Nadine Ranade v. Bt Americas, Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2428
NADINE RANADE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BT AMERICAS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-01039-LO-TCB)
Submitted: July 18, 2014 Decided: August 5, 2014
Before GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Annette K. Rubin, Leesburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeremy M.
Brown, Newark, New Jersey, David B. Tatge, EPSTEIN, BECKER &
GREEN, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
On September 18, 2012, Nadine Ranade (Ranade) brought this
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,1
action against BT Americas, Incorporated (BT Americas) claiming
that BT Americas violated the FMLA when: (1) it discharged her
from employment for alleged poor performance in March 2011 in
retaliation for exercising her FMLA rights; and (2) it
interfered with the exercise of her FMLA rights in September and
October 2010.2 Prior to her discharge, Ranade was employed by BT
Americas as a consultant for approximately three years.3 In a
thorough memorandum opinion, the district court granted BT
America’s motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ranade appeals from this
decision.
1 The FMLA allows certain employees to take a total of “12
work weeks of leave” during a twelve-month period for a “serious
health condition” that makes the employee “unable to perform the
functions of” her job. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
2 Ranade’s complaint simply alleges a “willful violation of
the FMLA.” (J.A. 10). The district court liberally construed
Ranade’s complaint to include an FMLA retaliation claim under 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) and an FMLA interference claim under 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
3 As a consultant, Ranade was assigned by BT Americas to
work on telecommunications projects with client companies, such
as Proctor & Gamble and Unilever. In this capacity, Ranade
often worked with the employees of the client companies.

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With regard to Ranade’s FMLA retaliation claim under 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), the district court correctly concluded that
BT Americas was entitled to summary judgment. We have
previously recognized that, because FMLA retaliation claims are
analogous to Title VII retaliation claims, they can be analyzed
under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–06 (1973). Nichols v. Ashland Hosp.
Corp., 251 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001). Ranade bears the
burden of making a prima facie showing “that [s]he engaged in
protected activity, that [BT Americas] took adverse action
against [her], and that the adverse action was causally
connected to [her] protected activity.” Cline v. Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998). If she makes
this prima facie showing, then BT Americas bears the burden of
offering a nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision to
terminate Ranade’s employment, and, thereafter, the burden would
return to Ranade to show that BT Americas’ “proffered
explanation is pretext for FMLA retaliation.” Nichols, 251 F.3d
at 502.
In this case, Ranade has failed to show that the district
court erred in holding that she had not demonstrated pretext.
First off, the nearly six-month gap between Ranade’s FMLA leave
(September 23 to October 5, 2010) and her termination in March
2011 undermines her claim that the two events are connected.

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See King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 n.5 (4th Cir. 2003)
(noting that a gap of two months and two weeks undermined the
inference of causation in the plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation
claim). Second, the uncontroverted evidence in the record is
that Ranade was given a performance improvement plan in
September 2010 and ultimately was terminated because of her poor
performance on a number of client accounts, including the
Proctor & Gamble, Unilever, and Capital Group client accounts.
The record further reflects that BT Americas made numerous
efforts to assist Ranade in improving her performance, but
ultimately terminated her when those efforts failed. Ranade has
not introduced evidence from which a jury could find that BT
Americas’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
her was pretextual, and, therefore, she cannot maintain an FMLA
retaliation claim.
With regard to the FMLA interference claim under 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1), the district court correctly concluded that BT
Americas was entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.
In order to establish a claim for interference with the exercise
of FMLA rights, Ranade must prove not only the fact of
interference, but also that the violation prejudiced her in some
way. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89
(2002); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). Such prejudice can be
proven by showing that she lost compensation or benefits “by

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reason of the violation,” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I);
sustained other monetary losses “as a direct result of the
violation,” id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II); or suffered some loss in
employment status remediable through “appropriate” equitable
relief, such as employment, reinstatement, or promotion, id.
§ 2617(a)(1)(B).
In this case, Ranade has failed to show that the district
court erred in holding that she had not met her burden of
demonstrating that BT Americas interfered with the exercise of
her FMLA rights. To be sure, Ranade notified BT Americas of her
need for FMLA leave and submitted the required documentation on
September 22, 2010, which indicated that she could not work more
than fours hours per day, five days per week, effective
immediately through December 15, 2010. BT Americas restructured
Ranade’s schedule to a part-time schedule of 8:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m., beginning the next day, September 23, 2010. On October 6,
2010, Ranade’s eligibility for FMLA leave ceased when she: (1)
provided BT Americas with documentation from her physician
clearing her to return to work full-time; and (2) returned to
full-time work that day. It is not disputed that throughout the
nine-day work period that Ranade qualified for a reduced work
schedule under the FMLA, BT Americas accommodated her, and
Ranade worked no more than four hours per work day during this
nine-day work period. Nor is it disputed that, on October 6,

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2010, she returned to a full-time work schedule with the same
salary and benefits she had prior to taking FMLA leave, and BT
Americas accommodated her ongoing physical therapy.
Ranade claims that BT Americas violated the FMLA when it
informed her on October 5, 2010 that she could either return to
work full-time or take continuous leave as provided under the
FMLA. BT Americas made this decision because the client whose
project Ranade was working on was unhappy with Ranade’s reduced
work schedule and BT Americas could not reach an acceptable work
schedule solution with the client that satisfied both its and
the client’s needs. Ranade’s claim in this regard fails for the
simple reason that BT Americas was not required to provide a
work schedule to Ranade that would disrupt its operations, and
the uncontroverted evidence in the record is that a reduced work
schedule (either in a flex or block form) was unworkable. See
29 C.F.R. 825.302(f) (“Intermittent leave or leave on a reduced
leave schedule must be medically necessary due to a serious
health condition . . . . The employee and employer shall
attempt to work out a schedule for such leave that meets the
employee’s needs without unduly disrupting the employer’s
operations . . . . ”). Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence in
the record demonstrates that Ranade returned to full-time work
on her own volition. It was her decision to schedule an
appointment with her physician, and it was her physician that

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determined she could return to work full-time. As the district
court noted,
[Ranade] can point to no evidence in the record that
BT [Americas] threatened her job (explicitly or
implicitly) or required her to come back full time, as
opposed to taking continuous FMLA leave . . . .
Rather, the email traffic from October 5 and 6 clearly
demonstrates that Ranade simply chose one of several
options available to her at the time. BT’s
obligations under the FMLA lapsed when Ranade’s doctor
officially cleared her to return full-time, with no
restrictions. Because it is undisputed that BT
[Americas] accommodated Ranade’s request for a reduced
schedule on each and every day that she qualified for
FMLA leave, a reasonable jury could not conclude that
BT [Americas] interfered with Ranade’s rights under
the FMLA.
(J.A. 664).
We also note that Ranade’s interference claim suffers from
another flaw--lack of prejudice. The only injury Ranade alleges
is that, as a result of BT Americas’ alleged unlawful denial of
her request for a reduced work schedule was that she was not
permitted to work a reduced work schedule. She does not claim
that she lost any compensation or benefits, sustained other
monetary loss, or suffered loss in employment status as a result
of the purported interference. While Ranade sought lost wages
and reinstatement in her complaint, she has failed to show that
she is entitled to any of these remedies. As noted above,
Ranade’s termination of employment was a separate and unrelated
event, and Ranade remained employed and was given full benefits
until her termination. As such, her interference claim fails.

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Cf. Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 549-50
(4th Cir. 2006) (holding that, where the plaintiff was
terminated due to a legitimate reason, he cannot show that he is
entitled to reinstatement even if the employer otherwise
interfered with his FMLA rights by denying leave).
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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