Beattie v. Madison Cty Sch Dist, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 00-60545
_______________
JOY BEATTIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MADISON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION;
BERT JACKSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
KEN MCCOY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
SHIRLEY SIMMONS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
MARY MCDONALD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
LEE MILLER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
KEN ACTON, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES;
MARIA A. JONES, IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
_________________________
July 5, 2001

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2
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA,
HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Joy Beattie, an at-will employee, was fired
as a secretary for Madison County Schools,
allegedly in retaliation for her support of Mi-
chael Kent’s candidacy for school superinten-
dent in opposition to the incumbent, Maria
Jones. Beattie sued the school district, the su-
perintendent, the principal, and the school
board members for First Amendment retalia-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violation
of MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-871, which pro-
hibits certain actions by employers regarding
employee’s voting rights. Beattie asked for a
permanent injunction, reinstatement, punitive
damages, and compensatory damages for lost
past and future wages, mental anguish, emo-
tional stress, and loss of reputation. The dis-
trict court dismissed the state law claim with-
out prejudice and granted summary judgment
for the defendants on the § 1983 claim on the
basis that Beattie had failed to establish a caus-
al connection between her political activity and
her discharge, an essential element of her
§ 1983 claim.1
Beattie appeals, contending that the district
court erred in concluding that she failed to
prove causation and erred in denying her mo-
tion to conduct additional discovery under
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). We affirm.
I.
From 1994-96, Beattie worked as secretary
to Mike Kent, principal of Rosa Scott Middle
School. From 1996 until her termination, she
worked for Ken Acton, the principal of Olde
Towne Middle School. Beattie claims she had
no history of disciplinary problems, but school
board members indicated that parents had
complained about her rudeness. On April 6,
1999, Acton wrote a letter recommending her
for annual re-employment.
Later that month, Larry Roberts, a city al-
derman and parent, came into the office and
discussed the upcoming election for school su-
perintendent. Acton suggested a reason that
Roberts should not vote for Kent, and Beattie
interjected her opinion to the contrary. Acton
orally reprimanded Beattie and instructed her
that as a school employee, she owed the cur-
rent superintendent her loyalty. Beattie tes-
tified in her deposition that Acton instructed
her not to express her opinions about Kent’s
candidacy “out of the office or anywhere be-
cause it was perceived . . . as coming from me
[Acton].” Acton supported Jones in the elec-
tion.
In June 1999, Jones visited the school and
informed Beattie that she had heard that Beat-
tie had made negative comments about her po-
sition on a proposed bond issue to build a new
high school. Shortly thereafter, Jones asked
Beattie to stuff envelopes for her campaign at
work, which Beattie did. Jones never deliv-
ered the envelopes. A few days later, Acton
drafted a letter recommending that Beattie be
transferred “not based on Joy’s ability to do
the job but on philosophical differences on
how a middle school should operate,” such as
her support of Who’s Who Among American
High School Students, her opposition to Ac-
ton’s proposals on cheerleaders and the dance
1 See, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d
923, 932 (5th Cir. 1999) (listing elements of a First
Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 as (1)
engaging in a protected activity; (2) suffering an
adverse employment action; (3) a causal connection
between the two; and (4) the execution of a city
policy causing the adverse action).

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3
team, and her support of membership in the
Little Six Conference for the football team.
Beattie put up signs in her yard to show her
support for Kent. When Jones was campaign-
ing in the neighborhood, she allegedly com-
mented to one of Beattie’s neighbors that “Joy
Beattie has two signs in her yard [supporting
Kent] and I’m going to her house to find out
why.” Jones did not confront Beattie about
the signs.
The next Monday, Acton revised his letter
recommending Beattie’s transfer, proposing
instead that she be removed. Acton sent the
memo to Jones. Beattie claims that all the
reasons cited in the memo for her removal oc-
curred before the April 6 letter. Beattie be-
lieves that four days later, Acton met with a
school district attorney, James Keith, and re-
vised the letter to include additional reasons
for her termination, most notably an allegation
of a breach of confidence.
Jones presented Acton’s recommendation
to the board, which on July 19, 1999, voted
unanimously to terminate Beattie. The board
previously had discussed complaints that Beat-
tie was rude to teachers, parents, and students.
All board members testified in affidavits that
they were not aware of Beattie’s political
activities or any alleged misconduct by Jones
and Acton and that they were neutral in the
campaign for superintendent. Further, they
stated that they would have terminated Beattie
without Acton’s recommendation.
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as did the
district court. E.g., Bos Dairy, L.C. v. United
States Dep’t of Agric., 209 F.3d 785, 786 (5th
Cir. 2000). “Summary judgment should be
used ‘most sparingly in . . . First Amendment
case[s] . . . involving delicate constitutional
rights, complex fact situations, disputed testi-
mony, and questionable credibilities.’” Ben-
ningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369,
377 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Porter v. Califa-
no, 592 F.2d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 1979)). Sum-
mary judgment should be granted, however,
“when the nonmoving part y fails to meet its
burden to come forward with facts and law
demonstrating a basis for recovery that would
support a jury verdict.” Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc).
III.
Beattie contends that the district court
erred in deciding that she failed to present
summary judgment evidence that her political
speech and activities motivated her termination
and therefore that the school district was not
liable. She also argues that the court erred in
concluding that Acton and Jones did not cause
her adverse employment action. To prevail on
her First Amendment retaliation claim, Beattie
must show either that the school board acted
in retaliation or that the improper motives of
another actor can be imputed to it.2
To prove a First Amendment retaliation
claim, Beattie must show that (1) she suffered
an “adverse employment decision”; (2) her
2 Under § 1983, Beattie may sue a local gov-
erning body, such as the school district, or the
school board as policymaker for the district, for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief if the
challenged action implements or executes a policy
officially adopted by that body’s officers. Neither
the school board nor the school district can be li-
able for the actions of Acton and Jones, if im-
permissible, under a respondeat superior theory.
See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978).

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speech involved “a matter of public concern”;
(3) her “interest in commenting on matters of
public concern . . . outweigh[s] the Defen-
dant’s interest in promoting efficiency”; and
(4) her speech motivated the adverse employ-
ment decision. Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch.
Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied 528 U.S. 1022 (1999).3 The only
contested issue is causation.
To prevail, Beattie must show that she en-
gaged in protected conduct and that it was a
motivating factor in her discharge. Then, the
burden shifts to defendants to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that they would
have come to the same conclusion in the ab-
sence of the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Beattie has not met her
initial burden of demonstrating that her speech
motivated her discharge.
A.
The parties do not contest that the board is
a policymaker for the school district or that the
board fired Beattie. They appear to agree that
the district may be liable for the board’s ac-
tions because the board is a policymaker for
the school district in its capacity to terminate
employees.4 If the board acted in retaliation
against Beattie for her support of Kent, the
school district may be liable.
Beattie’s evidence that the board violated
her rights is based on her assertion that she
had an excellent record with no reprimands.
She believes the conversation with Roberts
about the upcoming election precipitated her
difficulties at work and that the court should
infer improper motive from the timing of the
firing. Moreover, she asserts that the stated
reasons for her firingSSinsubordination, disclo-
sure of confidential information, undermining
Acton, rudeness to parents and teachers,
violating school policy, and being disloyal to
ActonSSoccurred before Acton’s initial recom-
mendation of re-employment. She states,
without corroborating evidence, that the alle-
gations of breach of confidence and rudeness
have no basis in fact. Thus, she contends, Ac-
ton’s real motive in changing the recommenda-
tion from a transfer to a removal (and Jones’s
real motive in accepting it) was retaliation.
Even if Beattie is correct, her reasoning
bears no relation to the school board’s liability
unless either the board acted in retaliation in-
dependently or the improper motives (if prov-
en) of Jones and Acton can be imputed to the
board. Acton and Jones cannot be liable in-
dependently if they did not make the final de-
cision.5 If, however, the board adopted the al-
legedly impermissible motives of Acton and
Jones through acting on the recommendation
or delegated its policymaking authority in the
area of at-will employment to Jones, it may be
liable.
1.
Municipal liability for constitutional torts
arises when the execution of an official policy
causes the injury. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[A] single
3 See also Sharp, 164 F.3d at 932.
4 Cf., e.g., Harris, 168 F.3d at 225 (finding that
a board’s decision to affirm a superintendent’s rec-
ommendation to transfer a teacher was an act of
official policy, noting that “[o]n at least two
occasions, we have held that the board of trustees
of an independent school district . . . is a pol-
icymaker for purposes of § 1983”).
5 Beattie has abandoned all claims against Ac-
ton and Jones individually.

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action by a municipal official possessing final
policymaking authority regarding the action in
question constitutes the official policy of the
municipality and . . . the determination of
whether a municipal official wields final
policymaking authority regarding a particular
action constitutes a question of state law.”
Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691,
698 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing McMillan v.
Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)). In
Mississippi, the school board has the power
“[t]o select all school district personnel.”
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301(p) (2000). The
question, then, is whether the board delegated
that authority to Jones.
Municipal liability attaches only where
the decisionmaker possesses final
authority to establish municipal
authority with respect to the action
ordered. The fact that a particular
officialSSeven a policymaking
officialSShas discretion in the exercise of
particular functions does not, without
more, give rise to municipal liability
based on an exercise of that discretion.
The official must also be responsible for
establishing final government policy
respecting such activity before the
municipality can be held liable.12
12 Thus, for example, the County
Sheriff may have discretion to hire
and fire employees without also
being the count y official
responsible for establishing county
employment policy. If this were
the case, the Sheriff’s decisions
respecting employment would not
give rise to municipal liability, al-
though similar decisions with re-
spect to law enforcement practic-
es, over which the Sheriff is the
official policymaker, would give
rise to municipal liability. Instead,
if county employment policy was
set by the Board of County
Commissioners, only that body’s
decisions would provide a basis
for county liability. This would be
true even if the Board left the
Sheriff discretion to hire and fire
employees and the Sheriff
exercised that discretion in an
unconstitutional manner; the
decision to act unlawfully would
not be a decision of the Board.
Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 484 & n.12 (1986)). Beattie
argues that the board’s deference to the su-
perintendent’s recommendations on at-will
employment matters exhibits a delegation of
policymaking authority and suggests that this
alleged complete control over a particular area
makes Jones an official policymaker whose
liability can be imputed to the district and the
board.
An official may be a policymaker for the
county in a particular area or on a particular
issue.6 In Brady, we noted that discretion
alone is not enough; the official also must cre-
ate policy. The official in Brady, however, re-
ceived his authority from a state statute that
granted him final policymaking power. Even
more importantly, his authority was unreview-
6 See Brady, 145 F.3d at 699 (internal citations
omitted) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion) (ob-
serving that “the challenged action must have been
taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official
or officials responsible under state law for making
policy in that area”)).

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able by any other body. Id. at 700.7
The board oversaw Jones’s employment
decisionsSSan indication that she may not be a
final policymaker. The mere existence of
oversight, however, is not enough; the
oversight must pertain to the area of authority
in question. Brady, 145 F.3d at 701. For
example, a superintendent’s transfer of a
teacher to another position might be a final
policy decision if that action was
unreviewable, even if the superintendent did
not have complete control over the hiring and
firing of district personnel. See id. at 701
(citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491
U.S. 701 (1989)).
Jones presented her recommendation to the
board, which terminated Beattie. Because the
board oversaw the precise action in question,
Jones did not have final policymaking power.
By the same analysis, Acton is not a final
policymaker: Jones oversaw each of his ac-
tions pertaining to Beattie’s discharge.
Therefore, neither the board nor the school
district is liable for their actions, unless their
allegedly improper motives can be imputed to
the board.
2.
Even if speech on a matter of public
concern was a substantial or motivating factor
in the termination, a defendant may escape lia-
bility by demonstrating that it would have tak-
en the same action in the absence of the
protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at
287. As explained above, Beattie must prove
a causal connection between her constitution-
ally-protected activity and the board’s
decision.8 Because Acton and Jones are not
final policymakers, Beattie must impute their
allegedly improper motives to the board by
demonstrating that the board approved both
Jones’s decision and the basis for it.9
All board members testified that they had
no idea t hat Beattie supported Kent in the
election and that they had remained neutral in
the campaign. They further testified to per-
sonal knowledge of complaints against Beattie,
such as those detailed in the letter
recommending her termination. The letter
maintained that Beattie refused to support
school polices and disclosed confidential em-
7 See also Reeves v. Claiborne County Bd. of
Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1987)
(finding a superintendent liable for transferring a
teacher in retaliation for her testimony in a court
case and emphasizing the importance of oversight
by remanding for a determination of whether a
school board customarily deferred to the decisions
of the superintendent); Neubauer v. City of Mc-
Allen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1573-74 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding a governmental entity liable under § 1983
“where the policy was made by an official to whom
the governing body had given policymaking
authority,” noting that the official’s decisions were
not subject to review), overruled on other grounds
by Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119,
126 (5th Cir. 1992).
8 See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 385 (1989) (requiring a “direct causal link
between a municipal policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation”); Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (holding that
“official policy must be ‘the moving force of the
constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
liability of a government body”) (citing Monell,
436 U.S. at 694).
9 E.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (“If the au-
thorized policymakers approved a subordinate’s
decision and the basis for it, their ratification
would be chargeable to the municipality because
their decision is final.”).

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ployment information.10 Beattie does not dis-
pute defendants’ position that the board saw
only this letter (not the previous draft
recommending a transfer) and had no actual
knowledge of her campaign activities.11 If
there is no evidence that the board knew of the
protected activity, Beattie cannot show that
the activity motivated retaliatory behavior.12
Beattie urges that Harris controls because
there, we found a board liable under § 1983
for approving a superintendent’s
recommendation; the board delegated
employment authority to the superintendent,
and in ratifying his decision through a
grievance hearing, the board assumed liability.
Harris, 168 F.3d at 225. During that
grievance procedure, however, the board
acquired actual knowledge of the basis for the
termination.13 Without a showing that the
board had actual knowledge of the alleged
improper basis of Jones’s and Acton’s
recommendation, the board cannot be liable
for the alleged retaliation. See Cabrol, 106
F.3d at 108.14
Even assuming the board did terminate
Beattie in retaliation for her campaign
activities, it can escape liability, because it
would have terminated her for other reasons.
Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.15 Board
members testified that they would have voted
to terminate Beattie even without Acton’s
letter, based on the complaints they received
that she was rude to students, parents, and
teachers. Beattie offers no evidence to refute
10 Beattie allegedly discussed, with a teacher
applicant, names that had been recommended to the
board, before the board’s final decision, and sent
an e-mail to other teachers after a teacher had
resigned but before the board had had a chance to
act.
11 She does not suggest that the school policies
with which she openly disagreed are protected
speech on matters of public concern.
12 See Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d
101 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment
for a town and mayor who terminated an employee
who had challenged a cockfighting ordinance,
because no evidence indicated that they knew about
his opposition to the ordinance).
13 Mississippi law provides that a terminated
employee of a school district may initiate a griev-
ance hearing before the board to contest his ter-
mination. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-111 (2000).
Neither party references this procedure, so pre-
(continued...)
13(...continued)
sumably Beattie did not avail herself of this pri-
vilege.
14 There is an exception to this rule where the
final policymaker’s decision is merely a “rubber
stamp.” If an employee can demonstrate that the
subordinate’s evaluation was tainted by an illegal
intent and that it had sufficient influence or lev-
erage over the ultimate decisionmaker, the motives
of the subordinate become relevant. See Rios v.
Rossotti, No. 00-50226, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
9420, at *19-*20 (5th Cir. 2001). Beattie
suggested that the board merely “rubber stamped”
the superintendent’s employment decisions, but she
presented no evidence to support that assertion.
15 See also Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21
(1999) (“The government can avoid liability by
proving that it would have made the same decision
without the impermissible motive.”); White v.
South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1169
(5th Cir. 1982) (“[E]ven if we assume the exercise
of protected first amendment activity played a
substantial part in the decision to terminate an
employee, the termination is not unconstitutional if
the employee would have been terminated
anyway.”).

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8
these affidavits. Thus, the board’s
independent reason for her termination shields
it from liability under Mt. Healthy.16
B.
Beattie claims that because she was fired at
the recommendation of Acton and Jones, and
because they were retaliating against her for
support of a political candidate, they are inde-
pendently liable. If Acton and Jones had fired
Beattie for the reasons she alleges, they may
have violated her First Amendment rights.
“[A] public employer cannot act against an
employee because of the employee’s affiliation
or support of a rival candidate unless the
employee’s activities in some way adversely
affect the government’s ability to provide ser-
vices.” Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 887
(5th Cir. 1995).17
1.
As we have noted, Acton and Jones did not
fire Beattie directly, but merely recommended
her termination to the board, which made the
final decision. If Acton and Jones did not
cause the adverse employment action, they
cannot be liable under § 1983, no matter how
unconstitutional their motives. Moreover,
even if the board adopted their
recommendation, that recommendation
exhibited no unconstitutional motive on its
face. Further, the evidence suggests that the
board fired Beattie for independent reasons,
and Beattie offers nothing but her own beliefs
to the contrary.
“The Constitution requires only that an em-
ployee be placed in no worse a position than if
he had not engaged in the conduct.” White,
693 F.2d at 1169. Because the board fired
Beattie for permissible, constitutional motives
independently of Acton’s and Jones’s
recommendation, that superseding cause
shields them from liability.
2.
Beattie attempts to connect the board’s de-
cision, by its timing, to Acton’s and Jones’s
motives. Timing alone does not create an in-
ference that the termination is retaliatory.18
Therefore, Beattie has not shown a causal
connection between Acton’s and Jones’s al-
leged retaliatory motives and her adverse em-
ployment action. Because the board made its
ultimate decision independently of these un-
proven unconstitutional aims, summary
judgment was proper.
IV.
Beattie contends that the district court er-
roneously denied her motion for additional
discovery under rule 56(f).19 We review for
16 See Gerhart v. Hayes, 217 F.3d 320, 322
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 573 (2000).
17 See also Reeves, 828 F.2d at 1103 (“[A]
government employer cannot retaliate against an
employee for the exercise of first amendment
rights.”).
18 See Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297,
301 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a retaliation
claim lacked merit where the employee mentioned
his EEOC filing minutes before his termination for
insubordination, but no other evidence suggested a
retaliatory motive); see also O’Connor v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 985 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir.
1993) (“[T]he fact that protected speech may
precede an adverse employment decision alone does
not establish causation under Mt. Healthy.”).
19 The rule provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party
(continued...)

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9
abuse of discretion a decision to end
discovery.20
Rule 56(f) motions are generally favored
and should be liberally granted. Stearns Air-
port Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518,
535 (5th Cir. 1999). Beattie “may not simply
rely on vague assertions that additional
discovery will produce needed, but unspecified
facts.” Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442 (internal ci-
tations omitted). She must show (1) why she
needs additional discovery and (2) how that
discovery will create a genuine issue of
material fact. Stearns, 170 F.3d at 535 (citing
Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442). If Beattie has not
diligently pursued discovery, however, she is
not entitled to relief under rule 56(f). See
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics In-
telligence & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388,
1397 (5th Cir. 1994). We need not address
whether Beattie has shown why she needs ad-
ditional discovery to create a genuine issue of
material fact, because she was not diligent. Id.
at 1397.
Beattie had several months, from the time
she sued, to depose the board members, who
are named defendants. She submits that she
did not depose them earlier because the parties
were in settlement negotiations, but a party
suspends discovery at his own risk. She claims
she did not become aware that she needed to
depose the board members until sixteen days
before the discovery deadline, and then the
parties could not find a mutually agreeable
time. She filed her rule 56(f) motion three
days after the defendants filed their motion for
summary judgment, the date at which she
alleges she first became aware of the
contradiction in testimony.21
Defendants explain that Beattie knew, as
early as February 2000, when the fact was in-
cluded in responses to interrogatories, that the
board had voted to terminate her and had cited
her rudeness to parents and teachers as a rea-
son for her dismissal. Moreover, Jones stated
in deposition that board members had received
complaints about Beattie. Furthermore,
Beattie became aware that she needed to
depose school board members as early as
March 15, giving her sixteen days before the
end of discovery to seek an extension.
Instead, she waited until after defendants had
filed their motion for summary judgment.
19(...continued)
cannot for reasons stated present by affi-
davit facts essential to justify the party’s
opposition, the court may refuse the appli-
cation for judgment or may order a con-
tinuance to permit affidavits to be obtained
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).
20 See Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638
F.2d 1272, 1289 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981) (reviewing
decisions determining scope and effect of discovery
for abuse of discretion); Krim v. BancTexas
Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993)
(reviewing, for abuse of discretion, decisions to
preclude discovery before granting summary judg-
ment).
21 Although Beattie claims that defendants,
shortly before the expiration of discovery, pro-
duced documents that warranted additional dis-
covery, she has not indicated with specificity how
these documents raised issues of material fact. The
district court found that they merely clarified issues
raised earlier in the depositions of Acton and Jones,
and Beattie received an extension of time to file her
response to the motion for summary judgment to
respond to those documents.

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10
Even though rule 56(f) motions should be
liberally granted, “[a] district court has broad
discretion in all discovery matters, and such
discretion will not be disturbed ordinarily un-
less there are unusual circumstances showing
a clear abuse.” Kelley v. Syria Shell Petrole-
um Dev., B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir.)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. de-
nied, 121 S. Ct. 426 (2000). Although
Beattie’s conduct during discovery does not
rise to the level disparaged in Leatherman,22
the district court acted within its discretion in
concluding that she had not pursued discovery
diligently enough to warrant relief under rule
56(f).
AFFIRMED.
22 In Leatherman, plaintiffs conducted very
little discovery for more than one year before filing
their rule 56(f) motion. Leatherman, 28 F.3d at
1397.

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