United States of America v. Roland Lee Morrison, a/k/a Rashad El-Mumin Muhammad

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROLAND LEE MORRISON, a/k/a Rashad El-Mumin Muhammad,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda Wright Allen, District
Judge. (2:10-cr-00195-AWA-TEM-1)
Submitted: July 20, 2012 Decided: August 6, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Walter B.
Dalton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt,
Appellate Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Joseph L. Kosky, Assistant
United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Roland Lee Morrison appeals his convictions for
fraudulent assertion of diplomatic immunity, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 915 (2006). On appeal, Morrison challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. We affirm.
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment
of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. United States v.
Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 2012). We are required
to “sustain a guilty verdict that, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, is supported by
substantial evidence.” United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377,
385 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“‘[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” Chong Lam, 677 F.3d at 198 (quoting United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). “[W]e do
not review the credibility of the witnesses and assume that the
[factfinder] resolved all contradictions in the testimony in
favor of the government.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d
233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden,” as reversal
of a conviction is limited to “the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Ashley, 606

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F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The United States Code prohibits a person, “with
intent to defraud within the United States, [from] falsely
assum[ing] or pretend[ing] to be a diplomatic, consular or other
official of a foreign government duly accredited as such to the
United States and act[ing] as such, or in such pretended
character, demand[ing] or obtain[ing] or attempt[ing] to obtain
any money, paper, document, or other thing of value.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 915. “Attempting to secure immunity from possible prosecution
is a ‘thing of value’ within the meaning of this
statute.” United States v. Shaabu-El, 275 F. App’x 205, 207
(4th Cir. 2008) (argued but unpublished) (citing United
States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753, 754-55 (3d Cir. 1971)).
Morrison first argues that, because no Moorish state
exists, the Government failed to establish that he “pretended to
be a diplomatic, consular, or other official of a foreign
government duly accredited as such to the United States.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 11). Because Morrison did not raise this
specific issue in his Rule 29 motion, the argument is waived on
appeal. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d at 200 (“When a defendant raises

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specific grounds in a Rule 29 motion, grounds that are not
specifically raised are waived on appeal.”).*
Next, Morrison argues that he lacked the intent to
defraud because no reasonable officer would have considered his
Moorish National Road Traveler card a legitimate diplomatic
card. However, it is Morrison’s state of mind, not that of the
arresting officers, that is relevant to his guilt or innocence.
When viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, including
Morrison’s dialogue with the officers and the testimony of
Morrison’s family members regarding his “diplomatic” card, we
conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence to
establish that Morrison intended to defraud the officers by
presenting the card as diplomatic identification.
Finally, Morrison argues that the Government failed to
establish that he attempted to obtain a “thing of value” by
presenting the Moorish National card in response to the
officers’ request for identification. Viewing the evidence as a
whole in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude
that substantial evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
Morrison provided the card in an attempt to use it “as a shield
* In any event, were we to review this issue on its merits
for plain error, we would conclude without difficulty that
Morrison could not meet the requisite showing. See United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (standard of review);
Shaabu-El, 275 F. App’x at 207-08.

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against the law,” Callaway, 446 F.2d at 754, and therefore
attempted to obtain a “thing of value” through its use.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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