(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-3026
(Summary Calendar)
GLENN LUCAS and EVA L. LUCAS,
ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CHRISTOPHER KELLY LIGHTFOOT,
ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(91-CV-2243 M)
(February 25, 1993)
Before KING, DAVIS and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This appeal is the latest chapterSQand, we insist, the last
oneSQin litigation fomented by Glenn and Eva Lucas following a
March 1, 1986, motor vehicle allision with an apartment building.

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2
The case has been up and down the state court system in Louisiana
as well as the federal district and appeals courts, off and on ever
since. Although the litigation may have commenced properly enough,
it has long since degenerated into harassment, vindictiveness and
pettifoggery by the Lucases, proceeding pro se. In one last
demonstration of patience, we objectively address in this opinion
the remaining arguments and claims proffered by the Lucases,
cautioning them, however, that our tolerance for their dogged
perseverance in presenting their now-baseless claims is at an end.
Should they not heed this caution but instead make any further
efforts whatsoever to prolong what has become totally unmeritorious
and frivolous litigation, they shall do so at the risk of exposure
to the full panoply of sanctions at our disposal.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
After a vehicle struck and damaged an apartment rented by
Glenn and Eva Lucas they filed a lawsuit in a Louisiana state
court, individually and on behalf of their minor children, alleging
that the accident had caused them personal and mental suffering.
Named as defendants in the suit were the driver of the vehicle,
Vincentine Acker, Acker's insurance carrier, and the owner of the
apartment, David Kraus. The Lucases alleged that Kraus failed to
take proper steps to make the damaged premises safe, and that he
failed to assist them in finding alternate housing while their
rental apartment was being repaired.
Kraus filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the

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1 The Lucases previously filed a tort action in federal
district court which was dismissed as frivolous and for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. After the dismissal, the Lucases
amended their complaint in order to state violations of their civil
rights. We affirmed the dismissal, concluding that "[f]ederal
jurisdiction cannot be invoked to review state-court judgments by
simply recasting the action in the form of a civil-rights
complaint, which is precisely what Lucas is doing here."
3
action against him should be dismissed for failure to establish an
actionable claim. After hearing oral argument on the motion, the
state trial judge rendered summary judgment in favor of Kraus. The
judgment was affirmed by the state court of appeal and certiorari
was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The Lucases filed the instant § 1983 action naming as
defendants Steven Koehler, the attorney who represented Vincentine
Acker; Christopher Kelly Lightfoot, the attorney who represented
David Kraus; Lightfoot's law firm, Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann
& Papale; John H. Brooks, who briefly represented the Lucases;
Joseph Clark, who subsequently represented the Lucases; and Clark's
law firm, Lewis & Caplan. Also named as defendants were the trial
judge, the state court of appeal, the state supreme court, and the
State of Louisiana.1
Attorney Koehler filed a motion to dismiss the § 1983 action,
arguing that the Lucases' claims were barred by prescription. The
remaining attorneys filed motions for summary judgment grounded in
prescription, and the State of Louisiana filed a Rule 12(b) motion,
claiming that the suit against it and its courts was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. The district court granted the motions, and
the Lucases appealed. We dismissed the appeal because the claims

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4
against the state trial judge remained to be adjudicated. He
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing absolute judicial
immunity. The district court granted the motion, and this appeal
followed.
II
ANALYSIS
A. Prescription
The Lucases argue that the district court erred in determining
that their claims were barred by prescription. They urge that
their claim is essentially for discrimination and under Louisiana
law, the prescriptive period of ten years applies. We review de
novo a district court's determination that a claim is time-barred.
Hickey v. Irving Independent School Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982
(5th Cir. 1992).
Although the Civil Rights Act provides a remedy for
discrimination, the essence of a civil rights suit is personal
injury, or tort. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280,
105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Each of the Lucases' claims
is governed by Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period for tort.
See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280 (the forum state's general personal
injury limitation applies to § 1983 suits); Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987)
(claims under § 1981 are also properly characterized as claims for
personal injury); Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 32,
35 n.4 (5th Cir.), opinion withdrawn in part, 688 F.2d 342
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 951 (1983) (a claim under

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§ 1985 is subject to Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations.);
42 U.S.C. § 1986; La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
A cause of action under § 1983 accrues when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the
action. The statute of limitations therefore begins to run when
the plaintiff is in possession of the critical facts that he has
been damaged and who has inflicted the injury. Gartrell v. Gaylor,
F.2d (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 1993, No. 92-2619), slip op. at
1947. The actionable injury in a civil conspiracy flows from the
overt acts of the defendants, not from the mere continuation of the
conspiracy. Turner v. Upton County, Tex., 967 F.2d 181, 185
(5th Cir. 1992) (citing Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 234-
35 (1st Cir. 1977)). Characterizing the defendants' separate
wrongful acts as having been committed in furtherance of a
conspiracy does not interrupt, suspend or otherwise postpone the
accrual of claims based on individual wrongful acts. Helton v.
Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
Thus, a cause of action may accrue before the final overt act in
furtherance of a conspiracy has been committed. Kadar, 549 F.2d at
234-35.
The Lucases advance the conclusionary allegations that as a
matter of racial discrimination the attorney-defendants conspired
to cause the dismissal of their state court lawsuit. They
similarly allege that the trial judge facilitated the conspiracy by
granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment; that the
state court of appeal ruled improperly by affirming the district

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2 The Lucases correctly assert that the district court
erroneously stated that their claim was filed on July 22, 1991;
however, the district court's error does not affect a determination
that the claim was time-barred, except as to the Louisiana Supreme
Court.
3 The amended complaint naming the State as a defendant was
not filed until July 21, 1991. It is questionable whether the
amended pleading would "relate back" to the date of the original
pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3).
6
court's actions; that the state supreme court tacitly approved of
the district court's actions by denying certiorari; and that the
State of Louisiana is responsible for the conduct of the state
courts. The Lucases continue to insist that they are entitled to
relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(2)(3), 1986, and 1988.
Final judgment in the state litigation, which dismissed the
Lucases' lawsuit, was rendered on September 15, 1989. The Lucases
filed the present § 1983 suit on June 19, 1991.2 Thus, the
district court correctly determined that their claims based on the
dismissal of the suit had prescribed. The state court of appeal
affirmed the district court's decision on April 11, 1990.
Consequently, the Lucases' claim against that court also
prescribed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari on
June 22, 1990. Even if we assume that the Lucases' claims against
the Louisiana Supreme Court and the State of Louisiana are not
barred by prescription,3 we may uphold the district court's
decision if there is some basis in the record supporting it. See
Knotts v. United States, 893 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1990). Again,
the state argued that the suit should be dismissed on the basis of

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7
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Louisiana Supreme Court is a
creature of the Louisiana Constitution and is thus an arm of the
state. See La. Const. Art. 5 § 3 (West 1992); Voisin's Oyster
House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1986). The
district court could have properly granted the motion on the basis
of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Garias v. Bexar Cty. Bd. of
Tr., 925 F.2d 866, 875 n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 193
(1991). Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of the
Lucases' claims against the Louisiana Supreme Court and the State
of Louisiana was proper and is affirmed.
The Lucases also posit that it was impossible for them to
determine that their civil rights had been violated because they
are not trained in the law. This assertion is disingenuous. After
their first federal complaint was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and as frivolous, the Lucases amended their
complaint on September 14, 1990, for the purpose of stating
violations of their civil rights. This demonstrates beyond serious
question that the Lucases knew of the alleged violations of their
civil rights before the one year prescriptive period had run.
The Lucases next contend that, even assuming that the
prescriptive period of one year applies, their claim was
nonetheless timely filed, given that they had to exhaust state
court remedies. They argue that their motion to join the trial
judge and the State of Louisiana interrupted the applicable
prescriptive period.
Although Congress has carved out specific, limited exhaustion

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requirements for adult prisoners, exhaustion of state
administrative remedies is generally not a prerequisite to the
bringing of an action pursuant to § 1983 by others not so situated.
Gartrell, slip op. at 1948 (citations omitted). Further, there is
no tolling provision applicable to the Lucases' case. See Rodriguez
v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1992) (when applying the
forum state's statute of limitations, the federal court should also
give effect to any applicable tolling provisions). This argument
is without merit.
B. Inappropriate or Premature Motions for Summary Judgment?
The Lucases next insist that the district court should not
have granted the attorney-defendants' motions for summary judgment
because those motions were inappropriate and premature. They urge
that the motions were inappropriate because the defendants filed
earlier motions attacking the claim as res judicata under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, which motions were denied. Thus, they allege, the
defendants are now precluded from raising the defense of
prescription because they should have raised the defense in the
earlier Rule 12 motion.
The filing of a Rule 12 motion does not preclude a defendant
from asserting a separate defense in his answer. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b). Each of the attorney-defendants asserted the defense of
prescription in a timely manner. Defendants Lightfoot, Hailey and
McNamara asserted the defense in their answer, as did defendants
Clark, Brooks, and Lewis & Caplan. Defendant Koehler asserted the
defense in a Rule 12 motion. The motions were not inappropriate.

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9
The Lucases also argue that the motions are premature because
a minimum of 30 days must elapse following the commencement of an
action before a motion for summary judgment can be filed. This
argument is specious. The rule to which the Lucases cite applies
to the claimant in an action, not the defendant. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A defending party may move for summary
judgment at any time after a complaint is filed. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b).
C. Loss of Judicial Immunity?
The Lucases also argue that the trial judge "lost" his
judicial immunity because he had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Even assuming that the judge could not assert the judicial
immunity defense, the action against him is time-barred as
previously discussed. Thus, this issue is moot.
D. Prejudice
Finally, the Lucases argue that our conduct and that of the
federal district court was prejudicial toward them. In its opinion
denying the defendants' motion for dismissal based on res judicata,
the district court stated that the Lucases' claims may be non-
meritorious. The Lucases argue that the district court's statement
encouraged the defendants to file their motions for summary
judgment. They also argue that the district court should not have
consolidated the hearing on the state's motion for dismissal with
the attorney-defendants' motions for summary judgment. They state
that doing so amounted to "judicial sabotage" rather than judicial
economy. They also claim that we erred in dismissing their

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10
previous appeal without addressing its merits.
These arguments are facially frivolous. A district court has
broad discretion in controlling its own docket. Edwards v. Cass
County, Tex, 919 F.2d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1990). The Lucases have
not established, nor does the record show, that the district court
abused its discretion by consolidating the defendants' motions.
We dismissed the Lucases' previous appeal for lack of
jurisdiction because the claims against the state trial judge
remained to be adjudicated; therefore, we need not have addressed
the merits of the appeal. Our action in so doing was not
"prejudicial" to the Lucases' case.
The Lucases also list as issues, but do not argue, that
Koehler and the trial judge failed to file answers to their
complaint and that the case should be remanded back to district
court. Only issues that are briefed are properly before this
court. Price v. Digtal Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.
1988). As these issues are not properly before us, we need not and
therefore do not address them.
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the district court
here under review are affirmed. We end this opinion as we began
it, cautioning the Lucases to accept the fact that the litigation
which dates to the accident of March 1, 1986, is dead. They must
take no further steps to resurrect it. In this regard, no further
filings by the Lucases, even petitions for panel rehearing or

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suggestions for rehearing en banc, shall be accepted by the clerk
of this court without the express written consent of a judge of
this court.
SO ORDERED.

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