(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens
on the legal profession." Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 92-3475
_______________
TONI DECOSSAF HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
K-MART CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
CA 90 2180 "I"
_________________________
May 19, 1993
Before WISDOM, DAVIS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This slip and fall case arose on July 26, 1989, when Toni
Hernandez slipped in a small puddle of bubble bath or shampoo in a
Chalmette, Louisiana, K-Mart store. Hernandez's husband caught
her before she fell, but the slip injured her back and aggravated
a dormant cyst in her ankle. After a three-day trial, the jury
awarded damages of $31,916.58. After reviewing the briefs and

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2
record, we conclude that no error occurred and affirm the judg-
ment.
I.
The district court established August 2, 1991, as the dead-
line for amending the complaint. On December 30, 1991, eight days
before trial, Hernandez sought to join the K-mart manager as an
additional defendant )) a joinder that would have destroyed diver-
sity of citizenship and deprived the district court of jurisdic-
tion. We review the district court's denial of Hernandez's motion
for abuse of discretion. Daves v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 661
F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981).
The district court did not abuse its discretion. Hernandez
seeks to justify her delay in seeking the amendment by claiming
that a Louisiana appellate decision clarified the law in this
area, allowing her to sue the manager. See Holmes v. Great Atlan-
tic & Pac. Tea Co., 587 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writ
denied, 592 So. 2d 412 (1992). We find this claim puzzling, as
that decision states that the law on this point has been settled
since 1973. See id. at 752.
Simply because a court had held that joinder was improper in
another case involving this K-Mart, does not mean that the law was
confused. Rather, the court in the other case applied the settled
law and concluded that no liability could be imposed under that
standard. Even if the law were incorrectly applied in that other
case, Hernandez had no excuse for not attempting to join the man-

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1 We reject Hernandez's argument that the district court abused its
discretion in excluding the testimony of her safety experts. The testimony
offered by the experts related to matters within the common knowledge of typi-
cal people, thereby obviating the need for expert analysis. Peters v. Five
Star Marine Serv., 898 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
3
ager earlier.
II.
Next, Hernandez argues that the district court erred by fail-
ing to grant her motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a
new trial on the ground that the evidence does not support a find-
ing of comparative negligence. The jury found Hernandez twenty-
five percent at fault. We must affirm the verdict unless the
evidence points so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that a
reasonable jury could not have arrived at the verdict. Boeing Co.
v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
Hernandez calls our attention to Doming v. K-Mart Corp., 540
So. 2d 400, 405 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), affirming the trial
court's granting of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
issue of comparative negligence. The trial court reduced the jury
finding of forty percent negligence to five percent. Here, how-
ever, the record presents adequate evidence to support the ver-
dict. Hernandez had shopped at this store many times and was
familiar with the store's layout. She testified that at the time
of the accident, she was looking straight ahead, rather than down,
and was not looking at displays or merchandise. A reasonable jury
could find negligence from these facts.1

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III.
Hernandez also argues that the jury verdict undercompensated
her for pain and suffering and disregarded evidence of her loss of
earnings. We will not disturb a jury finding on damages unless it
is entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained. Caldarera
v. Eastern Airlines, 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983). We do not
believe that the award for pain and suffering was so dispropor-
tionate as to justify a new trial, as the award was approximately
half as large as the damages for medical expenses. This award is
especially justified, as Hernandez admitted on cross-examination
that she had reinjured her ankle when she fell off of her
crutches. Given that she had previously denied this injury, the
jury had reason to question her veracity.
Likewise, we cannot conclude that the jury's award for loss
of earnings was unreasonable. Hernandez worked for her mother's
accounting firm and testified that she had missed thirty-nine
weeks of work because of the accident. Hernandez's mother testi-
fied, without documentation, that just prior to the accident she
had decided to increase Hernandez's workload and responsibilities
substantially. We think a reasonable jury could view this testi-
mony with some skepticism. As a result, we cannot disturb the
jury's findings.
IV.
Finally, Hernandez asserts that the jury erred by failing to

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2 K-Mart Corporation argues that we do not have jurisdiction over the
loss of consortium claim because Hernandez's husband is not listed as a party
on the notice of appeal. Although the notice of appeal uses the phrase "et
al.," we previously have held that "et al." suffices to provide notice where
there are only two parties. Morales v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 914 F.2d 83, 85
(5th Cir. 1990).
5
award damages for loss of consortium.2 Hernandez's husband testi-
fied that he had sexual relations with his wife once or twice per
day, every day before the accident, and that this dwindled to
about once per month after the accident. He testified that
Hernandez was bedridden for four months, yet she never told her
doctor. Given the frequency of pre-accident sexual relations
alleged by Hernandez, the jury rightly could view his claim with
some skepticism. When combined with the overall questionable
nature of testimony on other issues, the jury reasonably could
choose not to believe Mr. Hernandez's testimony.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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