Chehl v. So Univ Agri Mech, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30698
Summary Calendar
SAHIB SINGH CHEHL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE;
EDWARD R. JACKSON; HUEY LAWSON; MARVIN YATES; WILLIAM E. MOORE;
ERNEST L. WALKER,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 98-CV-640-D
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April 1, 2002
Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sahib Singh Chehl appeals from the summary-judgment
dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) against his employer,
Southern University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
(“Southern”), Edward R. Jackson, Huey Lawson, Marvin Yates,

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No. 01-30698
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William E. Moore, and Ernest L. Walker. Chehl also brought a
claim against Southern under Louisiana law for unjust enrichment.
Chehl does not argue that the district court erred in
dismissing his ADEA claim or his claim for unjust enrichment.
Thus he has waived any argument he might have asserted with
respect to the district court’s dismissal of these claims. See
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
Turning to Chehl’s claims against the individual defendants,
we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Chehl’s
Title VII claims, as Title VII does not impose personal liability
on individuals. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d
258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999). We are unable to discern any argument
in Chehl’s brief that the district court erred in dismissing the
claims against the individual defendants brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1981. If an appellant fails to make arguments in his
brief, they are deemed abandoned. See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224-25.
Chehl has also stated claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
under Title VII against Southern. With respect to the former,
this court must sua sponte raise the issue of its subject-matter
jurisdiction. See McDonald v. Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs, 832
F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 1987). We have held that Congress did
not express an intent to waive the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Sessions v. Rusk
State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981). We have also
held that Southern is a state entity entitled to assert Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Richardson v. Southern Univ., 118 F.3d
450, 456 (5th Cir. 1997). As Southern is entitled to immunity

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No. 01-30698
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from Chehl’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, this court is without
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany,
187 F.3d 452, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999).
Chehl’s complaint alleged that Southern has discriminatory
compensation practices and that he was unlawfully removed as
Director of the Aerospace Research and Education Project (“AREP”)
and as Chairman of the Mechanical Engineering Department due to
his race and religion. After a careful review of Chehl’s
arguments and the record, we find no error on the part of the
district court.
Chehl’s complaint also alleged a Title VII retaliation claim
against Southern. Chehl alleges that in retaliation for his
complaints regarding Southern’s allegedly discriminatory
compensation practices he was removed from his positions as
Director of AREP and department chairman. We express no opinion
as to whether Chehl has made out a prima facie case on his Title
VII retaliation claim. However, after a careful review of
Chehl’s arguments and the record, we hold that Chehl has failed
to show that any of the legitimate, nonretaliatory justifications
offered by Southern for Chehl’s removal from these positions was
pretextual, or that he would not have been removed from these
positions “but for” his participation in protected activity. See
Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2001).
The judgment of the district court is in all respects
AFFIRMED.

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