerable to claimant for the level
of work, residual functional capacity and work
limitations as found herein; and claimant's
subjective complaints are found not be [sic]
fully credible but somewhat exaggerated and
inconsistant [sic] with objective evidence of
record."
Under case law in this Circuit, "[a]t a minimum, objective medical
evidence must demonstrate the existence of a condition that could
reasonably be expected to produce the level of pain or other
symptoms alleged." Anthony, 954 F.2d at 296. The ALJ made clear
that he did not fully credit Brown's allegations of subjective
pain. Considering the discretion accorded the ALJ on this issue
and in light of his findings on the objecti ve evidence discussed

-- 8 of 12 --

9
below, the ALJ had sufficiently explicit and adequate reasons for
dismissing Brown's subjective complaints of pain.
Objective Medical Evidence:
The ALJ also scrutinized the combined effect of Brown's
impairments analyzing the basis and outcome of each of Brown's
surgical procedures and nonsurgical consultations to find that she
was not disabled.
The ALJ dismissed Brown's back condition by noting the
following factors: (1) she took only pain medication to treat it;
(2) she drove when necessary; (3) she stated that she had just
learned to live with the pain; and (4) her treating physician
observed only that she might possibly not be able to endure
sedentary work. He also noted that Brown had "full range of motion
of all [the] joints in her legs." As a result, the ALJ found that
Brown had the residual functional capacity to "perform the physical
exertion requirements of work except for the inability to engage in
the lifting and carrying requirements of light, medium and heavy
work due to scoliosis of the lumbar spine."
The ALJ weighed the objective medical evidence and explained
his reasons for discrediting the claimant's subjective complaints
of pain. See Anderson, 887 F.2d at 633. According to the ALJ,
"[t]he credible objective medical evidence of record is not
supportive of claimant's exaggerated allegations of totally
debilitating pain." Brown did not present medical evidence to
contradict his finding concerning her medical condition.

-- 9 of 12 --

10
There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's
determination that Brown's medical condition and pain do not amount
to a disability for purposes of social security.
Brown also contends that the ALJ erred by giving greater
weight to the opinions of the consulting physician rather than
those of the treating physician.
As an initial matter, Brown mischaracterizes the record by
alleging that the ALJ gave "little or no consideration to Dr.
Gardiner's opinion regarding [her] inability to do the full range
of even sedentary work."
Dr. Gardiner observed that Brown "may be unable to tolerate
even sedentary work," not that she could not perform the full range
of sedentary work. The ALJ incorporated Gardiner's evaluation in
his decision but chose not to give its equivocal nature controlling
weight in favor of disability. The ALJ gave greater weight to Dr.
Ritter's determination that Brown was "reasonably strong" and could
"walk well" and move around without inordinate difficulty.
As a general matter, to the extent the evidence was
inconsistent, "the ALJ is . . . charged with the responsibility and
discretion to determine just what weight to give to conflicting
evidence presented at the hearing." Wingo, 852 F.2d at 830. More
specifically, the ALJ is entitled to determine the credibility of
medical experts and to weigh their opinions accordingly. Scott v.
Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985). Gardiner's
determination of Brown's residual functional capacity was at best
equivocal. Ritter's evaluation by contrast was more definite.

-- 10 of 12 --

11
There is no case law, statutory, or administrative support for
Brown's proposition that a consulting physician's opinion is per se
less weighty than that of a treating physician. "The ALJ may give
less weight to a treating physician's opinion when `there is good
cause shown to the contrary.'" Id. (citations omitted).
Brown's final argument rests on the premise that she has a
significant non-exertional impairment that prevents her from
engaging in the full range of sedentary work and that the ALJ was
obligated to establish the existence of available jobs based on
expert vocational testimony.
Where "the findings of fact made with respect to a particular
individual's vocational factors and residual functional capacity
coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule, the rule
directs a conclusion as to whether the individual is or is not
disabled." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(a).
Here the ALJ made findings of fact as to Brown's age, education,
transferability of skills, work experience, and residual functional
capacity. In particular, he found that she had a ninth grade
education, was a "younger individual," had engaged in unskilled
work in the past, and retained the residual functional capacity to
work in a job that did not require light, medium, or heavy lifting
or carrying. These findings coincided with the criteria in the
Medical Vocational Guidelines and it was proper to rely on them.
Anderson, 887 F.2d at 634.
Sedentary work is defined as work that:
involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a
time and occasionally lifting or carrying

-- 11 of 12 --

12
articles like docket files, ledgers, and small
tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as
one which involves sitting, a certain amount
of walking and standing is often necessary in
carrying out job duties.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). These requirements are not dissimilar to
the types of activities Brown reported that she could perform.
An ALJ must solicit vocational testimony only if a claimant
cannot perform substantially all of the activities in a given
category of exertional requirements. Carter, 712 F.2d at 142. In
other words, the claimant must meet his prima facie burden of
showing disability before the ALJ must consult a vocational expert.
Green v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1091 (1983). Brown made no such showing. The ALJ
can take administrative notice that a significant number of
sedentary jobs exist in the region where the claimant lives. 20
C.F.R. § 416.966(d). The ALJ, here, found that Appendix 2 of 20
C.F.R. § 416.969 described numerous jobs in the national economy
that Brown could perform.
In this case, there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's findings and application of the vocational
guidelines. For these reasons, the secretary's decision to deny
Brown's application for supplemental social security was supported
by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.

-- 12 of 12 --