Brown v. City of Shreveport, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
April 22, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-30950
Summary Calendar
VYRON L BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CITY OF SHREVEPORT; COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, on behalf of
Neighborhood Revitalization Program, on behalf of Emergency
Recovery Program, on behalf of Permits Department, on behalf of
Paint Your Heart Out; UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES; RON ADAMS; EVA PHILLIPS;
MARCIA NELSON; J C MARSHALL; KEITH HIGHTOWER; TERRI SCOTT
ANDERSON; RAMON LAFITTE; LILLIAN PRIEST
Defendants - Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CV-2415
--------------------
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Vyron Brown appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the City of Shreveport and other defendants,
dismissing Brown’s § 1981 and § 1983 racial discrimination claims
with prejudice.

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 03-30950
-2-
1 Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 257-58
(5th Cir. 2001).
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
3 Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 257-58.
4 General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375, 391 (1982).
5 Webster v. Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en
banc); Bennett v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984).
We review de novo the district court’s order granting
summary judgment.1 We will affirm a summary judgment only when
there is no genuine issue of material fact.2 But “if the
nonmovant fails to establish facts in support of an essential
element of his prima facie claim, summary judgment is
appropriate.”3
Brown has failed to establish facts in support of multiple
elements of his § 1981 and § 1983 claims. First, Brown provides
no evidence that the relevant state actors had policy-making
authority such that their discretionary decisions could
constitute an official municipal policy. Second Brown provides
no evidence of widespread and persistent discrimination that
could constitute a custom fairly representing an official policy.
Third, Brown provides no evidence of purposeful discrimination to
support his § 1981 claim.4 Finally, Brown provides no evidence
that he was treated less favorably than similarly-situated people
outside the protected class. Given these failings, summary
judgment was appropriate.5

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 03-30950
-3-
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --