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* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-1135
No. 93-1349
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ZAKEE MUHAMMAD IDDEEN, a/k/a
WINDEL X. McMILLIAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(CA3-89-642-D(CR3-86-141-D))
(April 12, 1994)
Before GARWOOD, SMITH and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Zakee Muhammed Iddeen (Iddeen)
pleaded guilty of mail fraud in 1986. Later, the district judge
denied Iddeen's motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to a

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four-year term of imprisonment on each of the ten counts of
conviction. The district judge made the sentences run
consecutively. This Court affirmed Iddeen's conviction. The
district court denied Iddeen's motion under former Fed. R. Crim P.
35 to reduce his sentence. This Court affirmed the district
court's denial.
Iddeen then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for post-
conviction relief. He later amended his motion. The district
judge denied Iddeen's motion. Iddeen filed a notice of appeal.
The clerk of this Court granted Iddeen a stay of his appeal so that
Iddeen could file another § 2255 motion to raise another issue.
Iddeen returned to the district court and filed a motion for
rehearing and for recusal of the district judge. The district
judge denied Iddeen's motion. Iddeen filed a second motion for §
2255 relief. The magistrate judge recommended that the district
judge deny relief. The district judge adopted the magistrate
judge's report and recommendations and denied Iddeen's § 2255
motion. The clerk of this Court granted Iddeen's motion to
consolidate his appeals.
OPINION
Iddeen first contends that the district judge violated Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32 and the Due Process Clause by failing to identify the
victims of Iddeen's fraud and by failing to make a specific finding
regarding the amount of fraud for which Iddeen was responsible.
Iddeen raised in his first § 2255 motion the issue of the district
judge's failure to identify the victims. To the extent that Iddeen

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1 Iddeen evidently did not raise his contention on direct
appeal or in his motion under former Fed. R. Civ. P. 35. See R. 2,
240-48; R. 3, 323-26. The district court did not consider whether
Iddeen was procedurally barred from raising the contention in his
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wishes to raise a contention under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, the narrow
scope of § 2255 precludes him from so doing.
Relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 is reserved
for transgressions of constitutional rights
and for a narrow range of injuries that could
not have been raised on direct appeal and
would, if condoned, result in a complete
miscarriage of justice. Nonconstitutional
claims that could have been raised on direct
appeal, but were not, may not be asserted in a
collateral proceeding.
United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992)(internal
citation omitted). Iddeen could have raised a Rule 32 violation as
an issue on direct appeal.
Due process requires that the information that
the trial judge relies on in sentencing have
"some minimal indicium of reliability" and
"bear some rational relationship to the
decision to impose a particular sentence."
The defendant bears the burden of proving that
the information considered in sentencing is
"materially untrue."
United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 784 (5th Cir.
1991)(citations omitted). The sentencing transcript does not
indicate that the district judge relied on the identity of Iddeen's
victims when passing sentence. Nor did Iddeen object when the
district judge noted that Iddeen's offense had "led to the physical
destruction of many people's lives." Iddeen does not contend that
the district judge's conclusion was based on facts that are
materially untrue. His due process claim regarding the identity of
his victims must fail.1

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§ 2255 proceedings. See R. 3, 461-63; Supp. R. 12-14, 64-67, 69.
The Government made no appearance in those proceedings and
therefore did not raise the procedural bar issue. See Loose
Papers, tab B. This Court therefore need not consider whether
Iddeen was procedurally barred from raising the due process aspect
of the alleged failure of the district court to make factual
findings. See U.S. v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 995 (5th Cir. 1992).
4
Iddeen raised the district judge's failure to make a specific
finding on the amount of fraud in the district court solely in his
motion for a rehearing and for recusal of the district judge. In
that motion, Iddeen contended that counsel's failure to object to
the district court's statement that Iddeen had committed a "massive
amount of fraud" constituted ineffective assistance of counsel
because the district judge had obtained his information from
outside the record; that the judge should recuse himself and
testify about the definition of a "massive amount of fraud"; and
that his sentence was disproportionate. Even construing Iddeen's
rehearing and recusal motion liberally in the context of his § 2255
proceeding, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this Court
finds that Iddeen failed to raise a claim under either Rule 32 or
the Due Process Clause regarding the district judge's finding that
he had committed a "massive amount of fraud." Iddeen did not
contend that the district judge violated Rule 32 or the Due Process
Clause by basing his sentence, in part, on finding that Iddeen had

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engaged in a "massive amount of fraud." See id. Rather, Iddeen's
motion was based on ineffective assistance of counsel and recusal
arguments.
Even assuming that Iddeen's recusal and rehearing motion
should be construed as an amendment to his § 2255 motions, his
contention regarding the district judge's finding that he committed
a "massive amount of fraud" must fail. First, Iddeen did not
object to the district judge's finding. Second, the factual basis
for the plea, which Iddeen signed, indicates that he was involved
in defrauding insurance companies for at least ten non-existent
automobile accidents. Iddeen does not contend that his own factual
basis is materially inaccurate. That factual basis supports the
district court's conclusion regarding the scope of Iddeen's fraud.
Iddeen, who is represented by counsel, argues that the judge
should have recused himself because he had personal knowledge about
disputed sentencing facts, specifically, the identity of the
victims and the meaning of a "massive amount of fraud." Iddeen
also contends that the district judge should be called at an
evidentiary hearing to divulge his knowledge.
A federal judge should recuse himself, inter alia, "[w]here he
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Iddeen has not shown that
the district judge had personal, extra-judicial knowledge about any
of the facts in Iddeen's case. Iddeen's contention that the
district judge should be called as a witness at an evidentiary

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hearing is ridiculous and deserves no further comment.
Iddeen next contends that his cumulative sentence of 40 years
in prison is disproportionate and violates the Eighth Amendment.
He raised his disproportionality contention on direct appeal and in
his former Rule 35 motion. "It is settled in this Circuit that
issues raised and disposed of in a previous appeal from an original
judgment of conviction are not considered in § 2255 Motions."
United States v. Kalish, 780 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1118 (1986). Iddeen is foreclosed from raising
his Eighth Amendment contention.
Iddeen contends that his guilty plea was induced by counsel's
ineffective assistance. He raised ineffective-assistance
contentions in his direct appeal. This Court disposed of those
contentions on the merits. "`A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, once raised, litigated and rejected . . . cannot be raised
in a later proceeding merely by varying the factors allegedly
demonstrating incompetency.'" Glass v. Butler, 820 F.2d 112, 115
(5th Cir. 1987)(citation omitted). Iddeen therefore is foreclosed
from raising his ineffective-assistance contentions.
Iddeen next contends that the district judge violated the Due
Process Clause and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 by relying on information
gained at his co-defendants' trial without notifying Iddeen that he
would do so and without giving Iddeen an opportunity to controvert
the information on which the judge relied. Iddeen raised his
contention in his motion under former Rule 35. He therefore is
foreclosed from raising his contention in his § 2255 proceeding.

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Iddeen next contends that the district court should have held
evidentiary hearings on his motions. The district court may
dispose of a defendant's § 2255 motion without a hearing if "`the
motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'" United States v.
Drummond, 910 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1990)(citation omitted),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104 (1991). The motion and files of
Iddeen's case conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief.
No evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Finally, Iddeen contends that the district court should not
have dismissed his second motion as an abuse of § 2255. Iddeen
argues that he did not know the legal significance of the new
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel he raised in that
motion when he filed his first motion. He also argues that the
Court may consider the due process claim raised in his second
motion because the district court disposed of his first motion on
the merits.
As is discussed above, Iddeen is foreclosed from bringing new
ineffective-assistance claims. Additionally, as is discussed
above, Iddeen is foreclosed from contending that the district judge
erred by relying on information gained at the trial of Iddeen's co-
defendants. Because Iddeen cannot raise either of the contentions
he attempted to raise in his second § 2255 motion, this Court need
not address whether the district court dismissed a portion of his
second motion as repetitive.

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Iddeen's appeal is frivolous. Iddeen now has had three bites
at the appellate apple. This Court takes this occasion to warn
Iddeen and his retained attorney, Kevin J. Clancy, that future
frivolous appeals on Iddeen's behalf, particularly appeals in which
he attempts to raise issues he is foreclosed from raising, could
result in sanctions.
DISMISSED.

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