United States of America v. James Harold Otis

* District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting
by designation.
**Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 92-4610
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES HAROLD OTIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
CR6 91 62 (02)
_________________________________________________________________
March 25, 1993
Before KING and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and COBB*,
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
James Otis conditionally pled guilty to one count of cocaine
possession with the intent to distribute, a violation of 18
U.S.C. 841(a)(1), but reserved his right to appeal the district
court's denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress. The district

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court sentenced Otis to 121 months' imprisonment to be followed
by five years of supervised release. The only issue on appeal is
whether the district court erred in denying Otis' Fourth
Amendment motion to suppress evidence. Finding no error, we
affirm.
James Otis was a co-defendant of Robert Ryles, Jr., whose
conviction we have affirmed on this same day. See United States
v. Ryles, No. 92-4742, slip op. (to be reported in ___ F.2d ___).
Because Otis' Fourth Amendment claim is essentially identical to
Ryles' Fourth Amendment claim, which we rejected, we incorporate
herein our factual and legal discussion in Ryles' case. (Our
slip opinion in Ryles is attached hereto as an Appendix.)
We note that the only difference between Ryles' claim and
Otis' claim was that Ryles was the driver of the van, from which
the cocaine was seized, and Otis was a passenger and apparently
also the owner of the van. That factual difference is irrelevant
to our disposition of the Fourth Amendment claim. With respect
to both Ryles and Otis, the warrantless search and seizure of the
cocaine in the van by Texas DPS Trooper Barry Washington was both
reasonable and constitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's denial of
Otis' motion to suppress was proper and, thus, Otis' conviction
is AFFIRMED.

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