(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 91-1731
Summary Calendar
_______________________
ROBERT E. TUBWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DETECTIVE JERRY BLANKENSHIP,
ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(CAJ 89 0473 (L))
_________________________________________________________________
(December 18, 1992)
Before GARWOOD, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Tubwell challenges the district court's grant
of a directed verdict and other asserted trial errors in connection
with his civil rights claim against three police officers. Because
the trial court committed no reversible errors, we affirm.
Tubwell challenges the court's grant of defendants'
motion for a directed verdict on his two substantive claims. The

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district court reasoned that Tubwell's claim for denial of medical
care following his participation in a high-speed automobile chase
with the police was inadequate legally because Tubwell did not show
that the police exhibited deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. Technically, this was not the right formula. As
Tubwell was more like a pretrial detainee at the time of the chase
than a prisoner, the Constitution guaranteed his right to
reasonable medical care unless the failure to provide it was
related to a legitimate governmental objective. Van Cleave v.
United States, 854 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1988). The court did not
err in granting directed verdict, however, because Tubwell admitted
he experienced only slight, temporary injuries. There was no real
need for medical care, hence no unconstitutional deprivation of
care.
The court also granted a directed verdict on Tubwell's
procedural due process claim having to do with the fact that the
police called a private company to tow his car to a garage after he
was arrested. The car was released to a member of Tubwell's family
after they paid towing and storage fees. The district court held
that Tubwell had not shown that state remedies were inadequate to
protect his property rights. We need not focus on the adequacy of
remedies available under state procedure, however, because Tubwell
has not shown that what the officers did was wrong. The car was
not removed from him permanently; it was only towed and stored
temporarily. How state or federal constitutional law could have
been violated by this expediency following Tubwell's arrest is a

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mystery, and Tubwell's brief does not solve it. We discern no
deprivation of property without procedural due process and, equally
important, no basis on which to deny the defendants' claim of
qualified immunity.
The procedural issues of which Tubwell complains are
meritless. First, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in rescheduling the trial, particularly where Tubwell specifically
agreed to go forward on the rescheduled date. Second, the error,
if any, in denying Tubwell's motion in limine that sought to
prevent impeaching him with a 15-year old conviction for armed
robbery was harmless in light of the district court's grant of a
directed verdict. Third, Tubwell's challenge to one juror is moot
because the case was withdrawn from the jury's consideration.
Fourth, Tubwell does not dispute that he is an experienced writ-
writer and therefore had no need of appointed counsel.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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