Cynthia Lee v. Fairfax County School Board

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1050
CYNTHIA LEE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; Dr. JACK DALE, former
Superintendent; Dr. PHYLLIS PAJARDO, Assistant
Superintendent; JAMEY CHIANETTA, Principal,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:14-cv-01116-AJT-TCB)
Submitted: August 10, 2015 Decided: August 18, 2015
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher E. Brown, THE BROWN LAW FIRM, PLLC, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Mary McGowan, Robert M. Falconi,
BLANKINGSHP & KEITH, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Cynthia Lee challenges the district court’s order granting
the Fairfax County Public School (FCPS) Board’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Lee’s complaint alleging that
the FCPS Board and FCPS employees (collectively, “Appellees”)
violated Lee’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(2012), and her procedural due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and engaged in defamation and wrongful
termination under Virginia state law. Lee argues that her
claims are not barred by her prior settlement agreement with
FCPS because she entered the agreement under duress and the
agreement is unconscionable. We affirm.
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.
Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d
324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). All facts and reasonable inferences
are viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330
(4th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is only appropriate when
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power

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Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We first review Lee’s claim that her settlement agreement
should be set aside because she entered it under duress. Under
Virginia law, “[d]uress is not readily accepted as an excuse,
and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
Pelfrey v. Pelfrey, 487 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Duress exists when a
defendant commits a wrongful act sufficient to prevent a
plaintiff from exercising his free will, thereby coercing the
plaintiff’s consent.” Goode v. Burke Town Plaza, Inc., 436
S.E.2d 450, 452 (Va. 1993). Virginia courts have been
particularly hesitant to accept the exertion of economic
pressure as a form of duress. See id. at 452-53 (“Because the
application of economic pressure by threatening to enforce a
legal right is not a wrongful act, it cannot constitute
duress.”); Seward v. Am. Hardware Co., 171 S.E. 650, 662 (Va.
1933) (“A contract reluctantly entered into by one badly in need
of money without force or intimidation and with full knowledge
of the fact is not a contract executed under duress.”).
We have reviewed the record and found no evidence of
duress. Lee fails to show that FCPS engaged in any wrongful
conduct in the negotiation of the agreement, and her financial

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hardship, standing alone, is insufficient to invalidate a
contract due to duress under Virginia law.
We next consider whether the settlement agreement should be
invalidated as unconscionable. Traditionally, for a contract to
be unconscionable, it must have been “such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as
no honest and fair man would accept on the other.” Chaplain v.
Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d 108, 113 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In other words, “‘[t]he inequality
must be so gross as to shock the conscience.’” Id. (quoting
Smyth Bros. v. Beresford, 104 S.E. 371, 382 (Va. 1920)).
Unconscionability has both a substantive and procedural
element. Id. at 114. The former requires a “gross disparity in
the value exchanged.” Id. at 113 (internal alterations and
quotation marks omitted). The latter necessitates inequity and
bad faith in “the accompanying incidents . . . , such as
concealments, misrepresentations, undue advantage, oppressions
on the part of the one who obtains the benefit, or ignorance,
weakness of mind, sickness, old age, incapacity, pecuniary
necessities, and the like.” Id. at 114 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We conclude that neither element is present in the
settlement agreement before this court. In exchange for
releasing her claims against Appellees, Lee avoided termination

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for incompetence (for which she could have lost her teacher’s
license), retained a position at FCPS, wiped her record clean,
received a neutral reference from FCPS, and could resign with
only five-days notice if she were to obtain new employment. In
negotiating these benefits, Lee was represented by counsel. As
a result, the district court properly refused to invalidate the
settlement agreement due to unconscionability.
Because Lee does not contend that any of her claims were
beyond the scope of her settlement agreement, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. We also deny as moot her motion to
reconsider our order denying her motion to expedite. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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