Galvan v. City of Bryan Texas

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 2, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 04-20695
Summary Calendar
_____________________
STEVE A. GALVAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF BRYAN, TEXAS,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
USDC No. 4:03-CV-1576
_________________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Steve A. Galvan was employed by the City of Bryan, Texas, from
1991 until he was discharged in June 2002. Galvan’s position as a
crew worker required him to ride on the back of a truck and load
leaves and yard clippings into the truck. In 2001, the City
Council decided to provide additional services to residents but did
not appropriate funds for additional personnel. In order to
provide the services without additional personnel, the City
eliminated all of the crew worker positions, such as Galvan’s, and
upgraded them to “equipment operators”. It also required the

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equipment operators to become licensed commercial drivers. Galvan,
who has epilepsy and suffers from learning disabilities, was unable
to pass the tests required to obtain a commercial license, and was
therefore discharged.
He filed a complaint against the City under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
alleging that the City discriminated against him because he is
disabled. The City moved for summary judgment. The parties
consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, who granted the
City’s motion. The court held that Galvan failed to present
evidence that he is disabled, and that, even assuming he is
disabled, he failed to establish that he was qualified for the job
of equipment operator. It also held that Galvan failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies under Title VII; Galvan does not appeal
that ruling.
Galvan argues on appeal that the magistrate judge erred by
concluding that he is not disabled and by concluding that a
commercial driver’s license was an essential function of the job.
The magistrate judge held that although Galvan’s epilepsy and
learning disabilities were impairments, he had not presented any
summary judgment evidence to show that those impairments
substantially limited a major life activity. The court held
further that, even if Galvan were disabled, he still could not
prevail, because he did not present any evidence to show that he
was qualified for the job, because he failed to present any

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evidence to controvert the City’s evidence that a commercial
driver’s license was an essential function of the equipment
operator position.
Based on our de novo review of the record, the City was
entitled to summary judgment for the reasons stated in the
magistrate judge’s comprehensive, well-reasoned memorandum opinion.
The judgment is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.

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