Tweedy v. Cornyn, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
April 22, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-11088
Conference Calendar
JOHN EDWARD TWEEDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN CORNYN, Attorney General; GERALD GARRETT, Chairman,
Board of Pardons and Paroles; JANIE COCKRELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:01-CV-254-R
--------------------
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
John Edward Tweedy, TDCJ-ID #326250, has filed pro se
motions for a restraining order and to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) on appeal. His 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint was dismissed
as frivolous below, and the district court denied IFP status on
appeal by certifying that his appeal was not taken in good faith.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

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No. 02-11088
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Tweedy first seeks a restraining order requiring that
officials: cease housing him with inmates of other races in
order to interfere with his legal activities, refrain from
interfering with his legal mail, protect his legal materials
from loss in the event of a prison transfer, and return certain
confiscated property. This court grants injunctive relief “only
in exceptional cases.” See Greene v. Fair, 314 F.2d 200, 201-02
(5th Cir. 1963). Because he has not filed a motion in the
district court seeking injunctive relief for the confiscation
of his property, we do not consider it here. See FED. R. APP.
P. 8(a). Tweedy also has not demonstrated that a failure to
grant the remainder of his requested relief will result in
“irreparable injury.” See Lindsay v. City of San Antonio,
821 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1987). The particular relief he
requests relates to interference with his legal activities;
despite the alleged interference, Tweedy has been able to file
numerous legal pleadings and documents. Tweedy has not shown
that a failure to enjoin this interference would prevent him from
filing a necessary document in any pending or future action. His
motions for a restraining order are DENIED.
By seeking IFP status in this court, Tweedy is challenging
the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken
in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir.
1997). This court’s inquiry into an appellant’s good faith “is
limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on

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No. 02-11088
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their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King,
707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
Tweedy first argues that the district court erred in
dismissing his “official capacity” claims against the defendants.
To the extent the defendants were sued in their official
capacities, the dismissal of these claims was not error, and any
appeal would be frivolous. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25
(1991) (suits against a state official in his official capacity
are really directed against the state); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-99 (1984) (suits against
the state generally are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment).
Tweedy’s IFP brief does not address the district court’s
dismissal of his claims against the defendants in their
individual capacities; therefore, he has abandoned the issue of
whether that dismissal involves issues that are arguable on the
merits and not frivolous.
Tweedy next asserts that he intends to appeal the allegedly
improper transfer of his complaint to another district. Because
venue would have been proper in either district, and because the
decision to transfer was within the discretion of the district
court, any such appeal would be frivolous. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), (b).
After several adverse rulings in the district court, Tweedy
filed an “Affidavit of Bias under 28 [U.S.C.] § 144.” His IFP

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No. 02-11088
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brief asserts that the district court’s denial of IFP on appeal
is “more evidence to support” his claims of bias. Judicial
rulings will support a claim of bias only if they reveal an
opinion based on an extrajudicial source or demonstrate such a
high degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Adverse
rulings alone do not call into question a judge’s impartiality.
Id. Tweedy’s allegations of bias are conclusional and not
supported by any evidence.
Tweedy’s IFP brief fails to identify any issue that is
arguable on its merits and not frivolous. See Howard, 707 F.2d
at 220. His motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and his appeal is
DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5TH CIR.
R. 42.2.
The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous and the dismissal
of the complaint as frivolous by the district court both count
as “strikes” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba
v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Tweedy is
cautioned that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be
permitted to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed
while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
MOTIONS FOR RESTRAINING ORDERS DENIED; IFP MOTION DENIED;
APPEAL DISMISSED; THREE-STRIKES WARNING ISSUED.

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