Mohammad v. Ashcroft

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 18, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________
No. 03-60468
____________
ZAIN MOHAMMAD,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U S ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
A70 960 658
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Zain Mohammad, a native and citizen of Pakistan, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We find the IJ correctly
denied Mohammad’s application.

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Mohammad entered the United States without inspection in 1990. In 1998, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”) charged Mohammad with being removable from the United States
for being present without having been admitted or paroled. The IJ found Mohammad removable as
charged. Mohammad then applied for political asylum, withholding of removal and protection under
CAT.
Mohammad testified that he was persecuted in Pakistan because he was a member of the
Muhajar Qumi Movement (“MQM”), a political party. In 1988, while Mohammad was putting up
banners in support of the MQM and equal rights for Indians, he was attacked twice in the same day
by strangers who he believed were members of opposing political parties. Although he reported these
attacks the police failed to file a report or take any action. In 1989, Mohammad was attacked by
members of the People’s Party of Pakistan (“PPP”), the political party in power at the time, while he
was posting MQM banners with three other MQM members. The PPP members hit Mohammad with
a shotgun and a large piece of glass. Mohammad’s injuries required him to miss school for “quite a
while.” He received treatment for his injuries at a private clinic because the hospital refused to treat
him without a police report. Mohammad also testified that he was arrested by police officers in 1989
while walking with twenty members of the MQM. They were carrying banners and chanting that the
MQM was equal to the PPP. The MQM members disobeyed police orders to proceed no farther
because they were entering a PPP neighborhood. Mohammad was detained overnight, but was not
interrogated or mistreated.
The IJ found that Mohammad did not satisfy the criteria for asylum or withholding of removal.
The IJ determined Mohammad’s incidents with the PPP were skirmishes with members of the
opposing party, not persecut ion. The IJ noted that Mohammad was arrested for refusing to obey

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police orders, not his political beliefs, and that it has been eleven years since Mohammad’s incidents
in Pakistan. Thus, the IJ concluded he did not qualify as a refugee. Furthermore, the IJ found there
was no evidence to support the finding of torture triggering CAT protection.
We review the IJ’s decision because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion. See
Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 2003). Asylum may be granted to refugees. 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1). A person may qualify as a refugee either because he has suffered past
persecution or because he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b).
Persecution is
[t]he infliction of suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in
a way regarded as offensive . . . in a manner condemned by civilized governments. The harm
or suffering need not be physical, but may take other forms, such as the deliberate imposition
of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or
other essentials of life.
Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996). We must uphold the IJ’s decision that
Mohammad is not eligible for asylum unless Mohammad shows that the evidence presented was so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution. See INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).
Mohammad did not present evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail
to find he had been persecuted. Although repeated beatings by members of a political party in power
could constitute persecution, Mohammad did not demonstrate that his beatings were more than the
product of civil unrest in Pakistan. Specifically, he did not establish that his suffering was under
government sanction. See Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Finding persecution
ordinarily requires a determination that government authorities, if they did not actually perpetrate or
incite the persecution, condoned it or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the

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victim.”). Although t he police did not file a police report which prevented Mohammad from
obtaining care at a government hospital, he was not deprived of medical care because he was treated
at a private clinic. Further, he was arrested because he disobeyed police orders not because of his
political beliefs, and the police did not mistreat him. This does not constitute persecution.
Accordingly, a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find that Mohammad suffered past
persecution.
Nor has Mohammad established that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find that he
possessed a well-founded fear of future persecution. To prove a well-founded fear of persecution,
Mohammad must show that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would fear persecution
if deported. Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, not only was Mohammad never
specifically targeted by the PPP, but Mohammad’s family members, including his father, an MQM
member, remain in Paksitan without problem. It has been eleven years since Mohammad was attacked
while posting banners. Under these circumstances, a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled
to find Mohammad possessed a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, Mohammad also
cannot show that no reasonable factfinder would fail to find he met the more stringent standard for
withholding of removal. See Fadoul v. I.N.S., 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994).
Finally, Mohammad has not established that a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to
find that he qualified for relief under CAT. CAT provides that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return
. . . or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted). Torture is “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include
lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.”

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8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2). Mohammad has not demonstrated that he has suffered torture in the past.
Moreover, although the Pakistani government has a history of human rights abuses, he has not shown
that he will likely be tortured when he returns to his country. As stated, his family currently resides
in Pakistan without being subjected to torture. A reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to
find that Mohammad would be tortured.
AFFIRMED.

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