United States v. Vaillancourt

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
September 21, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-50279
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RITA L. VAILLANCOURT,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-02-M-548-ALL
USDC No. SA-03-CR-370-ALL
--------------------
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rita L. Vaillancourt appeals her conviction for driving
while intoxicated at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. She
argues that her conviction is not supported by sufficient
evidence. A review of the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Government indicates that the magistrate judge’s finding
of guilt was supported by substantial evidence. See United
States v. Mathes, 151 F.3d 251, 252 (5th Cir. 1998).
Vaillancourt was driving in an erratic manner and at a high rate

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No. 04-50279
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of speed just prior to being stopped at the post gate of Fort Sam
Houston. She told the military police officer that she had had a
few drinks at the Riverwalk that evening. Four military police
officers, who were trained in alcohol and drug recognition,
testified that in their opinion Vaillancourt was under the
influence of alcohol and incapable of safely operating a motor
vehicle on the evening that she was stopped. The officers
testified that she had a strong odor of alcohol on her breath,
bloodshot and glassy eyes, disheveled hair and clothing, a lack
of balance, and thick and slurred speech, and she had been
crying. She was unable to perform a dexterity test and unable to
complete an intoxilyzer test after two attempts. A review of
this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government
indicates that the evidence was sufficient to support
Vaillancourt’s conviction. See id.
Vaillancourt argues that her constitutional right to a
speedy trial was violated as she was arrested on March 9, 2002,
and was not tried until July 10, 2003 and the delay caused her
undue anxiety and concern. Vaillancourt was apprehended and
detained for this offense by military police on March 9, 2002.
Vaillancourt was charged by information on October 24, 2002.
Assuming without deciding that Vaillancourt’s right to a speedy
trial accrued on March 9, 2002, and that there was a 16-month
delay before her trial, Vaillancourt has not shown that her
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. The

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No. 04-50279
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Government moved for continuances because a critical Government
witness was deployed in the Middle East and unavailable for
trial. Thus, the Government had a legitimate reason for the
delay and did not intentionally cause this delay to obtain a
strategic advantage. Vaillancourt has shown only minimal
prejudice of undue anxiety and concern. She concedes that she
was not incarcerated prior to the trial and that her defense was
not prejudiced by the delay. Therefore, she has not shown that
her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. See
Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.

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