Mitchell v. City of Houston TX, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-20287
Summary Calendar
ROYCE EUGENE MITCHELL, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS;
ANTHONY HALL, JR., Houston City Attorney;
C.H. BRENHAM, Individually, and as a City of Houston Police
Officer; DANIEL JAY SIMMS, Individually, and as a Houston
Municipal Court Judge,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-01-CV-1790
--------------------
January 7, 2003
Before DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Royce Eugene Mitchell, Jr., appeals the grant of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to state
a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Mitchell argues that the
district court erred in holding that he relied upon invalid
authority to support his contention that there are two classes of

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 02-20287
-2-
citizenship and that he should be considered “sovereign.” He also
argues that the district abused its discretion in holding that he
was a “person” required to file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
arguing that he has the right to bring suit under the Bill of
Rights, and in invoking the Rooker/Feldman doctrine where there had
been no state court judgment. We review a district court’s ruling
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim de novo.
See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2002).
Mitchell’s argument that he, as a “de jure” citizen, has a
right to bring his suit under the Constitution without invoking 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is meritless. The district court correctly noted
that we have long harbored a great reluctance to allow the pursuit
of constitutional causes of action directly. Even the most cursory
reading of our case law demonstrates beyond cavil that we have
permitted prosecution of such actions directly under the
Constitution only when necessitated by a total absence of
alternative courses and “no other means” existed to seek “redress
for flagrant violations of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
When a statutory mechanism is available, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 being a
prime example, plaintiffs must invoke its protection. See Hearth,
Inc. v. Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare, 617 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1980); Hunt
v. Smith, 67 F. Supp. 2d 675, 681 (E.D. Tex. 1999)).
Without pleading 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchell has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Consequently, we
need not address whether the district court’s alternative holding

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 02-20287
-3-
that the Rooker/Feldman doctrine requires abstention. The judgment
of the district court dismissing Mitchell’s claims is AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --