Kenner v. St Charles Parish, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 30, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-30371
(Summary Calendar)
ANTHONY KENNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
ST. CHARLES PARISH; ST. CHARLES
PARISH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(2:02-CV-2990)
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BEFORE JONES, WIENER, and DeMOSS, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
PER CURIAM:*
In this employment discrimination case alleging a pattern or
practice of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)(a) and (b), Title VII-Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, as well as claims under Louisiana state
law, Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Kenner asserts that the district
court abused its discretion in (1) granting summary judgments in
January, 2005 and denying Kenner a new trial; (2) denying a new

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trial based on Kenner’s contentions involving his counsel’s
physical and mental inability to complete an opposition to the
motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants; (3) denying
Kenner’s ex parte motion to extend time in which to file a reply to
the defendants’ opposition to Kenner’s Rule 59 motion for new trial
grounded in his counsel’s continuing disability; and (4) denying
Kenner’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial grounded in allegations of
defendants’ withholding facts in violation of the discovery order
of the district court. Kenner also contends that the district
court clearly erred in granting summary judgment on insufficient
evidence (which, however, we review de novo). We affirm.
Our review of the record on appeal, including pleadings and
exhibits filed and arguments advanced in the appellate briefs of
the parties, satisfies us that, under the deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard of review applicable to all rulings of the
district court other than the grant of summary judgment —— and on
our de novo review of that judgment —— there is no basis in fact or
law for reversing the district court on any of its rulings in this
case. Consequently, the orders and judgment of the district court
are, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.

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