Brothers v. Telecheck Svcs Inc, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-20164
Summary Calendar
SUZANNE BROTHERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TELECHECK SERVICES, INCORPORATED;
TELECHECK INTERNATIONAL INC.;
TELECHECK RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.;
PAUL PALMER; LAURA ALFORD,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-99-CV-1985
_________________________________________
October 22, 2001
Before POLITZ, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Suzanne Brothers contends that the district court erred in granting the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing her employment
discrimination complaint because she presented evidence showing that she was

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1Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997).
2Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
3Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F3d 776 (5th Cir. 2000).
4Id. at 782.
2
subjected to sexual discrimination and a hostile work environment based on her
pregnancy. Brothers further maintains that she presented evidence showing that she
was compelled to resign her position because of the defendants’ malicious acts of
discrimination and the hostile work environment.
Brothers has not addressed on appeal the district court’s dismissal of her
claims against TeleCheck International, Inc. and TeleCheck Recovery Services,
Inc.; nor has she addressed her state law claim of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. These claims, therefore, are deemed abandoned.1
Assuming that the defendants reprimanded and criticized Brothers’ conduct
as she has alleged and required additional training and record keeping on her part,
Brothers, nonetheless, has failed to make a prima facie showing of sexual
discrimination because the conduct complained of did not amount to adverse
employment action effecting her employment status.2
Nor did Brothers make a prima facie showing that she was constructively
discharged. When an employee resigns, she may satisfy the discharge requirement
by establishing constructive discharge.3 To prove constructive discharge, one must
show that working conditions were “so intolerable that a reasonable employee
would feel compelled to resign.”4

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5Shepherd v. The Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871,
873 (5th Cir. 1999).
6Id. at 874 (citation omitted).
3
Brown asserts that she was subjected to continual harassment and singled out
for different treatment than that received by other employees in similar instances
because of her pregnancy. The defendants submitted evidence showing that
Brothers was treated like any other new employee who was performing poorly.
Brothers failed to come forward with any evidence in the form of deposition
testimony or affidavits establishing that other sales representatives in like
circumstances were treated differently. She presented no evidence reflecting that
her working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would have
felt compelled to resign.
Brothers’ contention that she was subjected to a hostile or abusive work
environment also fails. “[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex created a hostile or abusive working
environment.”5 “Whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ is determined by
looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.”6
Palmer’s alleged admonishments and criticisms of Brothers may have been
unwarranted in some instances, and his alleged initial response to her pregnancy
was offensive. The record contains no evidence, however, that Palmer continued to

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7Id.
4
make offensive statements concerning Brothers’ pregnancy or engaged in conduct
that was so extreme as to constitute a change in the terms and conditions of
Brothers’ employment.7 Thus, Brothers failed to demonstrate that she was
subjected to a hostile or abusive work environment.
The district court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and dismissing Brothers’ complaint with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.

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