United States of America v. Lawrence Wayne Reese

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4601
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE WAYNE REESE,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-4611
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LANCE TERRELL REESE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:15-cr-00032-LO-1; 1:15-cr-00032-LO-2)
Submitted: August 15, 2016 Decided: September 12, 2016
Before KING and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dontae Lamont Bugg, BUGG LAW FIRM, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia;
Geremy Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Kevin R. Brehm,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellants. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Michael E.
Rich, Christopher Catizone, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Lawrence Reese (“Lawrence”) and Lance
Reese (“Lance”) were convicted of various charges relating to
the arson of Lawrence’s business. Lawrence and Lance were
convicted of conspiracy to commit arson and arson, violations of
18 U.S.C. § 844(n), (i) (2012), respectively. Lawrence also was
convicted of arson to commit mail fraud, a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 844(h) (2012); arson to commit wire fraud, a § 844(h)
violation; mail fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012);
and wire fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
On appeal, Lance challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions. Next, Lawrence and Lance assert
that the district court erred by refusing to grant a new trial
based on certain comments made by the district court. Finally,
Lawrence challenges the district court’s imposition of
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences. We affirm.
I.
Lance asserts that the district court erred by denying his
motion for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).
We review the court’s denial de novo, United States v. Fuertes,
805 F.3d 485, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1220 (2016), and view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Government to determine whether the guilty verdict is
supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Bailey, 819

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F.3d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 2016). “In determining whether there is
substantial evidence to support a verdict, we defer to the
jury’s determinations of credibility and resolutions of
conflicts in the evidence, as they are within the sole province
of the jury and are not susceptible to judicial review.” United
States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Lance contests the Government’s proof of his participation
in the conspiracy on the ground that the only evidence was the
testimony of a convicted coconspirator. We have held, however,
“that the testimony of a co-defendant standing alone and
uncorroborated is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United
States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1190 & n.10 (4th Cir. 1997).
After viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the Government, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to prove Lance’s involvement in the
underlying conspiracy and aiding and abetting the arson. See
United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 149 (4th Cir. 2016)
(stating elements of conspiracy), petition for cert. filed, __
U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June 23, 2016) (No. 16-5017); United States v.
White, 771 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating elements of
arson), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1573 (2015); United States v.
Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 389 n.6 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating elements

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of aiding and abetting). Thus, the district court did not err
in denying Lance’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
II.
The Reeses challenge the district court’s denial of the
motion for a new trial based on certain comments made by the
district court during trial. Generally, “we review the district
court’s denial of a [Fed. R. Crim. P. 33] motion for a new trial
for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d
550, 558 (4th Cir. 2015). When a party fails to object during
trial, however, our review is for plain error.1 United States v.
Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 222 (4th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238 (4th Cir.
2015); United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 672 (4th Cir.
2001). Under either standard, Lawrence and Lance are entitled
to no relief.
The Reeses contend that the district court improperly
commented on the coconspirator’s testimony. See United States
1 To overturn the Reeses’ convictions under plain error
review, we must find (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3)
that affects substantial rights. Molina-Martinez v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016). Even if all three
conditions are met, it is within our discretion whether to
remedy the error, and we will refrain from intervening unless
“the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).

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v. Martinovich, 810 F.3d 232, 239 (4th Cir. 2016) (providing
standard). Here, the district court’s intervention “simply
fulfill[ed] its obligation to clarify confused factual issues or
misunderstandings [and] to correct inadequacies of examination
or cross-examination.” United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267,
1273 (4th Cir. 1995). In addition, the district court gave
numerous instructions to the jury reminding the jury that it was
their recollection of the evidence that controlled. See
Martinovich, 810 F.3d at 241. We therefore conclude that the
court’s isolated statement did not unfairly prejudice either
Lance or Lawrence so as to deprive either of a fair trial. See
United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336 (4th Cir. 2008).
Next, the Reeses challenge the district court’s comments
during Lance’s counsel’s closing argument and during the
Government’s closing rebuttal argument. Our review of the
record leads us to conclude that the district court did not err
in denying the motion for a new trial on these grounds. The
court instructed the jury that it was the Government’s burden to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that it was the jury’s
recollection of the evidence that controlled. See Martinovich,

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810 F.3d at 241. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of
the motion for a new trial was not erroneous.2
III.
Finally, Lawrence challenges his sentence. Our precedent
forecloses his argument that his sentences for arson and
conspiracy should be imposed concurrently with his sentences for
arson to commit mail and arson to commit wire fraud. See United
States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 293 n.6 (4th Cir. 2008); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). Thus, the district court appropriately
sentenced Lawrence to a total of 15 years’ of imprisonment.
IV.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2 To the extent Lance and Lawrence also argue that the
cumulative effect of the court’s comments deprived them of a
fair trial, we reject this claim as well.

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