Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Incorporated v. Nabil J. Asterbadi

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2182
WELLS FARGO EQUIPMENT FINANCE, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NABIL J. ASTERBADI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:15-
cv-01371-PWG)
Argued: September 20, 2016 Decided: November 4, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Irene M. KEELEY,
United States District Judge for the Northern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Keeley joined.
ARGUED: David B. Lamb, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Steven
Neal Leitess, LEITESS FRIEDBERG PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: David A. Donohoe, Potomac, Maryland, for
Appellant. Gordon S. Young, Pierce C. Murphy, LEITESS FRIEDBERG
PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we address the enforceability of a judgment
originally entered in the Eastern District of Virginia but
registered for enforcement in the District of Maryland under 28
U.S.C. § 1963. Particularly, we consider the time period during
which the judgment remains enforceable in Maryland.
Collecting on a financing debt incurred by Dr. Nabil J.
Asterbadi, CIT/Equipment Financing, Inc. (“CIT”) obtained a
$2.63 million judgment against Asterbadi in 1993, in the Eastern
District of Virginia. Under Virginia law, that judgment
remained viable for 20 years. Roughly 10 years after the
judgment had been entered, on August 27, 2003, CIT registered
the judgment in the District of Maryland pursuant to § 1963.
Under Maryland law, made relevant by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 69(a), judgments expire 12 years after entry.
CIT sold the judgment to Wells Fargo Equipment Finance,
Inc., and Wells Fargo thereafter, in April 2015, began
collection efforts in Maryland. Asterbadi filed a motion for a
protective order, contending that the judgment was unenforceable
because the efforts began more than 12 years after the judgment
had originally been entered in Virginia. Wells Fargo responded
that the registration of the Virginia judgment in Maryland
before it had expired under Virginia law became, in effect, a
new judgment that was subject to Maryland law for enforcement.

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Thus, it argued, Maryland’s 12-year limitations period began on
the date that the judgment was registered in Maryland, not on
the date that the original judgment was entered in Virginia, and
therefore the judgment was still enforceable.
The district court agreed with Wells Fargo, concluding that
the time limitation for enforcement of the judgment began with
the date of its registration in Maryland, on August 27, 2003,
and that therefore it was still enforceable against Asterbadi.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I
The judgment was entered on October 4, 1993, against
Asterbadi in the Eastern District of Virginia and arose from a
defaulted debt that Asterbadi incurred to invest in an airplane.
It was entered in the amount of “$2,286,009.97, plus interest
from May 31, 1993 on the sum of $2,184,950 at the rate of 1.5%
per month, and attorney’s fees of $347,742.50.” Under Virginia
law, the judgment remained enforceable for 20 years, or until
October 4, 2013. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-251(A).
While Asterbadi made a number of payments on the judgment
during the period shortly after it was entered, the judgment
has, in substantial part, remained unsatisfied. In furtherance
of its collection efforts, CIT registered the judgment in the
District of Maryland on August 27, 2003, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1963. It also recorded the judgment in state courts in
Fairfax County, Virginia; Prince George’s County, Maryland;
Montgomery County, Maryland; and the District of Columbia, under
the law of those jurisdictions. At the time that CIT registered
its judgment in the District of Maryland, Asterbadi still owed
some $1.75 million, much of which represented interest.
Several months later, on October 31, 2003, CIT undertook
collection efforts in Maryland to execute on stock that
Asterbadi held in Zachair, Ltd. To this end, it filed a motion
in the district court for an injunction prohibiting Asterbadi
“from transferring the [stock] Certificates and ordering him to
turn over the Certificates to CIT.” In response, Asterbadi, who
explained that he was a physician who had made “an ill-fated
investment in an airplane over 15 years ago,” claimed that CIT
had overstated the amount owed on the judgment. He also
asserted that his stock in Zachair was owned with his wife as
tenants by the entireties and therefore was not subject to
execution on the judgment. Nonetheless, he stated that he
“ha[d] no intention, and will not transfer, any shares of stock
in which he has any interest” and that he had no objection to
the entry of an order “which would preclude any such transfers.”
He did not, however, agree to an order transferring the stock
certificates to CIT. No further action was taken on the motion
for more than 10 years.

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Effective June 29, 2007, CIT sold and assigned its judgment
against Asterbadi to Wells Fargo as part of an asset purchase
agreement. Some years later, Wells Fargo renewed collection
efforts. In preparation for collection in Maryland, Wells Fargo
filed a notice of the assignment, as well as a copy of the
assignment, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on April
1, 2015. And on April 7, 2015, it filed a “Notice of
Assignment” in the district court, although without including a
copy of the assignment. After Wells Fargo filed the notice of
the assignment, it noticed the deposition of Zachair, whose
stock Asterbadi held.
Asterbadi filed a motion for protective order on May 8,
2015, contending that the Virginia judgment was not enforceable,
as Wells Fargo was seeking to enforce a judgment “entered more
than 21 years ago in Virginia,” which was beyond both Virginia’s
and Maryland’s statute of limitations for enforcing judgments.
He concluded that if the judgment was unenforceable, “there can
be no post-judgment discovery.” He acknowledged that, if the
limitations period began on the date of registration, a judgment
registered in the District in Maryland might still be
enforceable under Maryland Rule 2-625, which provides that a
money judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry. But he
argued that the registration of the judgment in Maryland was
“nothing more” than “ministerial” and that it “does not have the

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effect of entering a ‘new judgment’” with a new enforceability
period. Thus, he reasoned that any applicable limitations
period began at the time of the judgment’s entry in 1993 and
therefore that the judgment was unenforceable.
In view of Asterbadi’s arguments, the district court
entered an order requiring Wells Fargo to show cause “why this
matter is not subject to dismissal” for the reasons given by
Asterbadi. Wells Fargo responded, arguing that “once a [viable]
foreign judgment is recorded in the [District of Maryland], that
judgment remains effective and enforceable for the time period
provided by Maryland law -- 12 years unless earlier renewed for
another 12 year period” -- from the date registered. Therefore,
it claimed, the judgment was enforceable to August 27, 2015.
Asterbadi filed a reply and shortly thereafter a supplement
to his reply, asserting in his supplement the additional
argument that Wells Fargo did not have standing to enforce the
judgment because, while it filed a notice of the assignment of
the judgment in the district court, it did not file a copy of
the assignment itself, as required by Maryland Rule 2-624. He
attached to his supplement an actual copy of the assignment that
Wells Fargo had filed in Montgomery County, Maryland.
While the proceedings were pending, Wells Fargo filed a
renewal of its registered judgment in the district court on

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August 26, 2015, which, it contends, extended the enforceability
of its judgment under Maryland law to 2027.
By order dated September 16, 2015, the district court
rejected Asterbadi’s argument that Wells Fargo lacked standing
to enforce the judgment, noting that Asterbadi himself had
provided the court with a copy of the assignment that had been
filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and therefore
that “Wells Fargo ha[d] standing [to] respond to my show cause
order regarding the enforceability of the 1993 Judgment.” The
district court also rejected Asterbadi’s argument that when
discovery was commenced in 2015, the judgment was unenforceable
because the Maryland limitation of 12 years had run. Relying on
Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. International Yachting Group, Inc.,
252 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2001), the court held that “the
[Maryland] statute of limitations in this case started to run on
the date that the judgment was registered in this Court, August
27, 2003, and is currently enforceable against the Defendant.”
(Emphasis added). With respect to the motion for injunction
that had been pending since 2003, the court enjoined Asterbadi
from transferring his stock certificates in Zachair -- relief to
which Asterbadi had earlier consented -- but denied, without
prejudice, Wells Fargo’s request that Asterbadi be required to
turn those certificates over to it.

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Asterbadi noticed this appeal from the district court’s
September 16, 2015 order. After Asterbadi noticed his appeal
from that order, the district court entered a separate order on
October 14, 2015, denying, without prejudice, Asterbadi’s motion
for a protective order against discovery, pending this appeal.
II
Both parties raise jurisdictional issues. Wells Fargo
contends that Asterbadi appealed only the September 16, 2015
order, which entered an injunction to which Asterbadi had
earlier consented, and not the court’s denial of the motion for
a protective order, entered on October 14, 2015. And Asterbadi
contends that Wells Fargo lacks standing to enforce its judgment
against him because Wells Fargo filed only a notice of
assignment in the district court, not a copy of the assignment
itself, and therefore failed to comply with Maryland Rule 2-624,
which entitles parties filing an assignment to pursue
enforcement in their own name. We address these issues in
order.
A
In its September 16, 2015 order, the district court granted
in part and denied in part CIT’s original motion for an
injunction, a result to which Asterbadi had consented in his
original response to the motion for an injunction. After

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Asterbadi filed an appeal from that order, the district court
entered a separate order dated October 14, 2015, denying
Asterbadi’s motion for a protective order to halt Wells Fargo’s
discovery efforts. Wells Fargo now argues that Asterbadi should
have appealed the second order and that, because he never did
so, his appeal should be dismissed.
The filing of a proper notice of appeal is indeed
“jurisdictional in nature and . . . is a prerequisite to
appellate review.” Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 requires that the notice
of appeal “designate,” among other information, “the judgment,
order, or part thereof being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P.
3(c)(1)(B). And even though “[c]ourts will liberally construe
the requirements of Rule 3,” Barry, 502 U.S. at 248, we
generally confine our review to the order designated in the
notice of appeal, cf. Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 554 (4th
Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are obliged to identify those particular
matters over which we possess jurisdiction”).
In this case, however, Asterbadi was justified in
presenting his issues in connection with his appeal from the
district court’s September 16, 2015 order. While he had not
objected to the form of the injunctive relief entered, he
maintained that the court lacked the ability to grant any
injunctive relief because, as he argued, the judgment against

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him was unenforceable. In the September 16, 2015 order, the
district court explicitly rejected two of Asterbadi’s arguments
-- that Wells Fargo lacked standing to enforce the judgment and
that limitations for enforcement of the judgment had run. Those
rulings were necessary conditions precedent if the district
court were to grant any injunctive relief, as it did in the
September 16, 2015 order. Accordingly, we conclude that
Asterbadi’s appeal of that order allows him to challenge the
district court’s rulings on these two conditions that were
necessary for granting injunctive relief.
B
Asterbadi contends that because Wells Fargo did not comply
with Maryland Rule 2-624, it was not entitled to step into the
shoes of CIT, which had obtained the judgment against Asterbadi
in the first place. That Rule provides that the assignee of a
judgment may enforce the judgment in its own name when it files
“the assignment . . . in the court where the judgment was
entered.” Md. Rule 2-624 (emphasis added). Accordingly, he
maintains, Wells Fargo has no standing to enforce CIT’s judgment
in its own name.
It is important to note that, while Asterbadi’s argument
raises a question of federal law, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 69(a)(1) incorporates the state law of the

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jurisdiction where enforcement is sought for the procedure to be
followed in enforcing money judgments. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1962
(incorporating state law for determining judgment liens on
property located in the State). Accordingly, because federal
law so requires, it is appropriate that we look to Maryland Rule
2-624.
Whether a “notice” of assignment is sufficient to satisfy
the filing of “the assignment,” as provided in Rule 2-624, is
not a question that we need to resolve here. As the district
court observed, while Wells Fargo filed only a notice of
assignment in the district court, Asterbadi filed the actual
assignment, which had previously been filed in state court, so
that the district court had before it both the notice of
assignment and the assignment itself. While the procedure by
which the district court received the assignment might have been
awkward, that awkwardness did not deprive Wells Fargo of
standing to enforce the judgment that it had purchased.
III
On the merits, the parties agree on several threshold
issues. First, the original $2.63 million judgment in this case
was entered on October 4, 1993, in the Eastern District of
Virginia, and, under Virginia law, it remained enforceable for
20 years from the date of entry. Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-251.

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Second, roughly 10 years later, on August 27, 2003, CIT, the
judgment holder at the time, registered the judgment in the
District of Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Third,
Maryland law provides that a money judgment expires 12 years
from the date of entry or from the date of renewal, if it is
renewed before its expiration. Md. Rule 2-625. Finally,
Maryland’s 12-year limitation governs the enforcement of this
judgment in the District of Maryland.
Against these undisputed propositions, Asterbadi argues
that even though the Virginia judgment, when registered in
Maryland, was governed by Maryland’s 12-year limitation, the 12-
year limitation period began to run at the time when the
original judgment was entered in Virginia, i.e., on October 4,
1993. Under his argument, the enforceability of the registered
judgment in Maryland expired 12 years after 1993, or on October
4, 2005.
Wells Fargo contends that when the Virginia judgment was
registered in Maryland, it became, in effect, a new judgment
governed by Maryland’s 12-year limitations period, which began
running on the date of registration, August 27, 2003.
To resolve the dispute, we begin with § 1963 itself, under
which the Virginia district court judgment was registered in the
Maryland district court. Section 1963 provides in relevant
part:

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A judgment in an action for the recovery of money
. . . entered in any . . . district court . . . may be
registered by filing a certified copy of the judgment
in any other district . . . . A judgment so
registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of
the district court of the district where registered
and may be enforced in like manner.
28 U.S.C. § 1963. The statute was enacted in 1948 as a device
to streamline the more awkward prior practice of bringing suit
on a foreign judgment and thereby obtaining a new judgment on
the foreign judgment. As then-Circuit Judge Harry Blackmun
observed:
It seems to be conceded that the purposes of § 1963
were to simply facilitate the enforcement of federal
judgments, at least those for money, to eliminate the
necessity and expense of a second lawsuit, and to
avoid the impediments, such as diversity of
citizenship, which new and distinct federal litigation
might otherwise encounter.
Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1965); see also
Home Port Rentals, 252 F.3d at 404 (noting that Congress
explicitly enacted § 1963 to spare litigants the inefficiencies
of obtaining a judgment on a judgment); Stiller v. Hardman, 324
F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting that § 1963 provides “a
speedier and more efficient mechanism for the enforcement of
federal judgments” than the practice of obtaining a judgment on
a judgment); S. Rep. No. 83-1917 (1954), as reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3142, 3142 (explaining that § 1963 was enacted to
spare creditors and debtors alike “the additional cost and
harassment of further litigation which would otherwise be

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required by way of an action on the judgment in a district other
than that where the judgment was originally obtained”).
Thus, instead of requiring the holder of a Virginia
judgment to file a complaint in the Maryland district court on
the basis of the Virginia judgment, thereby engaging the federal
process to obtain a new judgment enforceable in the District of
Maryland, § 1963 allows the judgment holder simply to register
the Virginia judgment in Maryland but to retain the benefits of
obtaining a judgment under the former practice of suing on a
judgment to obtain a new judgment. Indeed, § 1963 explicitly so
provides, stating that a district court judgment registered in
another district court “shall have the same effect as a judgment
of the district court . . . and may be enforced in like manner.”
28 U.S.C. § 1963 (emphasis added).
We thus construe § 1963 to provide for a new judgment in
the district court where the judgment is registered, as if the
new judgment had been entered in the district after filing an
action for a judgment on a judgment. Accordingly, just as a new
judgment obtained in an action on a previous judgment from
another district would be enforceable as any judgment entered in
the district court, so too is a registered judgment. The other
courts of appeals that have construed § 1963 have reached the
same conclusion. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos
Human Rights Litig., 536 F.3d 980, 989 (9th Cir. 2008)

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(“[R]egistering a judgment under § 1963 is the functional
equivalent of obtaining a new judgment of the registration
court” (emphasis added)); Home Port Rentals, 252 F.3d at 405
(“[R]egistration truly is the equivalent of a new judgment of
the registration court” (emphasis added)); Stanford, 341 F.2d at
268 (“We feel that registration provides, as far as enforcement
is concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the
registration court” (emphasis added)).
With this understanding of § 1963, we apply the principles
applicable to any money judgment entered in a district court.
Under Rule 69(a), the judgment is enforceable in accordance with
state law, and in this case Maryland law provides that “a money
judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry or most recent
renewal.” Md. Rule 2-625. Accordingly, the registered judgment
in this case would have expired 12 years from August 27, 2003,
or on August 27, 2015. And because Wells Fargo renewed the
judgment for another 12 years on August 26, 2015, the registered
judgment remains enforceable in Maryland to August 26, 2027.
Asterbadi argues that registration is merely a “ministerial
act” that is carried out as a matter of procedure to enforce the
Virginia district court judgment, and therefore the original
Virginia judgment is actually the judgment Wells Fargo seeks to
enforce, even if that judgment is admittedly subject to the
Maryland 12-year limitation. Thus, he argues, the 12 years

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began running when the Virginia judgment was entered, as stated
in Maryland Rule 2-625 (providing that a “judgment expires 12
years from the date of entry” (emphasis added)). This argument,
however, overlooks the effect of registration under § 1963. If
registration were merely a ministerial act to enforce the
Virginia judgment in Maryland, there would be no need for the
statute to have added the language that the registered judgment
functions the same as a judgment entered in the registration
court. With that language, § 1963 elevates the registered
Virginia judgment to the status of a new Maryland judgment, and
it is accordingly enforced as a new judgment entered in the
first instance in Maryland.
The Stanford court likewise expressly rejected Asterbadi’s
“ministerial act” characterization of § 1963:
We have concluded that § 1963 is more than
“ministerial” and is more than a mere procedural
device for the collection of the foreign judgment. We
feel that registration provides, so far as enforcement
is concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the
registration court.
341 F.2d at 268. And the Stanford court gave the same reasons
that we do in reaching this conclusion:
To restrict registration to a procedural and
collection device for the foreign judgment itself, and
to have it expire with the foreign judgment, would
give the words of the statute a lesser status than
their plain meaning and to make registration something
far inferior to a judgment on a judgment.

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Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Again, as all the courts of
appeals have noted, the purpose of § 1963 was to give the same
effect achieved by a judgment on a judgment but without the
excessive process.
Asterbadi also argues that we should construe § 1963 in the
same manner as courts have construed the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act, which facilitates the enforcement of one
State’s judgment in the courts of another State. See, e.g., Md.
Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 11-801 to 11-807. He claims
that some courts have construed the Uniform Act or similar state
statutes in a manner that distinguishes between registering a
judgment and suing on a judgment, with the former subject to the
limitations of the state where the judgment was originally
entered and the latter subject to the limitations of the state
where the new judgment was obtained. While we do not assume
that this construction is an accurate one, see, e.g., Revised
Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act prefatory note (Unif.
Law Comm’n 1964), we are nonetheless not construing the Uniform
Act, but rather § 1963. And we construe § 1963 to elevate a
registered money judgment such that it functions in every way as
a new judgment. It follows that with the registered judgment
functioning as a new judgment, the limitations period for
enforcement runs from the date of registration. This is the
conclusion that every court of appeals that has construed § 1963

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has reached. See, e.g., Home Port Rentals, 252 F.3d at 407
(holding that “the applicable limitation law for purposes of
enforcement of the registered judgment in the registration
district is that of the registration state . . . and it starts
to run on the date of registration”); see also In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 536 F.3d at 989; Stanford, 341 F.2d
at 268.
Finally, Asterbadi proposed during oral argument numerous
horribles that he envisions will result from the fact that
creditors will be able repeatedly to restart a statute of
limitations through the simple act of registration, defeating
any purpose for the limitation. The posited consequences,
however, are no different than have always existed under the
more burdensome process of suing on an original judgment to
obtain a new judgment in the enforcement jurisdiction. When the
new judgment was entered, it carried with it the limitations
period then applicable to judgments in the State of entry.
Moreover, creditors in many States -- including in Maryland --
are also able to renew existing judgments indefinitely and thus
extend enforcement with new limitations periods without any
adversarial process. See, e.g., Md. Rule 2-625 (requiring only
that the “judgment holder . . . file a notice of renewal” at any
time before expiration of the judgment or a previous renewal,

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without any limit on the number of renewals that might be
filed).
In sum, we hold that the registration of the Virginia
district court judgment in the District of Maryland at a time
when the judgment was not time-barred by Virginia law functions
as a new judgment in the District of Maryland, and Maryland’s
12-year limitations period for enforcement on the judgment
begins running from the date of registration.
Accordingly, the district court’s September 16, 2015 order
is
AFFIRMED.

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