Lyons v. Lamb County, et al

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 00-11235
JEROME LYONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
LAMB COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants,
LAMB COUNTY; JERRY COLLINS; LINDA LIGHTFOOT,
Individually and in her Official Capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 00-11247
JEROME LYONS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
LAMB COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants,

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*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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PANDY ALEMAN, Individually and in her Official Capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(5:99-CV-320-C)
October 2, 2001
Before JONES, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
These consolidated cases involve a civil suit against Sheriff
Jerry Collins, Jail Administrator Linda Lightfoot, Jailer Pandy
Aleman, and Lamb County, Texas, which was initiated by inmate
Jerome Lyons alleging violations of his constitutional rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted motions
for summary judgment on behalf of Lamb County and Sheriff Collins,
in his official capacity, finding no genuine issues of material
fact on any theory of municipal liability. The district court also
granted a motion for summary judgment on behalf of Linda Lightfoot,
in her individual and official capacities based on qualified
immunity. As a result, the district court issued a final judgment
as to all claims alleged against Sheriff Collins, Linda Lightfoot,
and Lamb County. However, the district court denied Pandy Aleman's

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motion for summary judgment. The district court found that there
was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Pandy Aleman's
conduct immediately after she witnessed Jerome Lyons and Eddie
Rowton naked in their cell.
Jerome Lyons appeals the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sheriff Collins, Linda Lightfoot, and Lamb
County. Pandy Aleman appeals the district court's denial of her
motion for summary judgment. We review a grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same standards as the district court, while
viewing all disputed facts and reasonable inferences "in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Duffy v. Leading Edge
Prods., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is
appropriate only where "there is no genuine issue of material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). To survive summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must do more than simply allege a material issue of
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316, 324 (1986). The
nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
We have carefully considered Jerome Lyons' claims against Lamb
County, Sheriff Collins, and Linda Lightfoot in light of the entire
record, the parties' respective briefing on the issue in this

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appeal, and the required standard of review. We are persuaded that
there are no genuine issues of material fact in those claims. We
therefore AFFIRM the district court's denial of relief to Jerome
Lyons for the same reasons given by the court in its orders
granting summary judgment to Sheriff Collins, Linda Lightfoot, and
Lamb County, Texas.
In turning our attention to Pandy Aleman's appeal, we must
note it is well established that “[d]istrict court orders denying
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity are immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine, notwithstanding
their interlocutory character, when based on a conclusion of law.”
Lukan v. North Forest Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F.3d 342, 345 (5th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d
528, 531 (5th Cir. 1997)). Nevertheless, “[i]f disputed factual
issues material to summary judgment are present, the district
court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of immunity is not
appealable.” Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir.
2000) (quoting Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 431 (5th
Cir. 1993)). After a careful review of the entire record, we
believe the district court correctly concluded that there is a
genuine issue of material fact regarding Pandy Aleman's conduct.
Therefore, we DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction Pandy Aleman's
appeal from the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds.

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