DANIEL R. MCCLAIN, a/k/a Mr. McClain v. WARDEN, Turbeville Correctional Institution

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7729

DANIEL R. MCCLAIN, a/k/a Mr. McClain,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN, Turbeville Correctional Institution,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock
Hill. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (0:18-cv-03081-MBS)

Submitted: April 29, 2020 Decided: May 19, 2020

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daniel R. McClain, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

PER CURIAM:

Daniel R. McClain seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to
“revisit” his motion for recusal and denying his motion for default judgment. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
We review the denial of a motion for recusal for abuse of discretion. Kolon Indus.
Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 2014). A judge must
recuse himself when “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(1) (2018). Adverse “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis
for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Here,
McClain alleges that the district court was biased against him, citing as support only the
court’s adverse rulings in this case and in prior cases assigned to the same district court
judge. Because he fails to cite any extrajudicial source for the alleged bias, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McClain’s motion for recusal
or in declining to “revisit” his motion for recusal. We therefore affirm this portion of the
district court’s order.
The district court construed McClain’s motion for default judgment as a motion to
alter or amend its judgment denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). This portion of the order is not appealable unless a circuit justice
or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2018). A
certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2018). When the district court denies relief
on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists

3

could find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.
See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on
procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural
ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a
constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
Limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in McClain’s informal brief,
we conclude that McClain has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see
also Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an
important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved
in that brief.”). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss this portion
of the appeal.
We deny McClain’s motion for default judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART