Reynolds v. Brown & Root Inc

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 3, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-40156
(Summary Calendar)
MIRON ESUERT REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BROWN and ROOT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(1:03-cv-545)
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Before JONES, Chief Judge, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Miron Esuert Reynolds proceeded pro se in
the district court where he sought vacatur of an unfavorable
arbitration result. Reynolds had advanced claims against his
former employer, Defendant-Appellee Brown and Root, Inc., grounded
in racial discrimination, retaliation, and a racially hostile work
environment. These claims were rejected by the arbitrator, then by
the district court through its grant of summary judgment,
dismissing all claims asserted by Reynolds. The district court

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based its determination, in large part, on the Report and
Recommendation of the magistrate judge and on the narrow scope of
review of arbitration awards by the federal courts.
We have carefully considered the record on appeal and the
appellate briefs of the parties; and, like the district court
before us, we have remained mindful at all times of the limitations
on our review of arbitration awards and the strictures of the
Federal Arbitration Act. Without either agreeing or disagreeing
with the arbitrator or finding her wholly free of fault or error,
we are nevertheless constrained to affirm the district court’s
adoption of the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation as
well as that court’s disposition of Reynolds’s objections,
ultimately leading to the denial of vacatur of the arbitration
results unfavorable to Reynolds.
Reynolds also contends that the court abused its discretion by
refusing to appoint counsel to represent him in his appeal of the
arbitration proceeding. A pro se litigant is only entitled to the
appointment of counsel in civil rights cases in “exceptional
circumstances,” which this court has held include a consideration
of the type and complexity of the case; whether the litigant is
capable of adequately presenting his case; whether the pro se
litigant can adequately investigate the case; and whether the case
will require skill in the presentation of the evidence and cross-
examination. Ulmer v Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1982).
Not only did Reynolds fail to apply these factors in brief, but it

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is plain they do not mandate appointment of counsel for him.
Appellant was represented by counsel at the arbitration, where the
facts were developed. His briefing in this court confirms his
ability to grasp and present well his arguments. Finally, the
issue presented to the district court —— whether to vacate the
arbitrator's award —— is not complex and is based on law that
heavily favors the upholding of the award. Reynolds's contention
is meritless.
The Order of the district court is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.

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