Jones v. Clark, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-40608
Summary Calendar
REGINALD JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHARLES CLARK, Correctional Officer III;
WILBUR CARROLL, JR.; Correctional Officer III;
STEVEN R. SWIFT, Major; LELAND HEUSZEL, Assistant Warden;
BILL LEWIS, Regional Director,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 9:98-CV-290
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August 2, 2002
Before JONES, SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Reginald Jones (TDCJ # 781143) appeals the verdict in
favor of the defendants following a jury trial of his pro se civil
rights complaint wherein he alleged that prison guards used
excessive force against him. In his original brief, Jones lists
eighty enumerated “legal issues,” the majority of which are single-
sentence assertions of error containing no citations to the record

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or legal authority. Although this court applies less stringent
standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented
by counsel and liberally construes briefs of pro se litigants, pro
se litigants must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with
the requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 28. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d
523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th
Cir. 1993). Failure by the appellant to identify any error in the
district court's analysis or application to the facts of the case
is the same as if the appellant had not appealed that judgment.
Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748
(5th Cir. 1987).
Liberally construing both Jones’s original and reply
briefs, Jones has adequately briefed the following issues for
appeal:
(1) whether the jury verdict was unreasonable; (2) whether he
unfairly was prejudiced by discovery rulings; and (3) whether jury
instructions were flawed. To the extent that Jones intended to
raise any issues other than those listed above, Jones has waived
those arguments by failing to adequately brief them on appeal. See
Yohey, 985 F.2d at 225.
Jones argues that the jury’s verdict was in error because
the defendants falsely testified that he resisted them after he was
handcuffed. He suggests that it was “illogical” for the jury to
conclude that he would “wait to be handcuff[ed] and request for
supervisor ... to pull away violently.”

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We will uphold the jury’s verdict unless the facts and
inferences point so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of
Jones that reasonable men could not arrive at any verdict to the
contrary. See Brown v. Bryan County, Okl., 67 F.3d 1174, 1180 n.11
(5th Cir. 1995). All evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn
from such evidence should be considered in the light most favorable
to the defendants. Id.
Jones’s argument is essentially a challenge to the
credibility of the defendant-witnesses. We will not weigh
conflicting evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses
because that function is within the province of the finder of fact.
Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1992). Jones’s
challenge to the jury verdict is without merit.
Jones argues that he was denied a fair trial because the
defendants failed to provide a copy of TDCJ’s use-of-force manual
at trial. He also argues that the district court erred by denying
his request for discovery of the disciplinary records and personnel
files of the defendants.
Discovery issues are entrusted to the sound discretion of
the district court. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.
1994). “[D]iscovery rulings will be reversed only where they are
arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.” Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc.,
787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986). There is no abuse of
discretion when the litigant is unable to establish prejudice

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resulting from the district court’s discovery ruling. Marshall v.
Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1984).
A prison official’s failure to follow the prison’s own
policies does not necessarily constitute a violation of due
process, if constitutional minima have been satisfied. See Myers
v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the
parties agreed to the matter which Jones sought to introduce
through the manual -- that TDCJ policy requires that all steps
should be taken to prevent the use of force. Thus, Jones cannot
establish that his position as a litigant was prejudiced because he
did not have a copy of the TDCJ policy manual.
The district court denied Jones’s request for the
disciplinary records after concluding that they were “generally not
relevant” because and “the fact that inmates file grievances
against officers complaining that force was used on them is not
proof that force actually was used.” The court also noted that it
previously had ordered the defendants to disclose any and all
information concerning whether an allegation of excessive force by
them had been sustained. No abuse of discretion has been shown.
King, 31 F.3d at 346.
We also reject Jones’s argument that the “jury
instructions” were improper because the jury should have been
provided with the use-of-force manual during deliberations so that
the jury could examine whether the defendants could use force to
enforce a grooming violation. As discussed above, Jones has not

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demonstrated that the district court acted unreasonably by
proceeding without Jones having a copy of the TDCJ manual. See
Mayo, 787 F.2d at 1012. Jones’s “jury instruction” argument thus
is without merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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