United States v. Vaughn

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-31166
Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID VAUGHN,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CR-55-2-N
--------------------
June 18, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this direct appeal of David Vaughn’s conviction for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, the Government argues that
Vaughn’s waiver-of-appeal provision in his plea agreement
requires dismissal of this appeal. Vaughn argues that the
waiver-of-appeal provision in his plea agreement should be barred
as a matter of public policy. He argues that the waiver language
in his plea agreement was less than clear, especially in light of
his youth and limited education.

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 01-31166
-2-
A defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal as part
of a valid plea agreement if the waiver is knowing and voluntary.
United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992).
An informed waiver of the right to appeal does not implicate any
constitutional rights, and Vaughn has not provided any authority
supporting his argument that waiver-of appeal provisions are
generally against public policy. Id. at 569-70.
During Vaughn’s rearraignment, the district court reviewed
the plea agreement and explained to Vaughn that he was waiving
his right to appeal his sentence, except for the two exceptions
listed in the plea agreement. Vaughn indicated that he
understood the waiver provision and did not raise any questions
about the waiver or any other terms of the plea agreement,
although given several opportunities to do so. The record
reflects that Vaughn freely and voluntarily waived his right to
appeal his sentence, except for an upward departure from the
guideline sentencing range or a sentence above the statutory
maximum.
Insofar as Vaughn argues that he did not waive his right to
appeal the adjustment of his offense level for the obstruction of
justice because it constitutes an upward departure, such argument
is foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v.
Gaitan, 171 F.3d 222, 223 (5th Cir. 1999).

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 01-31166
-3-
Because Vaughn’s waiver of the right to appeal his sentence
is enforceable, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
See United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2001).
DISMISSED.

-- 3 of 3 --