19-30512•Landreneau v. Baker Hughes a G E
19-30512United States Court Of Appeals For The 5th Circuit11 feb 2020
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-30512
Summary Calendar
CHAD LANDRENEAU,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
BAKER HUGHES A G E COMPANY, L.L.C., formerly doing business as
Baker Hughes, Incorporated,
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 6:17-CV-773
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:*
Chad Landreneau appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on his sex discrimination claim under the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law, La. R.S. 23:332. We affirm.
Landreneau worked in the Human Resources (HR) department at Baker
Hughes for five and a half years, first as an HR Generalist and ultimately as
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5
TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 11, 2020
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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2
an HR Business Partner. Baker Hughes conducted annual evaluations of
Landreneau’s performance, and in his first four years he received a rating of
three out of four, which the company defines as “meets expectations.” In 2015,
he received a four, or “exceeds expectations.” In early 2016, Landreneau began
working under a new supervisor. In June of that year, the new supervisor gave
Landreneau a verbal warning for his role in allegedly backdating a COBRA
notification letter sent to an employee who had been terminated. Landreneau
denies any involvement in this mistake. The new supervisor also gave him a
written warning for allegedly mischaracterizing a Reduction in Force (RIF) as
eliminating the relevant position, when in fact two other employees took over
the position for the individual who was terminated. Landreneau similarly
denies that he made any error regarding this situation. Based in part on these
warnings, his new supervisor gave him a two, or “partially meets expectations”
during his 2016 annual evaluation.
In the months before Landreneau’s termination, Baker Hughes
restructured the HR department and created a new position at Landreneau’s
location called HR Manager. Because the company decided that the
restructuring should result in either the same or fewer employees in the
department, an HR Business Partner position had to be eliminated to create
the HR Manager position. Landreneau did not apply for the new position.
After the new manager was selected, Baker Hughes chose Landreneau’s
position to be eliminated. Landreneau was terminated on January 18, 2017.
Landreneau sued Baker Hughes claiming sex discrimination in
Louisiana state court on April 19, 2017. He contends that his position was
chosen to be eliminated because his new supervisor, a female, discriminated
against him on the basis of his sex. He alleges that his new supervisor wanted
the HR department to be entirely female, and she therefore rated him lower
than every other person working for her, all of whom were female. He also
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alleges that she manufactured the disciplinary warnings he received to keep
in place a policy of sex discrimination within the HR department. The case
was removed to federal court on June 16, 2017. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Baker Hughes on June 3, 2019.
“This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court.” Tradewinds
Envtl. Restoration, Inc. v. St. Tammany Park, LLC, 578 F.3d 255, 258 (5th Cir.
2009) (quoting Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 429 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir.
2005)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” United States v. Nature’s Way Marine, L.L.C.,
904 F.3d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). The court
reviews all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Because the Louisiana employment discrimination statute is similar to
Title VII, courts have held that claims under the statute may be analyzed
according to applicable federal precedents. Artigue v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
13-537 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14) 154 So. 3d 1, 6; La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc.,
302 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2002). Landreneau relies on circumstantial
evidence to prove his claim, meaning that the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies. Herster
v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 887 F.3d 177, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). To
prevail, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination. Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007).
The burden then shifts to the employer to “articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. If the employer does so, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish: “(1) that the employer’s
proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2)
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that the employer’s reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct,
and another ‘motivating factor’ is the plaintiff's protected characteristic.” Id.
The district court held in part that Landreneau failed to establish a
prima facie case because he did not identify a similarly-situated woman who
was treated more favorably. To meet his burden at this stage, Landreneau
must show, among other things, that “others similarly situated but outside the
protected class were treated more favorably.” Id. To be “similarly situated”
the employees being compared must have: “held the same job or
responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment status
determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation
histories.” Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). Further, the conduct that drew the adverse employment
action must have been “nearly identical to that of the proffered comparator
who allegedly drew dissimilar employment decisions.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted).
As the district court explained, Landreneau has failed to identify a
similarly-situated, female employee who was treated more favorably.
Landreneau does not seriously contest that he has no similarly-situated
comparator whose position was retained when he was terminated. Instead,
Landreneau argues that his supervisor engaged in sex discrimination by
manufacturing warnings against him in order to give him a low rating, thus
making him ineligible for the HR Manager position that she knew would be
available at the end of the year. He uses Da’Nae Fox as a comparator because
during 2016 she and Landreneau were both HR Partners, but she received a
year-end rating of four, while Landreneau received a two from the same
supervisor. Landreneau argues that this disparity in ratings allowed Fox to
be selected for the HR Manager position and made him ineligible for the
position.
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Fox is not similarly situated to Landreneau because Landreneau’s rating
was based on the warnings that he received, and Landreneau does not attempt
to show that Fox engaged in similar behavior and was not warned. Indeed,
Landreneau does not identify any reason that Fox was undeserving of her
performance rating. Further, as to Landreneau’s allegation that his warnings
were manufactured, it is undisputed that others were involved in both of the
incidents giving rise to Landreneau’s warnings. But Landreneau has not
identified a woman who received different treatment for similar involvement
in these incidents. As the district court held, Landreneau has therefore failed
to make the required showing that a woman was treated more favorably at any
point during his employment. See Lee, 574 F.3d at 260.
Accordingly, because Landreneau has not made a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination, the judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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