United States of America v. Heywood Monroe Bell

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4947
HEYWOOD MONROE BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
Joseph Robert Goodwin, District Judge.
(CR-99-104)
Submitted: June 20, 2000
Decided: June 30, 2000
Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Jacqueline A. Hallinan, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Ray M. Shepard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Heywood Monroe Bell was convicted pursuant to his guilty plea of
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. On appeal, he
alleges that the district court improperly enhanced his base offense
level for obstruction of justice1 and that he was entitled to a down-
ward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. 2 Finding no revers-
ible error, we affirm.
Police officers observed Bell and his cousin ("Woods") engaging
in what appeared to be drug transactions. The officers ultimately
arrested Bell and Woods and seized almost $2600 from Bell's person
and a substantial amount of crack cocaine hidden nearby.
During the sentencing phase of Bell's trial, the Government pro-
duced a letter Bell wrote to Woods while they were both in pretrial
confinement. The purpose of the letter was to provide a false story for
Woods to tell investigators. Unbeknownst to Bell, however, Woods
had already agreed to cooperate with the authorities. The Government
also produced evidence that Bell made threats against Woods and
another co-conspirator. On appeal, Bell alleges that the district court
erred by considering the letter to Woods because he did not have prior
notice that it would be used.3 Bell also claims that the court erred by
failing to make a materiality determination.
We review the district court's decision to enhance Bell's base
offense level for obstruction of justice de novo, and we find no error.
See United States v. Saintil, 910 F.2d 1231, 1232 (4th Cir. 1990). The
record shows that, at the time he entered into a plea agreement, both
Bell and his attorney were aware that the Government would present
evidence showing that Bell threatened witnesses and that he prepared
a false story for Woods to give to the police. Because Bell admitted
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1 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("USSG") § 3C1.1 (1998).
2 USSG § 3E1.1.
3 The probation officer did not mention the letter in the presentence
report.
2

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to writing the letter, we find no surprise in its use at sentencing. We
further find that, while some types of obstructive conduct require a
finding of materiality, influencing a co-defendant and suborning per-
jury do not.4
Because the enhancement for obstruction of justice was appropri-
ate, a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility would
only be justified in exceptional circumstances. 5 We find no such cir-
cumstances here. As a result, the district court properly declined to
reduce Bell's base offense level.
Accordingly, we affirm Bell's sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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4 See USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(a), (b)).
5 See USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4).
3

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