United States of America v. Stanley Curtis Gillom

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4425
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STANLEY CURTIS GILLOM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00439-CCE-1)
Submitted: January 21, 2016 Decided: February 5, 2016
Before KING, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles H. Harp II, CHARLES H. HARP II PC, Lexington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 3 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Stanley Curtis Gillom appeals the district court’s sentence
of 85 months of imprisonment for distributing cocaine base in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(C) (2012). He argues
that law enforcement engaged in “sentencing manipulation” by
arranging numerous controlled buys from Gillom, thereby
increasing the drug quantity for which he was held responsible
at sentencing. He contends that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to grant him a downward variance based on
this manipulation. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We consider both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
We have never expressly adopted the theory of sentencing
manipulation, and we have looked upon such claims with
“skepticism.” United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th
Cir. 1994). Gillom argues that Jones should be reconsidered
because it was decided when the Sentencing Guidelines were
mandatory rather than advisory. We need not decide whether to
apply the theory of sentencing manipulation, however, because in

-- 2 of 3 --

3
any event, no such manipulation occurred here. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to vary
downward on this basis.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --